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ABSTRACT 
 
Kevin Alan Park: Mortgage Insurance in the Great Recession 
(Under the direction of Roberto Quercia) 
 
 Mortgage insurance compensates lenders for losses in the event of a default by borrowers. 
Whether offered by private mortgage insurance companies or the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
mortgage insurance is often required for borrowers with insufficient wealth for a large downpayment to 
purchase a home. Consequently, mortgage insurance is particularly important for first-time homebuyers 
and historically underserved populations, such as racial and ethnic minorities. This doctoral dissertation 
evaluates and discusses mortgage insurance in the context of the housing boom and bust of the early 
twenty-first century. The first chapter provides an introduction to mortgage insurance in the United States. 
The second chapter estimates the degree of substitution between FHA insurance, private 
mortgage insurance, and a subordinate lien mortgage product that became popular during the housing 
bubble. Both types of mortgage insurance lost market share during the housing bubble. Only after 
conventional (i.e., not government-insured) options became less available did FHA fill the void. More 
recently, FHA lending has declined but has not been replaced by conventional alternatives. 
The third chapter evaluates the selection of private or FHA mortgage insurance and the decline in 
the availability of mortgage insurance, and therefore mortgage credit, as the housing market collapsed. 
Differences across racial and ethnic minorities are found in both the choice of insurance and the 
likelihood of denial. In addition, a decline in private insurer’s regulatory capital ratios constrained their 
ability to endorse new mortgages, demonstrating the importance of a public mortgage insurance program. 
The fourth chapter compares the risk of default of FHA-insured loans to similar privately-insured 
and uninsured loans. Surprisingly, FHA-insured loans are found to perform as well or better than 
uninsured loans and substantially better than privately-insured loans. Both FHA and private mortgage 
insurance, however, are found to suffer from adverse selection. 
The final chapter discusses the policy implications of these findings as the American housing 
finance system is rebuilt after the Great Recession.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO MORTGAGE INSURANCE  
Mortgage insurance is a contract in which lenders or investors are compensated for losses in the 
event of a default by the borrower. In the American home mortgage market, there are two main types of 
mortgage insurance: private mortgage insurance offered by monoline insurance companies and mortgage 
insurance offered by the federal government through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an 
agency within the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) . FHA was created to 
stimulate the housing market in the Great Depression. In the process, FHA developed the popular long-
term, fixed-rate, prepayable self-amortizing home loan and helped make homeownership an integral—
and achievable—part of the American Dream.  
The following chapters assess both public and private mortgage insurance in the context of 
another severe housing market collapse—the Great Recession of the 21st century. The second chapter 
estimates whether FHA mortgage insurance is a complement or substitute to conventional low 
downpayment alternatives, specifically private mortgage insurance and subordinate or “piggyback” 
mortgages used as the source of a downpayment to avoid mortgage insurance altogether. The third 
chapter evaluates the choice in the type of mortgage insurance and if mortgage insurance—and, by 
extension, mortgage credit—became less available during the housing downturn, with a particular focus 
on the effect of minimum capital requirements on private financial institutions. The fourth chapter 
examines the likelihood of default of comparable FHA-insured, privately-insured and uninsured home 
loans and the possibility of adverse selection in mortgage insurance programs. A conclusion summarizes 
the findings of these chapters and discusses their implications for the future of the American housing 
finance system. The remainder of this introduction provides background on mortgage insurance common 
to all three chapters and the motivation for the research. 
Mortgage Insurance in the American Housing Finance System 
 Most of the institutions that comprise the American housing finance system have their origins in 
the New Deal, an assortment of domestic programs enacted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to fight 
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the economic calamity known as the Great Depression. Although the stock market crash of 1929 is well 
known causa proxima for the Great Depression, other factors, including the housing market, contributed 
to make the economy vulnerable to disaster.  
Until the 1930s, home mortgages in the United States were typically short term (5 to 10 years), 
interest-only loans that required substantial downpayments of 50 percent or more (Green and Wachter 
2005). Short loan terms required a loan to be refinanced frequently, which could be a problem if house 
prices declined, raising the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, or financial institutions became illiquid and unwilling 
to roll over the loan. A private mortgage insurance market had grown out of the title insurance industry in 
the late 19th century, but was untested. A study of urban housing finance at the time noted: 
From the standpoint of the surety companies, the guaranteeing of mortgages or mortgage bonds is an 
experiment. To date losses have been negligible, but we have passed through no serious crises 
calculated to put the guarantee to the test. Rightly or wrongly, these companies take an attitude of 
watchful waiting which does not indicate any rapid increase in the near future of their contingent liability 
on this account. (Gray and Terborgh 1929) 
In fact, nominal house prices had peaked in 1925. Foreclosures began to climb for the next eight 
years. A thousand homes were foreclosed on every day in 1933 and one survey found nearly 44 percent 
of urban, owner-occupied homes with a mortgage were in default at the start of 1934 (Wheelock 2008). 
The nascent private mortgage insurance industry proved unable to weather the extreme losses (Alger 
1934; Graaskamp 1967). 
In response to the turmoil in the housing and mortgage markets, Title II of the National Housing 
Act of 1934 created a “system of mutual mortgage insurance” administered by the Federal Housing 
Administration backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government. By assuming the risk of 
default, FHA encouraged banks and other financial institutions to lend, creating new demand for housing. 
FHA-insured loans could be for up to 80 percent of the house value and were required to have “complete 
amortization provisions,” meaning regular loan payments included both principal and interest such that 
the loan would be completely repaid by the end of the loan term.  
Over time, a relaxation of FHA underwriting standards helped reduce wealth and income barriers 
to homeownership. Required downpayments were reduced to just five percent in 1950 and then three 
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percent or less in 1961. Loan terms initially set at 20 years were gradually increased to 30 years or more 
by 1954, spreading the loan principal over more payments and thereby reducing monthly costs (Vandell 
1995). FHA, along with mortgage insurance provided by the Veterans Administration, helped the 
homeownership rate increase from 43.6 percent in 1940 to 61.9 percent in 1960.  
Unfortunately, access and opportunity was not open to all. Early FHA underwriting manuals 
warned of the “ingress undesirable racial or nationality groups” and systematically favored financing 
suburban developments rather than houses in urban, minority areas (Stearns n.d.). Executive Order 
11063, signed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962, prohibited discrimination in federally-funded 
housing programs. Nevertheless, the lack of equal access to FHA insurance in the prosperous post-war 
period is considered a crucial factor that contributed to a lack of wealth-building among minority 
households (Coates 2014).  
The private mortgage industry was reborn in the mid-20th century, beginning with the creation of 
the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation in 1957. Private insurance grew quickly thanks in part to 
the privatization of the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) in 1968.  The charters of 
the re-purposed government-sponsored enterprise and its eventual twin, the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), allowed them to purchase conventional (i.e., not government-
insured) home mortgages with a specific restriction: 
No such purchase of a conventional mortgage secured by a property comprising one- to four-
family dwelling units shall be made if the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage at the time of 
purchase exceeds 80 per centum of the value of the property securing the mortgage, unless (A) the seller 
retains a participation of not less than 10 per centum in the mortgage; (B) for such period and under such 
circumstances as the corporation may require, the seller agrees to repurchase or replace the mortgage 
upon demand of the corporation in the event that the mortgage is in default; or (C) that portion of the 
unpaid principal balance of the mortgage which is in excess of such 80 per centum is guaranteed or 
insured by a qualified insurer as determined by the corporation. (12 U.S.C. 1717 (b)(2)) (emphasis 
added). 
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In practice, private mortgage insurance became the most common form of credit enhancement 
for conventional mortgages with high LTV ratios and vital to gaining access to the secondary market 
liquidity provided by the government-sponsored enterprises.  
 Private mortgage insurers and the conventional mortgage market typically adjust insurance prices 
based on borrower risk characteristics. By contrast, FHA uses very little risk-based pricing. For the first 
nearly fifty years, FHA insurance was paid by borrowers through monthly premiums equivalent to an 
annual payment of 0.5 percent of the original loan amount, as mandated by the National Housing Act of 
1934. The annual premium was replaced in 1983 with a 3.8 percent up-front premium, which could be 
financed in the loan amount. Since 1990, FHA has relied on both up-front and annual premiums. Among 
long-term (greater than 15 years) mortgage, the only variation in current FHA premiums is whether the 
base loan amount is above or below $625,500 and whether the LTV ratio is above or below 95 percent, 
although borrowers with low credit scores may not be eligible for insurance on mortgages with high LTV 
ratios. In fact, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 specifically prohibited FHA for one year 
from taking “any action to implement or carry out risk-based premiums, which are designed for mortgage 
lenders to offer borrowers an FHA-insured product that provides a range of mortgage insurance premium 
pricing, based on the risk that the insurance contract represent.” FHA has continued that moratorium on 
risk-based premium pricing. 
 FHA is also prohibited by law from insuring large loan amounts. Initially, FHA’s loan limits were 
set high enough to cover more than 85 percent of owner-occupied homes (Vandell 1995). But failure to 
adjust these limits for inflation gradually confined FHA to a narrower segment of the market. More 
recently, loan limits were typically set a 95 percent of the area median house price, but not less than 48 
percent of Freddie Mac’s conforming loan limit, although these limits were temporarily raised by the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. 
The combination of loan limits and lack of risk-based pricing has led FHA to serve a smaller, 
higher risk segment of the mortgage market than early in its history. . FHA’s clientele also tends to be 
disproportionately minority. Ironically, given the criticism for lack of access to FHA insurance in the past, 
the greater dependence of minority borrowers on FHA gave rise to concerns about a “dual market” in 
5 
 
which minorities and other underserved borrowers are unnecessarily shut out of the lower-priced 
conventional mortgage market (Bradford 1990). 
Nevertheless, FHA appeared to be a vestigial part of the American housing finance system 
towards the end of 20th century. As the government-sponsored enterprises reigned supreme after the 
Savings and Loan Crisis demonstrated the benefits of mortgage-backed securitization, private mortgage 
insurance and the conventional market in general had confined FHA into a small niche of borrowers. 
However, the American housing and mortgage markets in the new millennium were about to be roiled to a 
degree not seen since the Great Depression. 
Mortgage Insurance in the Great Recession 
 In the early part of the 2000s, the traditional institutions of the American housing finance system 
faced competition from new players and financial products. Mortgage-backed securities issued by 
financial institutions created an alternative to the government-sponsored enterprises. Structured financial 
instruments allowed even high risk mortgages to be packaged into highly rated securities. Mortgage 
insurance was not necessarily required to obtain a loan with a low downpayment. Instead, borrowers 
could obtain a second, “piggyback” loan to fund a downpayment. Consequently, both FHA and private 
mortgage insurance lost market share during the housing boom. FHA’s share of new loan originations by 
dollar volume fell from roughly ten percent in 2000 to less than two percent in 2006 (Figure 1.1). Similarly, 
the market share of private mortgage insurance fell from over 15 percent to less than nine percent.  
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Figure 1.1 Mortgage Insurance Market Share and House Price-Rent Index 
 
Note: Four-quarter moving average of market share. The Price-Rent Index is defined as the National Home Price 
Index deflated by Owners’ Equivalent Rent of Residences in the Consumer Price Index and indexed to the long-run 
average. 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance; S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index; Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 However, the availability of alternative loan products collapsed as housing prices fell. Private 
mortgage insurance initially filled the void, spiking to 16 percent of new loan origination volume in 2008. 
But private financial institutions in general and the private mortgage insurance industry in particular were 
not able to sustain a housing market in freefall. Only when the conventional mortgage market imploded 
did FHA see its share rise to nearly a quarter of new loan volume. The increase in FHA’s market share 
was aided by extraordinary increases in its loan limits, but the majority of the increase in endorsements 
remained among smaller loan amounts.  
 At the peak of the housing bubble, FHA’s serious delinquency rate was roughly seven percent, 
comparable to conventional subprime loans and above that reported by most private mortgage insurance 
companies. But as the housing market collapsed, the serious delinquency rates on most conventional 
loans began to rise. While FHA’s serious delinquency rate rose to approximately 12 percent, privately-
insured loans had delinquency rates between 13 and 21 percent. For comparison, the serious 
delinquency rate of subprime loans peaked at 35 percent.   
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 However, simple comparisons between serious delinquency rates may be misleading. The 
definition of seriously delinquency varies between mortgage insurance companies. Moreover, the flow 
rate involves combining books of business of different loan maturities. In particular, the increase in FHA 
loan volume after 2009 swelled the denominator used to calculate the serious delinquency rate and may 
therefore understate the increase in FHA default rates. On the other hand, FHA-insured borrowers are 
typically higher risk than those served by the private mortgage insurance industry; therefore, we might 
expect FHA generally to have a higher delinquency rate. The analysis of loan performance in the fourth 
chapter attempts to control for all these issues for an apples-to-apples comparison of default rates.  
  Mortgage defaults lead to mortgage insurance claims, which deplete the capital resources of 
mortgage insurers. State regulators typically require private mortgage insurance companies to maintain a 
25:1 risk-to-capital ratio, equivalent to a four percent minimum capital ratio.  Insurers that fall below 
minimum capital requirements may be forced into run-off, where revenue on existing policies continues to 
be collected and claims paid but companies are prohibited from endorsing new loans. As in the Great 
Depression, losses suffered in the Great Recession wreaked havoc on private mortgage insurers’ 
balance sheets. Three private mortgage insurance companies (Triad Guaranty Insurance Corporation, 
Republic Mortgage Insurance Co., and PMI Mortgage Insurance Co.) failed. Other insurers were allowed 
regulatory forbearance to continue operating. The relationship between capital reserves and the ability of 
private mortgage insurance to sustain the mortgage market in a downturn is examined in the third 
chapter.  
 FHA also has a minimum capital requirement, but its two percent capital ratio standard is not 
comparable to the four percent required of private insurers because of differences in insurance coverage. 
Private mortgage insurance typically only covers 12 to 35 percent of the loan amount, depending on the 
LTV ratio at origination, but FHA insures the full loan amount; consequently, FHA is often able to recoup 
losses through foreclosure where private mortgage insurance coverage would be exhausted. 
Nevertheless, FHA not only fell below its two percent capital ratio requirement, but turned negative. At the 
end of fiscal year 2012, losses on forward loans in the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, which finances 
FHA’s mortgage insurance program, were expected to exceed future revenue and existing capital 
resources by $13.5 billion. Consequently, FHA was required to draw on taxpayer funds for the first time in 
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its history. In September 2013, $1.7 billion was transferred from the U.S. Treasury to the Mutual Mortgage 
Insurance Fund. 
 In order to curb defaults and replenish capital reserves, mortgage insurers tightened underwriting 
standards and raised insurance premiums.  For example, FHA adopted a minimum credit score 
requirement and restricted maximum LTV ratios for other low credit scores. After years of unsuccessful 
attempts to curb controversial seller-funded downpayment assistance programs associated with appraisal 
fraud and high default rates, the practice was finally banned by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act. 
Congressional action (Public Law 111-229) was also needed to amend the National Housing Act so that 
premiums could be raised. Overall, upfront and annual premiums for mortgages with high LTV ratios and 
terms exceeding 15 years increased from 1.5 and 0.5 percent, respectively, to 1.75 and 1.35 percent over 
the course of the housing downturn. However, higher prices and more restrictive underwriting for 
mortgage insurance reduces the availability of mortgage credit and therefore also housing demand, 
exacerbating the downturn in the housing market. FHA faces a dilemma between fulfilling its public 
purpose of sustaining the mortgage market in periods of distress while maintaining the fiscal solvency of 
the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund and, by extension, reducing the risk to taxpayers.  
The turmoil in the mortgage market over the last housing cycle and the criticism of FHA’s mortgage 
insurance program in particular provides a unique opportunity to examine the role of mortgage insurance 
in the American housing finance system, from application for mortgage insurance to the performance of 
insured loans.  
Model of Mortgage Underwriting 
 The following chapters specifically examine 1) the correlation in endorsement volumes between 
FHA and private mortgage insurance, as well as alternative conventional low downpayment loan 
products, 2) the credit decision of mortgage insurers to approve or deny an application, as well as the 
selection of type of mortgage insurance in the application process, and 3) the performance of insured 
loans relative to similar uninsured loans. The empirical methodology of each chapter is grounded in a 
conceptual framework of mortgage lending proposed by Ferguson and Peters (1995). Under this 
conceptual framework, the credit risk of mortgage applicants is summarized by a single factor, Ω. 
Underwriting standards are represented as a maximum acceptable credit risk, Ω*. All applicants above 
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the maximum acceptable risk are rejected by the mortgage lender or insurers. Meanwhile, the average 
risk of loan originations is the weighted integral of all borrowers under the maximum acceptable risk. 
In this model, the mortgage market can be segmented by assuming either A) FHA has more lenient 
underwriting standards than conventional lenders and insurers, an approach introduced by Ambrose, 
Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2002) and adopted in the second chapter, B) applicants for FHA insurance 
tend to be higher risk than applicants for conventional credit, an assumption used in the third chapter, or 
C) some combination of both, used in the fourth chapter.  
 In summary, this dissertation project builds on the existing literature in economic theory and 
empirical methodology to derive policy implications that would make the mortgage insurance market work 
better for more people. The policy implications are presented in the conclusion section. 
Figure 1.2 Model of Mortgage Underwriting  
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CHAPTER 2: FHA SUBSTITUTION WITH CONVENTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
 In testimony before the House Financial Services Committee in 2013, Federal Housing 
Administration Commissioner Carol Galante stated, “By design, FHA’s programs are meant to 
complement, not supplant, private capital. They are there to address a lack of available mortgage credit 
when private capital retreats or underserves markets, and to step back when private capital returns or 
expands to serve previously underserved populations.” The last decade of mortgage lending 
demonstrates the countercyclical role of FHA. Between 2007 and 2009, the unemployment rate nearly 
doubled while house prices fell 20 percent. The availability of conventional low downpayment mortgage 
products, such as private mortgage insurance or so-called “piggyback” loans—subordinate liens used to 
finance the downpayment on a home purchase—collapsed. Meanwhile, the number of FHA 
endorsements nearly quadrupled. This paper evaluates the determinants of FHA endorsement volume, 
with particular emphasis on the substitution of low downpayment mortgage products.  
 Different forms of low downpayment mortgage products present different risks to borrowers. 
Although low levels of home equity are widely cited as the dominant cause of default (Quercia and 
Stegman 1992), other factors may influence the likelihood of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure. For 
example, by providing a “second set of eyes” in the underwriting process, mortgage insurers may impose 
a degree of additional discipline on lenders (Promontory 2011a). In particular, several studies have found 
evidence that piggyback loans were associated with an elevated risk of default during the housing crisis 
(LaCour-Little, Calhoun and Yu 2009; Promontory Financial Group 2011b; Schneider 2011). The effect of 
foreclosure on neighboring property values, which may exacerbate the risk of additional mortgage 
defaults, makes the concentration of low downpayment products in lower income and minority-majority 
neighborhoods even more concerning. 
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In addition, federal support for the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, which finances FHA’s 
mortgage insurance program, also presents risks to taxpayers.1 The Fund lost nearly $38 billion in 
economic value between FY2007 and FY2012.  In fact, the economic value of the Fund turned negative 
as the projected cost of future claims overwhelmed projected revenue and existing capital resources. 
Under the rules of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 2000, FHA was required to draw $1.7 billion from the 
U.S. Treasury in September 2013 to cover credit related losses for the first time in its history. 
Background 
 In the first several decades after its creation, FHA served a broad segment of the mortgage 
market. But over time, its mortgage insurance program has faced increased competition from 
conventional low downpayment products, including private mortgage insurance and, more recently, 
“piggyback” loans. These alternatives have contributed to a reduction in FHA’s market to a niche of 
underserved, higher risk borrowers and neighborhoods experiencing severe economic hardship.  
Public and Private Mortgage Insurance 
The National Housing Act of 1934 established FHA to provide federal insurance of mortgages. 
Section 202 of the Act created the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund to collect premiums and disburse 
claims for insurance on eligible loans defined in Section 203(b). Implementation of the insurance program 
entailed standardization of loan products and underwriting requirements. In order to protect taxpayers’ 
money, FHA created property inspection and appraisal standards (infamously including redlining and 
other practices that favored suburban, White neighborhoods over inner-city, minority ones). Loans were 
fully self-amortizing, meaning monthly mortgage payments included principal and interest such that the 
loan was fully repaid by the end of the term. After proving the viability of the mortgage insurance program, 
the term to maturity of loans was extended to up to 30 years in 1954, reducing required monthly 
payments. Maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios were initially set at 80 percent, resulting in substantially 
lower down payments than previously possible. They gradually increased up to 98.75 percent in order to 
                                               
1 The financial crisis demonstrated that even conventional market participants may also expose 
taxpayers. Private mortgage insurance companies, in particular, present counterparty risk to the 
government-sponsored enterprises. 
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further expand homeownership.2 Loan limits were imposed, but could finance more than 85 percent of 
homes (Vandell 1995).  
Although a private mortgage insurance (PMI) industry existed as early as the 1880s, it was not 
able to withstand the depths of the Great Depression and disappeared for over twenty years (Alger 1934; 
Graaskamp 1967). However, the success of FHA demonstrated the viability of mortgage insurance when 
properly managed. The private mortgage insurance industry was reborn when the Mortgage Guaranty 
Insurance Corporation was created in Wisconsin in 1957. Every state had passed legislation allowing for 
private mortgage insurance by 1973 (Herzog 2009; FHFA 2009). The role of PMI has been 
institutionalized in the American housing finance system by regulations that prevent the government-
sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, from purchasing mortgages with unpaid balances 
over 80 percent of the value of the property securing the loan, unless “guaranteed or insured by a 
qualified insurer as determined by the corporation.”  
FHA and private mortgage insurance appear to segment the mortgage market by credit risk. More 
lenient underwriting standards create an “FHA wedge” in the mortgage market between borrowers served 
by the conventional market and borrowers deemed unacceptable credit risks, based on either the 
borrower’s ability to repay or the value of the collateral (Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and Yezer 2002). 
Under this conception, there is very little room for product substitution because borrowers will always 
select the least expensive option available at any given point in time. Bunce et al. (1995) argue, 
“[O]verlap is only possible when the lender and borrower fail to take advantage of a bonafide PMI offer of 
the same service at lower cost.” And given the complexity of the underwriting process, even observed 
incidences are only evidence of potential, not actual, overlap.  
Although the delineation between FHA and conventional markets is not always sharp, higher 
credit risk increases the likelihood that a borrower will be forced to use FHA or else be denied credit. 
Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) find that a 10-point increase in credit score lowers the probability of 
using FHA insurance by 2.8 percent.  Decomposing credit scores into specific components of credit 
                                               
2 Maximum LTV ratios varied by loan amount. Only properties worth $50,000 or less were eligible for LTV 
ratios up to 98.75%. In low closing cost states, properties worth between $50,000 and $125,000 were 
limited to LTV ratios up to 97.65% and properties worth over $125,000 to 97.15% (Mortgagee Letter 
1998-29). The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 tightened downpayment requirements by 
decreasing the maximum LTV ratio to 96.5 percent (Mortgagee Letter 2008-23). 
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history such as revolving credit balance, ever delinquent, derogatory public notices provides even more 
explanatory power. Lacour-Little (2004) supports the finding that credit score predominantly distinguishes 
FHA and subprime mortgages from conventional prime mortgages, but also notes that documentation 
requirements appear to separate subprime and FHA loans. Immergluck (2011) also finds that low- or no-
documentation of income and assets reduces the likelihood of FHA insurance. 
 Yet even after controlling for these elements of credit risk, the race and ethnicity of borrowers is a 
significant factor in the choice of mortgage financing. Early empirical studies (e.g., Fullerton and MacRae 
1978; Canner, Gabriel and Woolley 1991; Gabriel and Rosenthal 1991; Holmes and Horvitz 1994) 
typically found minorities were disproportionately more likely to rely on FHA insurance than conventional 
mortgages. However, later studies find different patterns, possibly reflecting changes in the mortgage 
industry such as the introduction of greater risk-based pricing in the form of subprime loans. Pennington-
Cross and Nichols (2000) find that Hispanics are more likely to use FHA insurance but Blacks are less 
likely. Karikari, Voicu and Fang (2011) find minority borrowers and neighborhoods were more likely to 
receive subprime mortgages than FHA-insured loans. 
While highlighting the differences between FHA and conventional mortgages, these studies also 
reveal that the market is not nearly as segmented as theory would suggest. One US Department of 
Housing and Urban Development study from 1986 noted, “It appears, therefore, that Section 203(b) and 
private insurers are less different…than may be commonly believed.” Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and 
Yezer (2002) attribute the overlap to applicants’ tolerance for rejection. For example, risk averse 
applicants might apply for FHA insurance even when they would qualify for typically less expensive 
conventional mortgage credit alternatives.  
Several studies have tried to empirically quantify the degree of overlap between FHA insurance 
and the conventional mortgage market, which includes, but is not limited to loans with private mortgage 
insurance.  Rodda, Schmidt and Patrabansh (2005) estimate an 11 percent overlap in the combined 
borrower risk distributions of FHA endorsements and conventional loans purchased by the government-
sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. However, Gyourko and Hu (2002) find spatial 
differences, with the GSEs focusing on lower income borrowers in relatively high income neighborhoods 
and a large FHA presence associated with fewer conventional loans. Karikari, Voicu and Fang (2011) 
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estimate that 29 percent of subprime loans made in 2005 could have qualified for FHA insurance. Results 
presented in Spader and Quercia (2012) indicate that every ten subprime loans in a Census tract 
between 2002 and 2006 was associated with roughly three fewer FHA-insured loans, although the 
opposite effect is observed between 1998 and 2001. There is also evidence that the market share of FHA 
was negatively impacted by other public policies, including affordable housing goals for the government-
sponsored enterprises (An and Bostic 2008) and the Community Reinvestment Act (Spader and Quercia 
2012). On the other hand, Ding et al. (2008) find FHA and subprime loans are complements at the 
neighborhood level, with the share of FHA loans in a census tract positively correlated with the share of 
subprime loans. 
Piggyback Lending and the Housing Bubble 
In the housing bubble of the mid-2000s, alternative forms of low downpayment lending became 
available without requiring any mortgage insurance. Simultaneous origination of a second3 lien or 
“piggyback” loan enabled borrowers to avoid mortgage insurance altogether. For example, a so-called 80-
10-10 arrangement combines a first mortgage with an 80 percent LTV ratio and either a closed-end 
second (CES) or home equity line of credit (HELOC), amounting to another 10 percent of the sales price. 
The borrower’s downpayment is thereby cut in half, from 20 percent to 10 percent. An 80-20 structure 
uses a junior lien for 20 percent of the sales price, effectively eliminating the need for a downpayment. 
Until 2007, subordinate liens benefited from preferential tax treatment relative to mortgage 
insurance. Like other forms of secured home acquisition debt, interest payments on piggyback loans are 
tax deductible. Mortgage insurance premiums were not similarly treated until Section 419 of the Tax 
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 temporarily expanded the deduction for new originations. Subsequent 
legislation has extended the provision (e.g., Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007; Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010; American Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 2012). However, mortgage insurance premiums are fully deductible only for households with adjusted 
gross incomes of less than $100,000 ($50,000 if married and filing separately) and completely phased out 
for incomes over $109,000. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, only 24 percent of taxable 
returns with income less than $100,000 claimed the mortgage interest tax deduction in 2012, compared to 
                                               
3 “Second,” “subordinate” and “junior” are used interchangeably to denote loans with inferior claims on 
collateral.  
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65 percent of returns with income over that amount. And lower income households that do take 
advantage of the tax deduction receive a disproportionately smaller benefit.  Filing units with income 
under $100,000 accounted for 45 percent of returns claiming the deduction, but only 23 percent of the 
total amount of the tax expenditure. Consequently, higher-income households may still have an incentive 
to prefer second liens over mortgage insurance. 
On the other hand, piggyback loans expose the borrower to greater interest rate risk if the 
subordinate loan has an adjustable rate compared to mortgage insurance that is fixed at a predetermined 
premium. In addition, loan servicers are required under the Homeowner Protection Act of 1998 to 
automatically terminate private mortgage insurance on loans once the balance of the mortgage reaches 
78 percent of the original value of the secured property—typically less than twelve years for a 30-year 
fully-amortizing mortgage. The Federal Housing Administration followed suit with a similar cancellation 
policy in 2001 (see Mortgagee Letters 2000-38 and 2000-46), but rescinded it in mid-2013 (Mortgagee 
Letter 2013-04).4 The length of time over which payments on a subordinate lien must be made, however, 
is fixed by the amortization schedule. Consequently, mortgage insurance may be preferred in periods of 
house price depreciation because normal amortization will reduce the loan balance below the 78 percent 
threshold while subordinate liens may not be able to be refinanced at mark-to-market LTV ratios 
Nevertheless, the growth in piggyback loans during the housing bubble was dramatic. Goodman 
et al.’s (2010) analysis of CoreLogic data finds over half of first liens in private label securitizations 
between 2000 and 2007 had some kind of subordinate lien behind them, including nearly a quarter with a 
simultaneously originated junior lien. There were also noticeable geographic differences in the prevalence 
of piggyback loans. Calhoun (2005) finds rates of piggyback mortgages strongly correlates with an ex 
ante index of the risk of a decline in housing prices in the next two years, particularly for metropolitan 
areas in California. Belsky and Richardson (2010) note substantial regional variation in the use of 
piggyback loans, as well as disparities by the race and ethnic composition of the community, but not 
neighborhood income. These disparities were most pronounced in the most expensive metropolitan 
areas.  
                                               
4 FHA’s current policy requires annual premiums on loans with original loan-to-value ratios less than or 
equal to 90 percent for the first eleven years or the end of the mortgage, whichever occurs first. For loans 
with higher loan-to-value ratios, premiums are required for thirty years or the end of the mortgage. 
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Avery et al. (2008) use HMDA data and a matching process to pair conventional closed-end 
subordinate liens with their respective first liens when made by the same lender. Assuming that 
piggyback loans were used as a substitute for mortgage insurance when the first lien loan was not 
subprime and the combined loan amount was less than the conforming loan limit, Avery et al. estimate 
that nearly 1.5 million borrowers used piggyback loans to avoid mortgage insurance between 2004 and 
2007, accounting for nearly half (48.7%) of all subordinate home purchase mortgage originations.  
Belsky and Richardson (2010) estimate that the odds of using a piggyback CES in 2005 were 50 
percent greater when the first mortgage was subprime and 85 percent higher if the first mortgage was 
sold through private securitization. Black and Hispanic borrowers were also more likely to get a piggyback 
loan, although low income borrowers were less likely. Lee, Mayer and Tracy (2012) note important 
differences between types of subordinate mortgages. About 75 to 85 percent of Home Equity Lines of 
Credit (HELOCs) went to borrowers with credit scores over 700 and were often originated well after the 
first lien or to borrowers without other mortgages. CES loans, on the other hand, were more often 
simultaneous originations with non-prime first liens. 
Conceptual Framework 
In the theoretical framework used by Ferguson and Peters (1995) and Ambrose, Pennington-
Cross and Yezer (2002), the credit risk of mortgage applicants is represented as a single variable, Ω ϵ [0, 
1], with a probability density function 𝑓(Ω) (Figure 2.1). FHA’s less stringent underwriting standards can 
be represented as a maximum acceptable credit risk, ΩFHA, greater than that of conventional mortgage 
lenders or private mortgage insurers, ΩConv. 
Private mortgage insurers and conventional mortgage lenders must maintain minimum capital 
reserves in order to endorse or originate new business. Consequently, they will be forced to retrench and 
tighten underwriting standards as losses mount. In contrast, FHA insurance is valued even if the agency 
is technically insolvent because it is backed by the federal government. This allows FHA to support the 
market by maintaining constant underwriting standards through the housing cycle. Thus, ΩFHA should 
have less variation over time than ΩConv. Indeed, Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2002) find that 
the FHA rejection rate is less sensitive to cyclical economic risk factors than the conventional rejection 
rate and actually inversely related to some permanent risk factors like house price volatility. 
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Figure 2.1 Underwriting Standards and Loan Volume 
 
More importantly, changes in ΩFHA do not affect the cumulative distribution of conventional loan 
originations, but a change in ΩConv does affect the cumulative distribution of FHA endorsements. That is, 
variation in private mortgage insurance and piggyback lending is exogenous to the volume of FHA 
insurance. This may explain why Holmes and Horvitz (1994) find that the neighborhood default rate is 
negatively associated with conventional mortgage lending activity but positively associated with FHA 
activity. Immergluck (2011) also notes that falling house prices are associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of FHA insurance. The decrease in the maximum acceptable risk of private mortgage insurers 
and conventional subordinate home purchase mortgage lenders should lead to an increase in FHA 
endorsements, but a tightening of FHA underwriting standards may not lead to an increase in 
conventional mortgage volume. 
Methodology 
Following Spader and Quercia (2012), this paper uses a fixed effects model with census tracts as 
the unit of analysis to evaluate the determinants of FHA lending, including the degree of substitution with 
conventional low downpayment alternatives. 
 This model can be represented as 
𝐹𝐻𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡𝛿𝑃𝑀𝐼 + 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡𝛿𝐶𝐸𝑆 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
where 
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α represents neighborhood fixed effects (i.e., census tracts) 
X represents time-varying neighborhood characteristics 
PMI is the number of endorsements by private mortgage insurance companies 
CES is the number of conventional closed-end subordinate lien home purchase loan 
originations 
γ represents year of origination, and 
ε is a tract- and time-specific error term 
Neighborhood characteristics that vary by year include six variables. The number of mortgage 
applications in the census tract from 1) low- and moderate-income households, and 2) minority 
households capture the demand for low downpayment mortgage loan products. Economic conditions are 
accounted for by 3) the denial rate on conventional mortgage applications by county, 4) the 
unemployment rate by county and 5) annual change in employment by county , as well as 6) the annual 
(fourth quarter-to-fourth quarter) change in house prices in the metropolitan statistical area. 
The census tract fixed effects absorb both observed and unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics that are time-invariant. Similarly, dummy variables representing the year of origination 
account for differences in the economic climate not captured by time-varying characteristics. Errors are 
clustered at the metropolitan area level.  
The coefficients of interest are represented by δ and measure the degree of substitution between 
FHA endorsements and either private mortgage insurance or piggyback mortgages. In order to explore 
differences in the degree of product substitution among underserved populations, the analysis is repeated 
using four subsets of the national data, including 1) minority households, 2) low- and moderate-income 
households, 3) majority-minority neighborhoods, and 4) low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.5 In 
addition, regional variation in substitution effects is explored by evaluating the distribution of coefficients 
across models estimated separately for each metropolitan area.  
Notably, the dependent variable, FHAit, is not the market share of the Federal Housing 
Administration but rather the absolute volume of loan endorsements. The market share would 
                                               
5 Restrictions based on household demographics are a subset of applicants in every census tract, while 
restrictions based on neighborhood characteristics are a subset of census tracts. Consequently, the later 
results in a reduction of sample size while the former does not.  
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tautologically rise or fall with a decrease or increase, respectively, in the market share of alternative loan 
products. Meanwhile, the absolute volume of loan endorsements could also rise (product complement), 
fall (product substitute) or be unaffected by the other products.  
Data 
 Detailed information on home mortgage loan originations is available through the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA), which was enacted in 1975 to “provide the citizens and public officials of the 
United States with sufficient information to enable them to determine whether depository institutions are 
filling their obligations to serve the housing needs of the communities and neighborhoods in which they 
are located” (12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2010)). Since the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, most mortgage lending institutions have been required to submit an application-
level register to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), which compiles the data 
for public use.   
 Information in the loan-application register (LAR) includes loan type, meaning whether the loan is 
conventional or insured by some government agency such as FHA. Although reporting is not required of 
smaller lenders, the HMDA data is estimated to cover 90 to 95 percent of all FHA lending (HUD 2011). 
Reforms to HMDA reporting requirements in 2004 included lien status, allowing identification of CES 
loans. Unfortunately, HELOCs are not required to be reported, resulting in an underestimate of total 
piggyback loans. As noted, Lee, Mayer and Tracy (2012) find that borrowers with lower credit scores are 
more likely to receive CES liens instead of HELOCs. 
The 2004 reforms also included a variable on the interest rate spread, a proxy for subprime loans. 
However, the required baseline interest rate used to calculate the spread changed in 2009, making the 
comparison before and after that period difficult. In addition, subprime lending is more associated with 
weak credit history and not mutually exclusive with other low downpayment options. Indeed, higher-priced 
lending reported in HMDA is strongly correlated with CES lending and Belsky and Richardson (2010) find 
that assuming a higher-priced loan increased the likelihood of assuming a piggyback loan from 12 
percent to 31 percent. This would create a collinearity problem in the regression analysis. For these 
reasons, this analysis focuses on FHA substitution with private mortgage insurance and piggyback 
lending rather than subprime lending. 
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At the request of the Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, FFIEC also began to process 
information from mortgage insurance companies in 1993, leading to the creation of a similar database of 
private mortgage insurance activity (see Canner et al. 1994). Given the relative concentration in the 
mortgage insurance industry relative to general mortgage lending, reporting coverage is presumed to be 
as good as or better than HMDA. 
The LAR also includes information on the race/ethnicity and income of the applicant. This study 
identifies minority households as any applicant whose race and ethnicity are other than non-Hispanic and 
White.6 Low- and moderate-income households are identified as applicants with reported income less 
than 80 percent of area median income, defined as the median family income in the metropolitan 
statistical area. Area median income is obtained from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey, along 
with the median family income and racial/ethnic composition of the census tract. Low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods are similarly identified as census tracts with median family income less than 80 
percent of area median income. Majority-minority neighborhoods are identified as census tracts where 
non-Hispanic White households account for less than 50 percent of all households in the tract.  
Finally, the LAR lists the loan amount and purpose as well as the occupancy and type of the 
property securing the mortgage. This analysis will focus on endorsements of first lien (unless CES) 
mortgages for purchase of owner-occupied, site-built, one-to-four unit properties in metropolitan areas 
between 2004 and 2011. Metropolitan statistical areas are fixed at their 2004 definitions. Similarly, 
applications are restricted to loan amounts less than the 2004 FHA loan limit, adjusted for inflation, for 
single-family units in a given county.7 This is meant to isolate the determinants of FHA lending from the 
effect of the large increase in FHA loan limits during this period. Because piggyback loans would typically 
cover less than one-fifth of the purchase price, CES originations are restricted to loan amounts less than 
roughly 21 percent of the FHA loan limits.8  
                                               
6 Lenders are allowed to list up to five races for every borrower and co-borrower. This study relies on the 
ethnicity and race listed in the first field of the primary borrower.  
 
7 Inflated is measured using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Consumer Price Index – All Urban 
Consumers. 
 
8 Specifically, FHA loans require a 3.5% downpayment, or 96.5% maximum loan-to-value ratio, meaning 
the largest comparable piggyback loan amount would be  0.20 0.965⁄ ≈ 20.7%of the FHA loan limit.  
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The application- and loan-level data in HMDA is aggregated to tracts from the 2000 census, 
which serve as the unit of analysis. This study focuses on the period between 2004 and 2011 because 
changes to HMDA reporting requirements make comparisons to periods before 2004 difficult, while the 
shift in reporting to the 2010 tracts would make some neighborhood geographies inconsistent after 2011. 
Log transformation of the tract-level loan counts was considered, but not used because the number of 
neighborhoods with no endorsements or originations of at least one of the low downpayment options in a 
given year would substantially diminish the sample size and create an issue with missing data. Model 
errors violate the assumption of normality with or without log transformations of the different low 
downpayment loan products. However, significant tests in linear regression have been found to be valid in 
large samples even in non-normal distributions (Lumley et al. 2002).  
As noted, the research design also includes time-varying factors. Because HMDA does not 
include information on household wealth and assets, the demand for low downpayment mortgages is 
approximated by the number of first lien home purchase mortgage applications in a census tract across 
all loans, conventional and government-insured, from two typically wealth-constrained populations: low- 
and moderate-income households and minority households. HMDA also does not provide information on 
credit scores; therefore, the perceived risk of a neighborhood is gauged by the share of conventional-only 
first lien home purchase mortgage applications reported by HMDA in a county that are denied by the 
lender. However, the denial rate is a function of both the credit quality of the applicant pool and the risk 
tolerance of mortgage lenders in the neighborhood, compromising its usefulness as a control variable. In 
addition, control variables defined at the county or metropolitan area level may not accurately describe 
conditions in the neighborhoods where FHA lending is most prevalent if these neighborhoods are 
systematically different than the surrounding region. 
Findings 
  Table 2.1A and 2.1B present the volume and market share, respectively, of FHA, private 
mortgage insurance and CES loan originations falling under the 2004 FHA loan limits adjusted for 
inflation. Together, the number of these low downpayment loan products peaked at over 1.2 million in 
2005 but has since fallen 45 percent. However, as a share of the total market, these products increased 
from 46 percent in 2004 to over 62 percent in 2008 before falling to 54 percent in 2011. 
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Table 2.1A High LTV Mortgage Lending 
Thousands 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All Borrowers and Neighborhoods 
 
Total 2,523.7  2,585.1  2,223.3  1,731.8  1,443.6  1,492.9  1,330.8  1,264.3  
 
FHA 311.3  231.3  194.5  189.7  527.5  739.0  653.4  550.3  
 
PMI 448.8  379.9  364.6  571.0  319.5  107.8  75.0  101.9  
 
CES 412.3  625.2  595.1  266.1  53.1  26.3  26.3  27.6  
 Subtotal 1,172.4 1,236.4 1,154.2 1,026.8 900.0  873.1  754.7 679.8 
Minority Borrowers 
 
Total 943.8  943.0  813.7  571.0  457.6  478.2  438.2  400.2  
 
FHA 130.0  83.1  67.4  70.9  194.4  270.0  252.7  212.9  
 
PMI 275.3  178.5  145.0  233.0  130.4  33.1  18.8  24.3  
 
CES 185.3  276.7  249.3  92.0  17.9  7.6  8.4  10.3  
 Subtotal 590.7  538.3  461.7  395.9  342.7  310.6  280.0  247.5  
Lower Income Borrowers 
 
Total 1,120.3  1,104.2  937.9  726.0  619.5  778.6  683.5  620.7  
 
FHA 178.3  129.0  102.6  85.8  245.1  428.3  387.3  313.8  
 
PMI 236.3  202.1  207.6  308.2  142.3  40.3  26.0  34.8  
 
CES 143.5  230.3  190.4  65.6  16.1  10.6  12.2  14.8  
 Subtotal 558.1  561.3  500.6  459.7  403.5  479.1  425.5  363.5  
Majority-Minority Neighborhood 
 
Total 614.6  615.2  527.0  364.7  321.5  343.0  301.5  261.0  
 
FHA 87.6  57.4  46.2  48.0  146.1  209.1  186.5  150.4  
 
PMI 112.1  84.4  77.2  132.2  73.9  19.2  10.4  12.7  
 
CES 126.1  180.6  159.6  56.5  12.5  4.8  5.2  7.2  
 Subtotal 325.8  322.4  283.1  236.8  232.6  233.1  202.1  170.3  
Lower Income Neighborhoods 
 
Total 600.8  636.0  560.0  403.2  306.6  301.4  258.6  219.0  
 
FHA 94.6  66.2  56.3  55.2  138.3  178.9  156.0  120.1  
 
PMI 121.0  102.0  101.0  159.5  72.4  18.2  11.0  13.4  
 
CES 108.0  167.4  150.2  52.0  9.9  5.0  5.3  6.0  
 Subtotal 323.6  335.6  307.5  266.7  220.7  202.1  172.3  139.5  
Under inflation-adjusted 2004 FHA loan limits 
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Table 2.1B High LTV Mortgage Product Market Share 
Percent 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All Borrowers and Neighborhoods 
 
FHA 12.3 8.9 8.7 11.0 36.5 49.5 49.1 43.5 
 
PMI 17.8 14.7 16.4 33.0 22.1 7.2 5.6 8.1 
 
CES 16.3 24.2 26.8 15.4 3.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 
 
Subtotal 46.5 47.8 51.9 59.3 62.3 58.5 56.7 53.8 
Minority Borrowers 
 
FHA 13.8 8.8 8.3 12.4 42.5 56.5 57.7 53.2 
 
PMI 29.2 18.9 17.8 40.8 28.5 6.9 4.3 6.1 
 
CES 19.6 29.3 30.6 16.1 3.9 1.6 1.9 2.6 
 
Subtotal 62.6 57.1 56.7 69.3 74.9 64.9 63.9 61.9 
Lower Income Borrowers 
 
FHA 15.9 11.7 10.9 11.8 39.6 55.0 56.7 50.6 
 
PMI 21.1 18.3 22.1 42.5 23.0 5.2 3.8 5.6 
 
CES 12.8 20.9 20.3 9.0 2.6 1.4 1.8 2.4 
 
Subtotal 49.8 50.8 53.4 63.3 65.1 61.5 62.3 58.6 
Majority-Minority Neighborhoods 
 
FHA 14.3 9.3 8.8 13.2 45.4 60.9 61.8 57.6 
 
PMI 18.2 13.7 14.7 36.3 23.0 5.6 3.4 4.9 
 
CES 20.5 29.4 30.3 15.5 3.9 1.4 1.7 2.7 
 
Subtotal 53.0 52.4 53.7 64.9 72.3 67.9 67.0 65.3 
Lower Income Neighborhoods 
 
FHA 15.7 10.4 10.1 13.7 45.1 59.4 60.3 54.9 
 
PMI 20.1 16.0 18.0 39.6 23.6 6.0 4.2 6.1 
 
CES 18.0 26.3 26.8 12.9 3.2 1.7 2.1 2.7 
 
Subtotal 53.9 52.8 54.9 66.1 72.0 67.1 66.6 63.7 
Under inflation-adjusted 2004 FHA loan limits  
Looking at each low downpayment product separately, three distinct “waves” are evident. CES 
originations peaked in 2005 at over 625 thousand, accounting for over 30 percent of the home purchase 
market, but collapsed to just 30 thousand loans and two percent of the market by 2009. Private mortgage 
insurance spiked in 2007, rising to 571 thousand and a third of the market, but also fell as many mortgage 
insurers encountered high claims and heavy losses. Only after these conventional options had retrenched 
did FHA’s volume and market share increase.  
The number of FHA endorsements rose from 190 thousand in 2007 to 527 thousand in 2008 and 
739 thousand in 2009. As a share of the market, FHA increased from 11 percent in 2007 to nearly half in 
2009. Figure 2.2 displays these three waves. The solid bars indicate loan originations under FHA’s 2004 
loan limit, adjusted for inflation. The patterned bars indicate loan originations above these loan limits. 
Figure 2.2 shows that the majority of the increase in FHA lending was under the 2004 loan limits, and 
therefore not a consequence of loan limit increases. 
The use of low downpayment mortgage products is more pronounced among the traditionally 
underserved populations studied; however, the pattern of products varies by group. For example, private 
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mortgage insurance was disproportionately used by minority borrowers in 2004, accounting for 29 percent 
of origination compared to less than 18 percent across all borrowers and neighborhoods. Yet by 2009, the 
market share of private mortgage insurance was less in each of the underserved populations than the 
national average. Before 2011, piggyback loans are consistently less likely to be used by low- and 
moderate-income borrowers than the general population.  
Figure 2.2 Low Downpayment Mortgage Products 
 
*Adjusted for inflation 
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Figure 2.3A Market Share by Metropolitan Area, 2005 
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Figure 2.3B Market Share by Metropolitan Area, 2009 
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The results of the fixed effects models begin with Table 2.2. For ease of interpretation, estimates 
less than one will sometimes be described using their inverse. For example, an estimated coefficient of -
0.250 might be described as one less FHA endorsement for every four originations of a conventional 
alternative. 
The overall fixed effects model (Table 2.2) incorporates all borrower and neighborhood types. 
The coefficients capturing the effect of year reveal that even after controlling for demand from typically 
wealth-constrained applicants, conventional low downpayment alternatives, and economic conditions, the 
number of FHA endorsements increased between 2004 and 2008 before falling. The demand for credit 
from typically wealth-constrained populations has a statistically significant relationship with the number of 
FHA endorsements. Specifically, there is an additional FHA-insured loan origination for every 7.9 first lien 
home purchase mortgage applications from minority applicants, and an additional FHA endorsement for 
every 2.5 applications from lower-income households.  
The unemployment rate also has a statistically significant and positive relationship with the 
number of FHA-insured loan originations, but the change in employment and the change in house prices 
are not statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient for the denial rate on conventional 
first lien home purchase loans is statistically significant, but negative, indicating a higher denial rate is 
associated with fewer FHA endorsements.  
The coefficient on conventional low downpayment alternatives shows substantial substitution with 
FHA insurance. There is one less FHA endorsement for every additional 2.3 privately-insured loan 
originations and every 1.4 closed-end subordinate lien mortgage originations, meaning there is greater 
substitution between FHA and CES loans than between FHA and private mortgage insurance. However, 
both coefficients are statistically significant. 
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Table 2.2 FHA Endorsements: National Fixed Effects Model 
      Coeff. Std. Err. 
Applications 
   
 
Minority  
 
0.127*** 0.014 
 
Low- and Moderate-Income 
 
0.398*** 0.025 
High LTV Substitutes 
   
 
PMI Endorsements 
 
-0.448*** 0.024 
 
CES Originations 
 
-0.719*** 0.035 
Economic Conditions 
   
 
Conventional Denial Rate 
 
-0.186*** 0.023 
 
Change in Employment Level 
 
-0.018 0.035 
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
0.748*** 0.090 
 
Change in House Prices 
 
0.009 0.017 
Year 
   
 
2004 
 
. . 
 
2005 
 
1.290*** 0.311 
 
2006 
 
2.764*** 0.340 
 
2007 
 
3.170*** 0.368 
 
2008 
 
5.400*** 0.395 
 
2009 
 
3.110*** 0.447 
 
2010 
 
1.805*** 0.446 
 
2011 
 
1.332** 0.443 
Constant   -0.806 0.801 
N 
 
415,360 
 F 
 
227.6*** 
 
R2 
 
0.858 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.837 
 AIC   2731533   
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level 
Table 2.3 presents the results when restricting the data by applicant characteristics. Among 
minority households (Table 3A), more of the variables representing economic conditions are statistically 
significant, including the year-over-year change in house prices. However, the coefficients do not always 
follow the expected signs. For example, an increase in county-level employment is associated with an 
increase in FHA lending. In addition, the coefficients associated with the year of origination do not reveal 
an increase in FHA lending. In fact, there is a statistically significant decrease in FHA lending to minority 
households after 2008 relative to 2004. Among low- and moderate-income households (Table 3B), the 
pattern of statistical significance on control variables closely resembles that of the general model. 
The substitution effects between FHA lending and conventional low downpayment alternatives 
are much stronger in these sub-populations. There is one less FHA endorsement for roughly every two 
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privately-insured loans among minority households, or one less FHA endorsement for every 1.4 privately-
insured loans among lower-income households. The degree of substitution between FHA insurance and 
CES originations is roughly one-to-one among both these sub-populations. 
Table 2.3 FHA Endorsements: Minority and Lower Income Households 
   
Minority 
 
Lower-Income 
      Coeff. Std. Err.   Coeff. Std. Err. 
Applications 
      
 
Minority  
 
0.307*** 0.017 
 
. . 
 
Low- and Moderate-Income 
 
. . 
 
0.374*** 0.019 
High LTV Substitutes 
      
 
PMI Endorsements 
 
-0.511*** 0.039 
 
-0.735*** 0.025 
 
CES Originations 
 
-0.962*** 0.048 
 
-1.054*** 0.048 
Economic Conditions 
      
 
Conventional Denial Rate 
 
-0.103*** 0.013 
 
-0.112*** 0.013 
 
Change in Employment Level 
 
0.053** 0.020 
 
-0.025 0.019 
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
0.568*** 0.059 
 
0.353*** 0.056 
 
Change in House Prices 
 
-0.045*** 0.007 
 
-0.002 0.008 
Year 
      
 
2004 
 
. . 
 
. . 
 
2005 
 
0.066 0.156 
 
0.609*** 0.173 
 
2006 
 
-0.155 0.188 
 
1.252*** 0.184 
 
2007 
 
-0.181 0.167 
 
1.980*** 0.189 
 
2008 
 
0.143 0.186 
 
2.344*** 0.200 
 
2009 
 
-1.268*** 0.281 
 
1.684*** 0.262 
 
2010 
 
-1.703*** 0.281 
 
1.426*** 0.272 
 
2011 
 
-1.852*** 0.255 
 
1.029*** 0.258 
Constant   -0.579 0.459   -1.440** 0.445 
N 
 
415,360 
  
415,360 
 F 
 
136.9*** 
  
284.9*** 
 R2 
 
0.821 
  
0.855 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.796 
  
0.835 
 AIC   2308048     2286247   
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level 
Table 2.4 presents the results when restricting the data by neighborhood characteristics. The 
substitution effects in majority-minority neighborhoods are similar to those among minority applicants. 
However, the degree of substitution in lower-income neighborhoods is weaker than even the overall 
model shown in Table 2, although still statistically significant. The effect of the unemployment rate on 
FHA activity is also noticeably diminished in lower-income neighborhoods. 
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Table 2.4 FHA Endorsements: Minority and Lower Income Neighborhoods 
   
Majority-Minority 
 
Lower-Income 
      Coeff. Std. Err.   Coeff. Std. Err. 
Applications 
      
 
Minority  
 
0.192*** 0.018 
 
0.033** 0.012 
 
Low- and Moderate-Income 
 
0.351*** 0.026 
 
0.311*** 0.018 
High LTV Substitutes 
      
 
PMI Endorsements 
 
-0.551*** 0.046 
 
-0.411*** 0.029 
 
CES Originations 
 
-0.909*** 0.047 
 
-0.547*** 0.031 
Economic Conditions 
      
 
Conventional Denial Rate 
 
-0.220*** 0.039 
 
-0.187*** 0.021 
 
Change in Employment Level 
 
-0.120* 0.057 
 
-0.021 0.028 
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
0.548*** 0.139 
 
0.191** 0.061 
 
Change in House Prices 
 
0.028 0.023 
 
0.030* 0.013 
Year 
      
 
2004 
 
. . 
 
. . 
 
2005 
 
0.900 0.510 
 
-0.149 0.264 
 
2006 
 
1.637** 0.603 
 
0.442 0.293 
 
2007 
 
2.856*** 0.598 
 
1.306*** 0.294 
 
2008 
 
5.851*** 0.659 
 
4.223*** 0.343 
 
2009 
 
3.567*** 0.753 
 
3.655*** 0.409 
 
2010 
 
2.602*** 0.749 
 
2.642*** 0.366 
 
2011 
 
2.416** 0.740 
 
1.621*** 0.333 
Constant   -1.055 1.217   3.280*** 0.612 
N 
 
130,437 
  
141,812 
 F 
 
74.1*** 
  
119.0*** 
 R2 
 
0.855 
  
0.827 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.834 
  
0.802 
 AIC   876029     831802   
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level 
The results of the national model may obscure important regional variation in the degree of 
substitution. Consequently, separate models are run for every metropolitan area in the data, resulting in 
358 estimates. Table 2.5 presents the averages from these metropolitan area models. Weighting the 
results by the number of observations (i.e., census tracts) in the metropolitan area increases the absolute 
value of the estimated substitution coefficients, but the averages of the metropolitan estimates are less 
than those derived from the national fixed effects model.  
Figure 2.4 presents the distributions of metropolitan estimates using histograms. The curved line 
shows a normal distribution based on the weighted average and standard deviation of the metropolitan 
estimates. For comparison, the vertical dashed lines show the estimates derived from the national fixed 
effects model.  
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Table 2.5 Metropolitan Estimates of FHA Substitution: Summary 
 
PMI 
 
CES 
  Mean Coeff. Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Coeff. Std. Dev. 
Average -0.289 0.195 
 
-0.478 0.290 
Weighted Average -0.292 0.213   -0.548** 0.237 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level 
Figure 2.4 Metropolitan Area Estimates Distribution 
 
Note: Curved line shows normal distribution based on the weighted average and standard deviation of the 
metropolitan estimates. The vertical dashed lines show the estimates derived from the national fixed effects model.  
Given the number of metropolitan areas, a Bonferroni correction is used to reduce the likelihood 
of obtaining false positives at the 5 percent confidence level when examining the distribution of 
estimates.9 Even after this correction, 202 out of 358 models (56 percent) find the coefficient on privately-
insured mortgages statistically significant, and 248 models (69 percent) find the coefficient on CES 
originations significant. Every statistically significant coefficient was negative, indicating substitution with 
FHA insurance. The large share of metropolitan areas for which the coefficients on low downpayment 
alternatives are negative and statistically significant indicates that product substitution is not limited to 
                                               
9 i.e., critical p-value =  𝛼 = 0.05 𝑛 = 358⁄ = .00014 
0
10
20
30
40
50
M
et
ro
p
o
lit
an
 A
re
as
-2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5
PMI Coefficient
0
10
20
30
40
50
M
et
ro
p
o
lit
an
 A
re
as
-2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5
CES Coefficient
 32 
 
certain geographic regions. Nevertheless, Figure 2.5 shows some geographic patterns in the estimated 
coefficients. For example, none of the estimated coefficients on private mortgage insurance 
endorsements are significant in metropolitan areas located in California, but 80 percent of the coefficients 
on CES originations in the state are significant and the mean value is stronger. Yet the strength and 
statistical significance of coefficients shows no systematic relationship to the level of PMI and CES 
activity.  
Figure 2.5 Metropolitan Estimates of FHA Substitution 
 
 
Finally, it is possible to use the model of FHA activity to create counterfactuals that isolate the 
impact of economic conditions from changes in conventional low downpayment alternatives. First, the 
number of FHA endorsements in a census tract is predicted while holding the number of PMI 
endorsements and CES originations at their 2004 levels and allowing economic conditions (applications 
from minority and lower-income households, conventional denial rate, unemployment rate, change in 
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employment, change in house prices and year of origination) to vary. Then the simulation is repeated with 
the number of conventional alternatives allowed to vary while holding economic conditions to their 2004 
levels. Figure 2.6 shows the effect of these two components on the change in FHA lending, with the 
actual change represented by a solid black line. The decline in private mortgage insurance activity and 
piggyback lending contributed to an increase in FHA volume from 2006 to 2010. By contrast, economic 
conditions reduced FHA lending in 2006 and 2007, increased it in 2008 and 2009, then led to a reduction 
again in 2010 and 2011. Overall, over two-thirds of the increase in FHA activity between 2007 and 2009 
was due to a decline in conventional low downpayment alternatives.  
Figure 2.6 Components of Change in FHA Lending 
Year-Over-Year Change 
 
Discussion 
Based on the conceptual framework used in this paper, tightening FHA underwriting standards 
does not affect the number of conventional loan originations, but tightening conventional underwriting 
standards can increase the number of FHA endorsements. Underwriting involves multiple dimensions, but 
tightening standards ultimately results in fewer conventional loan originations and more FHA 
endorsements. However, the degree of substitution appears greater between FHA and piggyback loans 
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than between FHA and private mortgage insurance, at least for the time period analyzed. This may be 
because while all loan products serve low wealth borrowers, FHA insurance and piggyback loans may 
cater to households with worse credit history than those households typically served by private mortgage 
insurance companies.  
However, the delineation between conventional and FHA markets is not solely determined by 
underwriting standards but also by relative prices. Private mortgage insurers employ greater risk-based 
pricing, requiring higher premiums for higher-risk borrowers. At some threshold, these premiums exceed 
the flat and less cyclical prices of FHA. Effectively, relative prices help determine the maximum credit risk 
taken by conventional lenders and private mortgage insurers, but FHA influences this standard by its loan 
limits and premium schedules.  
Indeed, FHA premiums have been raised multiple times, with the annual premium rising from 
0.55 percent in early 2010 to up to 1.35 percent by mid-2013 (see Mortgagee Letters 2008-22; 2010-02; 
2010-28; 2011-10; 2012-04; 2013-04). Nevertheless, FHA was less expensive at the start of 2015 than 
conventional loans financed through the government-sponsored enterprises for borrowers with credit 
scores under 680 and a downpayment of just five percent (Zandi and deRitis 2015). Although this paper 
accounted for changes in loan limits, it does not have enough information on private mortgage insurance 
premiums to control for relative prices. Consequently, conventional loan volumes may not be entirely 
exogenous to FHA policies and endorsements as assumed in the conceptual framework presented. The 
Obama Administration’s white paper on housing finance reform trumpeted “changes at FHA to help 
ensure the private market, not FHA, fills the market opportunities created by reform.”  
Unfortunately, the components of change analysis shows no evidence of “crowding in” private 
capital. There has not been a corresponding increase in either private mortgage insurance endorsements 
or subordinate home purchase loan originations to offset declines in FHA endorsements between 2009 
and 2011. The conventional market simply may not be capable of serving the market so soon after a 
financial crisis. For example, based on regulations in sixteen states, a mortgage insurer may be 
prohibited from endorsing new loans if its capital falls below four percent of its risk in-force (commonly 
referred to as a 25:1 risk-to-capital ratio). In fact, three private mortgage insurance companies were 
forced into run-off and two filed for bankruptcy. More generally, conventional lenders and private 
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mortgage insurers tightened underwriting standards and increased their own insurance premiums to 
guard against insolvency.  
By contrast, FHA is able to ensure housing markets have continued access to mortgage credit 
because it is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. But this public purpose is at odds 
with the financial viability of FHA’s insurance program. The first actuarial review of the Mutual Mortgage 
Insurance Fund stated, “We do not believe it is possible to build MMI’s equity to a level needed to cover 
catastrophic risk. To do so would require premiums at levels that would impair MMI’s social purposes. 
Catastrophic risk is implicitly covered through the backing of the U.S. Treasury” (Price Waterhouse 1990). 
In this sense, the credit subsidies estimated for FHA’s books of business in the housing crisis, and 
ultimately the negative economic value of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, act as an automatic 
economic stabilizer similar to unemployment insurance and akin to stimulus policies like the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
Prematurely scaling back FHA’s activity may jeopardize recovery of the housing market. 
According to Moody’s Analytics, homes sales would have fallen an additional 2.4 million, and prices 
dropped nearly another 20 percent, if FHA had stopped insuring loans in October 2010. “Arguably the 
most important policy response to the housing crash has been the dramatic expansion of Federal 
Housing Administration lending” (Zandi and deRitis 2010). Moreover, retrenching before the Mutual 
Mortgage Insurance Fund is recapitalized creates an inter-temporal form of adverse selection, where FHA 
is most concentrated in the worst performing years of the housing cycle. The 2007 to 2009 books of 
business are projected to ultimately cost the Fund nearly $27 billion (HUD 2014).More recent 
endorsements are projected to yield budgetary cost savings. But the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund’s 
capital ratio is still just 0.41 percent, well below the two percent required by the National Affordable 
Housing Act of 1990. Curbing fraudulent practices, such as seller-funded downpayment assistance 
programs, is necessary, but excessively raising premiums and tightening underwritings standards may be 
self-defeating.  
The need to stabilize both the housing market and FHA’s market share led to FHA to lower its 
annual insurance premium in 2015. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Julien Castro (2015), 
stated: 
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FHA has long been a beacon of hope for underserved borrowers… And we want more 
folks to be able to access our services. First, this means expanding access to credit. 
Some believe that a few years ago, it was too easy to get a home loan. The fact is that in 
2015, it’s too hard… Secondly, we want to make home ownership more affordable for 
those who already qualify for a loan. Last week, President Obama announced that FHA 
will reduce its annual mortgage insurance premiums by half a percentage point by the 
end of this month. Right now, FHA premiums are at a historically high level, and the cost 
of obtaining the American dream is too great for a lot of working folks, folks in the middle 
class… 
 
As a result, Moody’s Analytics home sales will increase by 45,000 and single-family housing starts by 
20,000 with only a modest effect on FHA’s financial health (Zandi and deRitis 2015). 
Conclusion 
The number of FHA endorsements in any year and neighborhood is negatively affected by the 
availability of conventional low downpayment mortgage products. There is one less FHA endorsement for 
approximately every additional 2.3 privately-insured loan originations and every 1.4 closed-end 
subordinate lien mortgage originations. This substitution is statistically significant in the majority of 
metropolitan areas and stronger in traditionally underserved populations, except lower-income 
neighborhoods. Further, the decline in conventional low downpayment mortgage products is responsible 
for the majority of the increase in FHA lending at the peak of the housing crisis. Since then, the decline in 
FHA lending has not been offset by an increase in conventional alternatives, suggesting that FHA is 
prematurely raising premiums and tightening its underwriting standards.  
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CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION AND ACCESS TO MORTGAGE INSURANCE 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, credit in general—and residential mortgage credit in 
particular—has been more difficult to access. While house prices have since stabilized, the availability of 
mortgage credit has yet to return to normal. In November 2012, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 
Ben Bernanke, noted 
Certainly, some tightening of credit standards was an appropriate response to the lax 
lending conditions that prevailed in the years leading up to the peak in house prices... 
However, it seems likely at this point that the pendulum has swung too far the other way, 
and that overly tight lending standards may now be preventing creditworthy borrowers 
from buying homes, thereby slowing the revival in housing and impeding the economic 
recovery. 
 
President Obama echoed these thoughts in his 2013 State of the Union Address. “[E]ven with mortgage 
rates near a 50-year low, too many families with solid credit who want to buy a home are being rejected. 
Too many families who never missed a payment and want to refinance are being told no. That’s holding 
our entire economy back.” Speaking to the National Press Club in 2015, Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development, Julian Castro remarked, “Some believe that a few years ago, it was too easy to get a home 
loan. Now, it's too hard.” 
  Data supports these assertions of tight credit. According to CoreLogic’s Housing Credit Index, 
credit availability in late 2010 was only a third of the levels in the late 1990s (Fleming 2014). RealtyTrac 
(2015) reports the share of loan originations with downpayments of three percent or less declined to just 
25 percent in 2014, the lowest rate in at least eleven years. Not surprisingly, lack of credit availability has 
limited the ability of new homeowners to enter the market. The National Association of Realtors® (2014) 
estimates that first-time homebuyers represented just a third of home purchase loans in 2014, the lowest 
share since 1987. Goodman, Zhu and George (2015) estimate that tighter underwriting standards have 
resulted in 
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1.2 million fewer loans in 2012 relative to 2001 levels. Borrowers in Florida, as well as Black and Hispanic 
borrowers, have been disproportionately impacted (Goodman, Zhu and George 2014). 
 An understudied aspect of mortgage credit availability is the role that mortgage insurance plays in 
facilitating access to homeownership, especially for first-time homebuyers.  Mortgage insurance provides 
coverage to investors against credit losses related to default on mortgage loans.  Borrowers without the 
means for a substantial downpayment are often required to purchase coverage, making the availability of 
mortgage insurance integral to the overall availability of mortgage credit. If a borrower does not qualify for 
mortgage insurance, he or she may be denied the loan itself. This paper examines the selection of FHA 
or private mortgage insurance and the subsequent credit decision of the insurer whether to approve or 
deny the application. The findings further the understanding of racial disparities in mortgage lending and 
the counter-cyclical function of FHA mortgage insurance.  
Background 
 There are two primary forms of mortgage insurance in the United States – one public and one 
private.  The Federal Housing Administration’s mortgage insurance program was created by the National 
Housing Act of 1934 to help stabilize the mortgage market in the midst of the Great Depression. 
Borrowers pay up-front and annual insurance premiums (currently, 1.75% and 0.85%, respectively, for 
30-year mortgages under $625,500 with LTV ratios over 95 percent), although the up-front premium can 
be financed in the loan amount. In exchange, investors receive coverage for the full amount of the 
outstanding loan balance in the event of default.   
The modern private mortgage insurance industry was born two decades later with the creation of 
the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation in 1957. Insurance premiums are typically paid monthly 
and vary by LTV ratio and borrower credit score. The degree of coverage depends on the insurance 
policy but typically ranges up to only the first 35 percent of the loan amount in the event of default, leaving 
investors at risk during periods of extreme loss severity. 
The role of private insurance in the American housing finance system is bolstered by the charter 
of the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which prohibits them from 
purchasing mortgages with downpayments less than 20 percent of the property value, unless “guaranteed 
or insured by a qualified insurer as determined by the corporation.” Together, FHA and private mortgage 
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insurance are integral to ensuring access to mortgage credit for low wealth households in the American 
housing finance system. 
The next sections review the overlap between FHA and conventional (not government-insured) 
segments of the mortgage market and the general accessibility of mortgage credit across borrowers and 
market conditions, including institutional factors that affect the choice of and availability of mortgage 
insurance. 
Market Segmentation and Overlap 
A substantial degree of overlap has been found between FHA and conventional mortgage 
markets (Rodd, Schmidt and Patrabansh 2005; Karikari, Voicu and Fang 2011). Nevertheless, FHA 
insurance is typically associated with borrower characteristics indicative of greater credit risk. Figure 3.1 
clearly shows that FHA-insured loans usually have higher loan-to-value ratios and lower credit scores 
than those in the conventional market. Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) find that the probability of 
using FHA insurance increases by 2.8 percent for every ten point decrease in credit score. Lacour-Little 
(2004) similarly finds that credit score separates FHA and subprime mortgages from conventional prime 
mortgages, but that FHA has stricter documentation standards than subprime loans.  
Although both FHA and private mortgage insurance have tightened underwriting standards in 
recent years, FHA continues to accept borrowers with lower credit scores. According to loan-level data 
released by Fannie Mae, the average credit score on home purchase mortgages with private mortgage 
insurance financed through the Enterprise between 2004 and 2013 was roughly 742; however, credit 
scores increased from 709 to over 764 within that period, demonstrating the effect of stricter underwriting 
standards. For comparison, the credit score on FHA-insured home purchase loans increased from less 
than 640 to over 700 (HUD 2014). According to Ellie Mae (2014), the credit score on denied applications 
for home purchase mortgages reached 733 in 2012 for conventional loans and 669 in 2013 for FHA-
insured loans. 
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Figure 3.1 LTV Ratio and Credit Score on Loans with Insurance 
  
 
Source: Fannie Mae Single-Family Loan Performance Data; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Note: Home purchase mortgages only. 
Institutional factors also appear to influence the likelihood of FHA financing. Karikari, Voicu and 
Fang (2011) find loans originated through depository institutions (commercial banks, thrifts and credit 
unions) are more likely to use FHA insurance compared to independent mortgage companies. In contrast, 
Immergluck (2011) finds wholesale or correspondent lending channels were associated with an increased 
likelihood of being an FHA loan. The difference may be due to the fact that Karikari, Voicu and Fang use 
data from 2005, at the peak of the housing bubble, while Immergluck uses data from 2008, when 
conventional mortgage credit was becoming less available. Immergluck also notes that FHA’s historical 
market share increases the likelihood of FHA insurance, indicating lenders’ familiarity with FHA lending 
may have a legacy effect. 
Another institutional arrangement prevalent in the mid-2000s that may have influenced borrowers’ 
decision between FHA and conventional credit, as well as the choice of which private mortgage insurer to 
use, is captive reinsurance. Reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies and is generally 
recognized as a legitimate risk management strategy. Under a “captive” reinsurance arrangement, a 
mortgage insurance company would cede a portion of its insurance premium revenue to a subsidiary of 
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the mortgage lender; in exchange, losses would be shared.10  By sharing losses, the captive reinsurance 
arrangement can align incentives between the lender and mortgage insurance company.  
However, the risk assumed by the reinsurer must be commensurate with the amount of premiums 
ceded. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac temporarily amended their Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility 
Requirements in early 2008 to limit captive reinsurance out of concern for the capital base of mortgage 
insurance companies and their ability to pay claims. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Alston v. 
Countrywide Financial Corp. (2009) that captive reinsurance arrangements violated the prohibition on 
kickbacks and unearned income under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974.11 Then in 
2013 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed complaints against several mortgage 
insurance companies, alleging that the  “‘reinsurance’ provided by the lenders’ captive reinsurers was of 
little if any value because the projected value of the reinsurance… was far less than the premiums… 
expected to cede.” But private mortgage insurers “advocated the use of captive arrangements to 
encourage lenders to use [their] services” (see CFPB 2013).  
Four of the mortgage insurers settled with CFPB, agreeing to pay $15 million in civil penalties. In 
addition, the settlement requires the insurers not to enter into any new captive reinsurance arrangements 
without approval of CFPB for a period of ten years, although most had already voluntarily suspended new 
arrangements. In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s new Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility 
Requirements states, “Approved insurers may not enter into any new lender captive reinsurance 
contracts nor cede any additional risk to existing lender captive reinsurance arrangements” (FHFA 2014). 
Neighborhood characteristics and economic conditions also impact risk assessments given their 
potential to affect the value of the collateral securing the mortgage. Holmes and Horvitz (1994) find 
conventional lending declines as the default rate in a neighborhood increases but FHA activity rises. And 
Immergluck (2011) notes falling house prices are associated with an increase in FHA insurance. 
                                               
10 Most commonly, risk sharing was structured on an “excess of loss” basis in which the reinsurer is 
responsible for losses above an “attachment point” up to a given amount. 
 
11 The court ruled that captive reinsurance arrangements violated RESPA even though borrowers were 
not alleged to have been overcharged. In fact, rates had been approved by the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Department, but the court rejected the “Filed Rate Doctrine” on the grounds that the plaintiffs challenged 
the “wrongful conduct, not the reasonableness or propriety of the rate that triggered that conduct.”   
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Even after controlling for these factors, the race and ethnicity of borrowers continues to be 
associated with differences in credit channel. Prior to the housing bubble, empirical studies typically found 
minorities were more likely to rely on FHA insurance (Fullerton and MacRae 1978; Canner, Gabriel and 
Woolley 1991; Gabriel and Rosenthal 1991; Holmes and Horvitz 1994). Bunce et al. (1995) summarizes, 
“The main finding from these studies was that race was a significant determinant of FHA financing. 
However, limited data on important borrower characteristics made it difficult for the authors to reach 
strong conclusions about disparate treatment and redlining.” The growth of subprime lending disrupted 
this pattern. For example, Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) find that Hispanics continued to be more 
likely to use FHA insurance, but Blacks were less likely. And Karikari, Voicu and Fang (2011) find minority 
borrowers and neighborhoods were more likely to receive subprime mortgages than FHA-insured loans.  
Most of these studies have focused on FHA and conventional loan originations. This focus on 
mortgage origination conflates the potential borrower’s decision about which channel to apply for 
mortgage credit and the lender or mortgage insurer’s decision to approve the application. Onder (1998) is 
an exception and finds, for example, that “high Black FHA loan originations can be explained by the high 
Black FHA applications.” A complete understanding of access to credit and FHA market share requires 
incorporating both application and credit decisions. 
Credit Availability 
 In the late 1980s, Bill Dedman wrote a series of groundbreaking, Pulitzer Prize-winning articles in 
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution called “The Color of Money,” which documents racial disparities in 
mortgage lending. Dedman (1988) finds that banks in Atlanta were making five times as many loans per 
household in White neighborhoods compared to predominately Black neighborhoods with similar income. 
This is partly because there are fewer house sales in Black neighborhoods and Blacks have 
proportionately fewer loan applications. But home purchase mortgage applications are also four times 
more likely to be denied if the applicant is Black. 
 Munnell et al. (1996) find similar racial disparities in the likelihood of denial in Boston. The authors 
augment applications for conventional mortgages in the 1990 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data with 
information from credit reports and loan applications obtained directly from lenders, including important 
underwriting factors like the loan-to-value ratio, credit history, and debt-to-income ratio. These additional 
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factors have substantively and statistically significant impacts on the likelihood of denial. However, 
Munnell et al. find that, even when accounting for these risk characteristics, race remains a major factor 
impacting a borrower’s ability to get a mortgage. In fact, race alone accounts for an 8 percentage point 
difference in the denial rate. 
Li and Goodman (2014) follow Munnell et al. in merging additional loan characteristics with 
HMDA data. However, the credit quality data obtained from CoreLogic is only available for originated 
loans, not all loan applications. The authors assume that only low credit quality applicants are ever 
denied. Therefore, the “real denial rate” can be calculated by removing loan originations to high credit 
quality borrowers from the denominator of loan applications. This not only increases the reported denial 
rate but accounts for changes in the credit quality of the applicant pool over time.  
With this methodology, accounting for the credit quality of the applicant pool reduces but does not 
eliminate racial disparities in the denial rate. Minority low credit quality applicants (denied applications and 
low quality originations) still have real denial rates 20 to 30 percent higher than non-Hispanic White low 
quality applicants. Low quality applicants are two to three times more likely to be denied by conventional 
lenders than in the government-insured channel, regardless of race. 
In addition, the credit quality of the applicant pool and the availability of credit  is connected to the 
economic cycle Low quality applicants accounted for an average of 50 percent of all applications in 2000, 
but rose to 62 percent at the height of the housing bubble in 2006 before falling to just 31 percent in 2013. 
The adjusted denial rate fell to 25 percent in 2004, showing the relaxed underwriting standards that fueled 
the bubble, before increasing to 43 percent as of 2013. 
Other studies have confirmed the cyclicality of credit availability. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) 
aggregate HMDA data by metropolitan areas and estimate denial rates between 2000 and 2006, finding 
that after controlling for economic conditions, denial rates for prime mortgages fell through 2003 and then 
increased, while denial rates for subprime mortgages exhibited little variation. Mian and Sufi (2009) find 
that zip codes with high latent demand experienced disproportionate declines in denial rate, increases in 
loan originations and rising house prices between 2001 and 2005 despite lower income and job growth.. 
Avery et al. (2011) find that observed declines in mortgage application denial rates since 2008 appear to 
be caused by changes in the composition of the applicant pool. Specifically, a 2.9 percentage point gross 
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decline in the rate of denial between 2008 and 2009 disappears after controlling for borrower 
characteristics and lending institution. Similarly, a 0.3 percentage point decline between 2009 and 2010 
actually becomes a 0.2 point increase. 
Wilcox (2009) uses principal component analysis to combine surveys of loan officers, rate 
spreads, prevalence of adjustable-rate mortgages and conditional default rates into a single measure of 
underwriting standards. The composite metric shows a modest tightening of underwriting standards 
between 2000 and 2002, steady and significant decline until early 2007, then a sharp increase “more than 
double the prior decline, indicating extreme underwriting tightness.” Similarly, Bassett et al. (2012) 
remove bank-specific and macroeconomic factors from the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey to create an exogenous indicator of general credit availability that exhibits the same 
general trend found by Wilcox. Moreover, in a supplemental questionnaire to an April 2012 survey, the 
Federal Reserve found that relative to 2006, many lenders were less likely to originate even GSE-eligible, 
30-year fixed-rate mortgages intended for home purchase. For example, half of the respondents said that 
they were “Somewhat less likely” or “Much less likely” to lend to a borrower with a FICO score of 680 and 
a ten percent down payment (Driscoll 2012). 
One reason mortgage credit might become less available during a housing crisis is the 
requirement that mortgage insurance companies maintain a minimum amount of qualified capital relative 
to the risk in-force. The risk in-force is determined by the degree of insurance coverage, typically between 
12 percent and 35 percent of the loan amount. The most common maximum risk-to-capital ratio is 25:1, 
equivalent to a four percent minimum capital ratio. Private mortgage insurance companies that fall below 
this minimum capital requirement may be forced into run-off, where existing claims continue to be paid 
but companies are prohibited from endorsing new loans. 
As part of their regulatory capital, private insurers are also required by state regulations to build a 
contingency reserve by setting aside half of every premium dollar earned for up to ten years. The 
contingency reserve is meant to build a counter-cyclical buffer against potential catastrophic losses and 
prevent mortgage insurance companies from paying out excessive dividends in good years. However, 
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mortgage insurance companies often received permission to pay “extraordinary”12 dividends during the 
housing bubble, leaving many private insurers under-prepared for the bust. 
Figure 3.2 shows how the capital ratios of mortgage insurers plummeted during the housing 
crisis. Triad Guaranty Insurance Corporation voluntarily ceased endorsing new loans in June 2008 due to 
credit losses and diminished capital reserves and filed for bankruptcy in June 2013. Similarly, Republic 
Mortgage Insurance Co. and PMI Mortgage Insurance Co. were forced into run-off by state regulators in 
August 2011. PMI also filed for bankruptcy that November. Not only did these three insurers stop 
endorsing new loans, but claims on existing policies were partially deferred. By the end of 2013, the 
government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were owed $2 billion in deferred 
payments on mortgage insurance claims (Zandi, Parrott and deRitis 2014). Other insurance companies 
required forbearance from capital regulations or creation of approved affiliates to continue operation. 
Figure 3.2 Regulatory Capital Ratios 
 
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission filings and other company reports. 
                                               
12 “Extraordinary” dividends are generally defined as distributions that combined with any other 
distributions made within the previous year that exceeds ten percent of the insurer’s statutory surplus or 
the statutory net income during the previous calendar year. 
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FHA also has capital requirements. The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 mandates the 
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund which finances FHA’s 203(b) mortgage insurance program maintain at 
least a two percent capital ratio, defined as the economic value13 as a share of the total insurance in-
force. Because FHA insures 100 percent of the loan value, the insurance in-force is equal to the risk in-
force. Consequently, FHA is more exposed to risk but often able to recoup losses in foreclosure where 
private mortgage insurance coverage would have been exhausted.  The first actuarial review of the 
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund notes, “[T]he difference between the 20% per loan risk taken by MICs 
versus the 100% per loan risk taken by FHA also renders use of the [private mortgage insurance 
companies’] 4% capital-to-risk requirement less meaningful to FHA” (Price Waterhouse 1990). 
Regardless, FHA’s capital ratio was over six percent as recently as fiscal year (FY) 2007. But the 
economic value of the MMI Fund plummeted over $38 billion over the next five years, pushing the capital 
ratio not only below its two percent requirement but to a negative 1.4 percent. That is, future claims were 
projected to overwhelm premium revenue and existing capital resources. Nonetheless, not only was FHA 
able to continue endorsing new loans, but the market became to rely on FHA insurance more heavily 
even as the economic value of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund dipped into the red. The resiliency of 
FHA’s mortgage insurance program is directly related to its ability to draw on the U.S. Treasury in exigent 
circumstances. 
Federal backing is integral to understanding FHA’s counter-cyclical properties. Ambrose, 
Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2002) find that the FHA denial rate has been less sensitive to cyclical 
economic risk than the conventional market has been and actually declines in relationship to some 
permanent risk factors like house price volatility. Similarly, Li and Goodman (2014) show that cyclical 
changes in the “real denial rate” are primarily driven by the conventional market. The real conventional 
denial rate was more than four times higher than the real denial rate on government-insured loans in 
1998, but fell to just 60 percent higher in 2004 and has since increased again to be twice as high. Notably 
however, the real denial rate on government-insured loans has been steadily increasing, from 13 percent 
in 2001 to 32 percent in 2013.  
                                               
13 The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 defines economic value as “the current cash available to 
the Fund, plus the net present value of all future cash inflows and outflows expected to result from the 
outstanding mortgages in the Fund.” 
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FHA was created to ensure access to credit during the Great Depression and it reprised that role 
during the Great Recession, suffering heavy credit losses in the process. The negative economic value 
prompted a mandatory $1.7 billion appropriation in September 2013 under the rules of the Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 1990, the first such transfer in FHA’s history. But as former FHA Commissioner John 
Weicher (1995) argued, “[T]he fact that FHA does not lose money on its home mortgage insurance is not 
a justification for its existence; the justification is that it serves a public purpose. Serving that purpose 
without losing money is an indication that the FHA home mortgage insurance program works reasonably 
well—not perfectly, but reasonably well.” 
Conceptual Framework 
 Although the literature suggests that institutional dynamics, borrower race and ethnicity, and other 
factors impact the choice and availability of mortgage insurance, economic theory generally assumes the 
primary determinant is credit risk, meaning the chance a borrower will be unable or unwilling to repay the 
debt causing them to default on the loan. Moreover, any evaluation of institutional effects and racial 
disparities must adequately control for possible differences in credit risk for valid inferences. 
Based on the theoretical model used by Ferguson and Peters (1995), credit risk of mortgage 
applicants is summarized by a single factor, Ω ϵ [0, 1], with a probability density function, 𝑓(Ω), and 
cumulative distribution, 𝐹(Ω) . Underwriting standards can be represented as a maximum acceptable 
credit risk, Ω*, where all applicants above Ω* are rejected by the financial institution (e.g., lender or 
mortgage insurer). The denial rate (?̂?) is the share of applications falling above the maximum acceptable 
credit risk.  
?̂? = 1 − 𝐹(Ω∗) 
And the average credit risk is of originated loans is 
Ω∗̅̅ ̅ = ∫
Ω𝑓(Ω)𝜕Ω
𝐹(Ω∗)
Ω∗
0
 
  Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2002) extend this model to accommodate segmentation 
between conventional and FHA markets. Conventional lenders are assumed to have more stringent 
underwriting standards than FHA, represented as a lower maximum acceptable credit risk (Ω𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣 < Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴). 
Borrowers that fall above this maximum acceptable credit risk instead apply for FHA mortgage insurance, 
and borrowers that fall above FHA’s maximum acceptable risk are denied. In practice, some borrowers 
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are denied by conventional lenders instead of applying for FHA insurance, while others receiving FHA 
insurance could have qualified for conventional mortgage credit. Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and Yezer 
attribute this crossover to tolerance for rejection and incorporate ad hoc carve outs to the conceptual 
framework to accommodate these borrowers. 
 An alternative approach is to use two different application distributions, 𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣(Ω) and 𝑓𝐹𝐻𝐴(Ω), 
such that lower risk applicants typically choose to apply for conventional mortgage credit and higher risk 
applicants select FHA mortgage insurance, leading to differences in the average risk profiles (see Figure 
3.3).  
∫ Ω𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣(Ω)𝜕Ω
1
0
< ∫ Ω𝑓𝐹𝐻𝐴(Ω)𝜕Ω
1
0
 
In fact, Ferguson and Peters use the approach of two different yet possibly overlapping risk distributions 
distinguished by borrower race to analyze the possibility of disparate treatment. But the authors note  
[T]he model is not limited to this racial interpretation. For example, we can interpret the 
components as representing applicants with high versus low income (wealth), applicants 
with stable versus unstable employment prospects, applicants from different geographic 
regions, etc.  
 
Figure 3.3 Credit Risk Distribution of Applications 
 
The conventional-FHA conceptual framework adapted in this paper is easily comparable to the 
high and low wealth representation proposed by Ferguson and Peters. Lower risk borrowers generally 
select into private mortgage insurance to take advantage of the lower mortgage pricing in the 
conventional market. Bunce et al. (1995) argue, “[O]verlap is only possible when lender and borrower fail 
to take advantage of a PMI offer of the same service at lower cost.” Yet overlap in applicant risk 
distributions may exist due to different tolerances for rejection, as Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and Yezer 
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suggest, or because of lender specialization in one or another channel of mortgage credit, or because of 
a lender steering individual borrowers. Nevertheless, FHA’s share of both applications and mortgage 
originations will still rise with credit risk. 
𝜕 (
𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐴(Ω)
𝐹(Ω)
)
𝜕Ω
> 0 
The difference in average risk of the applicant pools leads to a lower denial rate on conventional 
applications than FHA applications if both use the same maximum acceptable credit risk standard. 
𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛?̂? < 𝛿𝐹𝐻?̂? 
While at the same time, the average risk of conventional mortgage originations will be less than FHA-
insured originations. 
Ω𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ < Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
While we would expect that lower denial rates would be associated with higher credit risk, the conceptual 
model here shows that the conventional market has both a lower denial rate and lower credit risk. This 
can be explained by the fact that applicants are sorted, by themselves and/or by lenders, into a type of 
mortgage application, possibly in ways not observable through traditional measures of credit risk. 
Consequently, models that solely focus on the likelihood of denial will fail to account for this selection 
bias. By contrast, a model that integrates the insurance selection decision of the applicant or lender as 
well as the credit decision of the insurer will yield more robust inferences on the availability of credit, and 
insights into the sorting behavior of applicants. 
Methodology 
This paper uses a regression model with sample selection developed by Heckman (1979) and 
extended to a binary outcome by Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981).14 The equation of interest relates 
credit risk (Ω) as a function of neighborhood, applicant and loan characteristics. 
Ω = 𝛼𝑋 + 𝜀1 
However, we only observe whether the credit risk of a given application exceeds the maximum 
risk acceptable (Ω*) to the mortgage insurer and is therefore denied, which can be represented by 
variable δ.  
                                               
14 The selection model with a binary outcome is implemented using the heckprobit command in Stata 
13.1. 
 50 
 
𝛿 = 0 if Ω < Ω∗ (Approved) 
𝛿 = 1 if Ω ≥ Ω∗ (Denied)      
This dichotomous outcome can be modeled using the probit equation 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛿 = 1|𝑋) = Φ(𝛼𝑋) 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
 The Heckman model enables consideration of the selection into the two types of mortgage 
insurance: private mortgage insurance and FHA mortgage insurance. Because private mortgage insurers 
typically cater to a lower risk segment of the market, the choice of insurance may indicate unobserved 
information about the credit risk of the applicant. This sorting can be represented as a latent index  
𝐹𝐻𝐴∗ = 𝛽𝑍 + 𝜀2 
in which the observed behavior is whether the applicant applies for private or FHA mortgage insurance. 
𝛾 = 0 if 𝐹𝐻𝐴∗ < 0 (Private Mortgage Insurance application) 
𝛾 = 1 if 𝐹𝐻𝐴∗ ≥ 0 (FHA Mortgage Insurance application)       
Again, the dichotomous dependent variable can be modeled using a probit equation. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛾 = 1|𝑋) = Φ(𝛽𝑍) 
The selection model approach is preferable to a simple two-stage model because it allows errors 
to be correlated. 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜀1, 𝜀2) = 𝜌 
If ρ≠0, then selection bias is present.15  
After incorporating the selection equation into the outcome probit model, the likelihood function 
becomes 
∏ Φ2(𝛼𝑋, 𝛽𝑍, 𝜌)
𝛾=1
𝛿=1
× ∏ Φ2(−𝛼𝑋, 𝛽𝑍, 𝜌)
𝛾=1
𝛿=0
× ∏ Φ(−𝛽𝑍)
𝛾=0
 
where Φ2 is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function. 
Data 
                                               
15 The inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ (i.e., tanh−1 𝜌 =
1
2
ln (
1+𝜌
1−𝜌
)) is estimated rather than the correlation 
directly.  
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 The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) annually compiles information 
collected from financial institutions on home mortgage lending activities as required under the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975. Since revisions in 2004 to Regulation C that implements 
HMDA, the loan-application register that each financial institution is required to submit has included 
information on loan amount, purpose and lien status, property type and occupancy, as well as the 
income, race/ethnicity and sex of the applicant. This paper focuses on first-lien home purchase loans 
under FHA’s single-family conforming loan limit for purchase of owner-occupied, one-to-four unit 
properties in metropolitan areas between 2004 and 2013. 
The HMDA data is unique because it includes information even on applications for loans that are 
not originated. Consequently, this paper is able to define the denial rate as the number of applications 
denied by the financial institution as a share of all applications for which a credit decision was made. 
Approved applications include loans “approved but not accepted,” in which “the borrower has satisfied the 
underwriting conditions of the lender and the lender agrees to extend credit but the loan is not 
consummated.”16  Applications withdrawn or closed for incompleteness are not considered. Withdrawn 
applications may be hidden denials; however, Munnell et al. (1996) run a multinomial model with 
withdrawn applications as an alternative outcome and find that withdrawals do not look like denials. They 
conclude that the data provide “little evidence to support modeling withdrawals as a lender, rather than a 
borrower, choice.” 
FFIEC has compiled a similar database of applications for private mortgage insurance since 
1993. Combining this data with applications for FHA-insured mortgages from HMDA creates a complete 
database of mortgage insurance applications. The data is exceptional in its coverage; although not all 
lenders are required to report, data collected under HMDA is estimated to cover 90 to 95 percent of all 
FHA lending (HUD 2011).  Although reporting is voluntary, the private mortgage insurance data is 
supposed to be similarly comprehensive due to the relatively consolidated nature of the private mortgage 
insurance industry (Canner et al. 1994). 
                                               
16 The loan may not be originated, for example, for failing to meet customary loan-commitment or loan-
closing conditions, not including “(1) conditions that constitute a counter-offer, such as a demand for a 
higher down-payment; (2) underwriting conditions concerning the borrower's creditworthiness, including 
satisfactory debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios; or (3) verification or confirmation, in whatever form 
the lender ordinarily requires, that the borrower meets underwriting conditions concerning borrower 
creditworthiness” (FFIEC 2010). 
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Examining only this subset of the HMDA data insured by FHA or private mortgage insurance 
companies is better suited to measuring changes in credit availability because mortgage insurance is 
typically only sought for high loan-to-value ratios, information that is not currently recorded directly in the 
loan-application registers. According to loan-level data released by Fannie Mae, the average loan-to-
value ratio on home purchase mortgages with private mortgage insurance financed through the 
Enterprise is roughly 92 percent. For FHA-insured home purchase loans, the typical loan-to-value ratio is 
around 96 percent (HUD 2014).  
There may be some discrepancy in appending FHA data to the private mortgage insurance 
database because the lender, rather than the mortgage insurer, makes the credit decision recorded in 
HMDA. However, under FHA’s Direct Endorsement program, the mortgagee underwrites and closes the 
mortgage loan without prior review or approval from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. Further, HMDA reporting guidelines state, “If an institution evaluates an application based 
on the criteria or actions of a third party other than an investor (such as a government or private insurer or 
guarantor), the institution must report the action taken on the application (loan originated, approved but 
not accepted, or denied, for example)” (FFIEC 2013). Nevertheless, the decision to approve or deny an 
applicant for FHA mortgage insurance may be based on a combination of FHA’s underwriting criteria and 
a decision by the originating institution. Even though FHA accepts the credit risk on any applications 
meeting its underwriting standards, lenders may have reasons not to originate a mortgage, including 
credit overlays intended to avoid indemnity for possible underwriting errors and the costs of servicing 
defaulted loans. 
  
  
 
Table 3.1A Mortgage Insurance Applications by Year and Action 
   
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Federal Housing Administration 
          
 
Action (Percent) 
          
  
Originated 82.4 82.7  83.6  78.8  78.0  80.9  79.8  79.7  80.2  79.1  
  
Approved But Not Accepted 4.3  5.1  4.6  4.4  5.2  4.9  4.6  4.7  4.0  4.0  
  
Denied 13.3  12.2  11.8  16.9  16.9  14.2   15.5  15.5  15.8  16.9  
 
Applications* (Thousands) 375.8  286.0  252.5  272.7  844.1  1,121.9  1,006.5  813.1  788.3  707.6  
Private Mortgage Insurance 
          
 
Action (Percent) 
          
  
Originated 88.0  85.2  87.0  87.1  69.1  67.3  79.9  85.8  90.1  92.0  
  
Approved But Not Accepted 10.5  13.8  12.0  11.2  25.2  21.3  10.5  9.0  6.9  5.9  
  
Denied 1.5  1.1  1.0  1.7  5.8  11.4  9.6  5.2  2.9  2.1  
 
Applications* (Thousands) 508.2  473.1  480.7  780.1  681.0  237.5  143.1  173.2  278.2  466.0  
All Applications* (Thousands) 884.0 759.2 733.2 1,052.8 1,525.1 1,359.4 1,149.6 986.4 1,066.5 1,173.6 
*Loan amounts below FHA single-family loan limits. 
Table 3.1B FHA Application Market Share by Year and Region 
Percent 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Northeast 29.5 27.0 29.3 24.4 45.3 75.6 82.3 77.6 69.7 56.7 
 
New England 31.0 26.7 27.0 20.6 47.0 75.4 79.7 72.8 63.6 51.1 
 
Middle Atlantic 29.0 27.0 30.1 25.7 44.7 75.7 83.3 79.6 72.2 59.0 
Midwest 39.0 35.3 30.3 22.0 54.0 79.2 82.7 76.5 67.3 54.1 
 
East North Central 39.4 35.5 30.9 22.9 53.8 78.8 82.6 76.7 68.2 55.4 
 
West North Central 38.0 35.0 28.9 19.9 54.4 80.0 82.9 75.9 65.4 50.8 
South 46.5 41.5 38.1 29.5 58.1 85.0 89.9 85.6 78.1 65.0 
 
South Atlantic 39.3 33.5 31.3 24.7 56.8 86.0 90.9 86.4 78.2 63.8 
 
East South Central 51.7 46.4 40.4 29.9 60.0 84.1 88.8 84.0 75.7 63.7 
 
West South Central 54.7 49.7 45.2 35.7 59.2 84.0 88.8 84.9 79.0 67.3 
West 50.3 42.8 37.6 23.4 57.9 85.4 90.7 85.2 75.8 61.3 
 
Mountain 56.1 48.3 41.9 27.0 64.0 87.8 91.1 84.5 74.7 60.8 
 
Pacific 41.6 33.3 28.7 17.9 53.8 84.1 90.5 85.7 76.5 61.6 
All Applications 42.5 37.7 34.4 25.9 55.3 82.5 87.6 82.4 73.9 60.3 
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The combined database consists of nearly 10.7 million mortgage insurance applications, of which 
roughly 60 percent are for FHA insurance and slightly over ten percent are denied (Table 3.1A). The 
denial rate varies by insurance type and year. Consistent with our conceptual framework, the denial rate 
on FHA applications is typically higher than for private mortgage insurance, averaging over 15 percent 
between 2004 and 2013 compared to just three percent for private mortgage insurance. However, the 
denial rate on private mortgage insurance applications spiked to over 11 percent at the height of the 
foreclosure crisis in 2009. In contrast, the highest denial rate on FHA insurance applications was in 2013, 
the most recent year data is available. FHA’s market share also varies by time and region (Table 3.1B). 
FHA received only a quarter of applications for mortgage insurance in 2007, but accounted for over 80 
percent between 2009 and 2011. FHA’s market share has typically been lowest in the Northeast and 
highest in the West and South.  
Accounting for shifts in the geographic composition of mortgage insurance applications is 
important in order to accurately understanding changes in credit availability over time. Similarly, the 
characteristics of applicants change over time. The following variables are used as covariates in the 
selection and outcome equations.  
Demographics 
The loan-application register includes the borrower’s race, ethnicity and sex. This paper 
combines these fields into the following single set of mutually exclusive demographic 
categories based on the responses of the primary applicant. This scheme provides the 
most flexibility for exploring demographic patterns. 
 Non-Hispanic White Male  Non-Hispanic White Female 
 Non-Hispanic Black Male  Non-Hispanic Black Female 
 Hispanic or Latino Male  Hispanic or Latino Male 
 Other Male  Other Female 
 Demographic Information Not Available 
 
Estimated Debt-to-Income Ratio 
The loan-application register provides the loan amount and income used to underwrite 
the application. These are combined into a debt-to-income (DTI) ratio commonly used to 
measure the capacity to repay the loan. Converting the loan amount to a debt payment 
requires assuming a 30-year mortgage term and using prevailing conventional mortgage 
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interest rates in the same state and year as measured by Freddie Mac’s Primary 
Mortgage Market Survey. This estimated DTI ratio is represented using a series of 
dummy variables capturing four percentage point intervals in the ratio as well as a 
dummy variable for applications with missing income. 
Relative Loan Amount 
This paper uses the median sales price of existing single-family homes in the same 
county as the loan application, estimated by Moody’s Economy.com based on National 
Association of Realtors® data, to provide local housing market context for the proposed 
loan amount. The relative loan amount is expressed as a loan-to-median value ratio and 
represented using a series of dummy variables capturing 15 percentage point intervals in 
the ratio. Admittedly, the county median sales price is a poor substitute for the value of 
the collateral used to secure the mortgage—information not currently collected under 
HMDA. The borrowers and neighborhoods served by FHA may be systematically 
different than other properties even in the same county. 
Active Lenders 
The number of active lenders in the market is measured by the number of distinct 
financial institutions reporting under HMDA that accepted application for home purchase 
loans in the same Census tract in a given year. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) find that, at least 
in the subprime market, denial rates were inversely related to the number of active 
lenders. 
Market Conditions 
The health of the local economy affects the likelihood of default and therefore may be 
considered by mortgage insurers in their underwriting decisions. Market conditions are 
measured using three variables: 
Unemployment Rate - Measured at the county-level with information 
provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Change in House Prices - Year-over-year change in house prices by 
metropolitan area and division calculated using the house price index 
released by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
Serious Delinquency Rate - The share of home mortgages 90 days late, or in 
the foreclosure process, in a given state reported by the Mortgage Bankers 
Association’s National Delinquency Survey. 
Again, variables defined at the county- or higher geographic-levels may not accurately 
describe the conditions in the neighborhoods where mortgage insurance, particularly 
FHA insurance, is being sought.  
Location 
HMDA reporting requires the location of the property intended to secure the loan to be 
identified using the Federal Information Processing Standard used by the U.S. Census 
Bureau down to the Census tract. The full data contains nearly 67,000 Census tracts, 
which would be computationally arduous. Instead, this paper first runs the model on the 
full data using only metropolitan area/division-level fixed effects. Next, the data is 
restricted to Census tracts with at least one application in each year studied (2004 to 
2013).17  Ten percent of these Census tracts are randomly sampled for a supplemental 
analysis incorporating Census tract fixed effects. Two additional samples are selected 
based on housing market characteristics. A “Rust” sample consists of metropolitan areas 
and divisions that experienced very little housing price appreciation during the housing 
bubble but have suffered house price declines between 2004 and 2013 and are located 
primarily in the “Rust Belt” region of the industrial Midwest. A “Bubble” sample consists of 
markets with large swings in house prices and are mostly located in the “Sand States” of 
Florida, California and Nevada. Figure 3.4 shows how metropolitan areas were classified 
based on short- and long-term changes in house prices and Appendix A lists the 
metropolitan areas included in each sample.  
  
                                               
17 These years span the 2000 Census and 2010 Census. Consequently, only Census tracts that did not 
change between Census years can be included in the sampling frame. 
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Figure 3.4 Metropolitan Area Types 
 
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency 
The estimated coefficients associated with Census tracts included in the national ten 
percent sample are subsequently analyzed for patterns  in the selection of mortgage 
insurance type and the likelihood of denial associated with certain neighborhood 
characteristics from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey. 
Model identification comes primarily from the non-linear form of selection equations; however, 
one variable unique to the selection question is included: 
FHA Legacy Share 
In estimating the likelihood of FHA insurance in 2008, Immergluck (2011) includes the 
average FHA market share in the state between 1999 and 2002 in order “to detect 
potential legacy effects of FHA lending.” 
That is, we might expect FHA volume to be higher in places that had high levels 
of FHA lending before the subprime boom. This might be because mortgage 
brokers or lenders in the region had some accumulated expertise or comfort with 
FHA lending or other reasons.  
 
This paper also measures possible legacy effects using a geographic-based variable, but 
based on FHA market shares within the financial institutions active in a neighborhood. 
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
H
o
u
s
e
 P
ri
c
e
 C
h
a
n
g
e
, 
2
0
0
4
 t
o
 2
0
1
3
 (
P
e
rc
e
n
t)
House Price Change, 2004 to Peak (Percent)
"Rust"
"Bubble"
Other
 58 
 
The institutional FHA share in a given neighborhood is estimated as the FHA share of 
lender j in the previous year18 (t -1) multiplied by that lender’s share of all loans in a given 
Census tract g in the current year t, summed over all lenders. 
𝐹𝐻𝐴 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑔𝑡 = ∑ (
𝐹𝐻𝐴𝑗𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡−1
) (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑡
)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
Lenders not active in either the current or previous year are excluded from the numerator 
and denominator. 
Finally, the outcome equation for private mortgage insurance companies includes the respective 
capital ratio for each financial institution and year in addition to fixed effects for each institution. However, 
because capital ratios could not be found for every private mortgage insurance company, outcome 
models are run with and without this variable. FHA’s capital ratio would be collinear with year and 
therefore cannot be included. 
Table 3.2 summarizes these variables for each of the four samples used in this paper. Non-
Hispanic Whites account for nearly 60 percent of mortgage insurance applications between 2004 and 
2013. Non-Hispanic Blacks account for almost ten percent of applications and Hispanics for 13 percent. 
Loan amounts averaged roughly four percent below the median sales price in the county and the debt-to-
income ratio averaged roughly 19 percent for those with reported income (two percent of applications did 
not report income). Total mortgage insurance applications were lowest in 2006 and peaked in 2008. 
Census tracts averaged 34 financial institutions active in accepting mortgage applications (not limited to 
loans with mortgage insurance). The county unemployment rate averaged seven percent and the state 
serious mortgage delinquency averaged 5.6 percent. Year-over-year change in metropolitan area house 
prices was flat on average over these ten years but with wide variation, particularly in the “Bubble” 
housing markets. Although the non-Hispanic White share of borrowers is slightly elevated and loan 
amounts moderately smaller, the ten percent sample of Census tracts is largely representative of all 
applications. 
  
                                               
18 Lenders are tracked over time using the federal tax identification number found in the HMDA transmittal 
sheet rather than the agency code and respondent identification number provided in the loan-applicant 
register. 
  
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
    A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
Applications 10,689,655 555,030 530,553 450,147 
Geographic Fixed Effects 51 2,443 2,054 2,167 
Mortgage Insurance (%) 
    
 
FHA 60.5 59.1 67.2 59.2 
 
PMI 39.5 40.9 32.8 40.8 
Action (%) 
    
 
Originated 81.4 81.7 76.8 80.6 
 
Approved But Not Accepted 8.0 8.0 9.3 8.1 
 
Denied 10.5 10.3 13.9 11.2 
Demographics (%) 
    
 
Non-Hispanic White Male 38.8 40.3 27.9 48.9 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Male 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.8 
 
Hispanic Male 8.7 7.4 19.7 1.9 
 
Other Male 2.5 2.0 2.2 1.0 
 
Non-Hispanic White Female 20.0 21.2 15.8 25.8 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Female 5.1 5.2 3.7 4.8 
 
Hispanic Female 4.1 3.5 9.6 0.9 
 
Other Female 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.5 
 
Not Available 15.1 14.9 15.8 12.5 
Loan-to-Median Value Ratio (%) 
    
 
Under 55% 13.3 14.2 20.4 8.4 
 
55% to 69% 15.2 16.0 19.2 10.6 
 
70% to 84% 18.0 18.0 18.3 13.6 
 
85% to 99% 16.0 15.6 13.6 13.4 
 
100% to 114% 11.8 11.4 8.7 11.5 
 
115% to 129% 8.2 8.0 6.1 9.3 
 
130% to 144% 5.7 5.5 4.4 7.4 
 
145% or Higher 11.8 11.3 9.2 25.9 
Debt-to-Income Ratio (%) 
    
 
Under 8% 4.3 4.8 3.6 8.8 
 
8% to 11% 12.1 13.0 9.7 19.4 
 
12% to 15% 20.1 20.9 17.1 24.6 
 
16% to 19% 21.3 21.4 20.3 20.7 
 
20% to 23% 17.3 16.8 18.5 13.4 
 
24% to 27% 11.5 10.8 13.4 6.7 
 
28% to 31% 6.4 5.8 7.8 3.0 
 
32% or Higher 5.2 4.6 6.8 2.0 
  Not Available 1.8 1.8 2.8 1.5 
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Continued 
      
 
A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
Proj. FHA Lender Share  (Mean) 25.0 24.0 30.3 23.9 
  
(17.0) (16.8) (20.6) (16.7) 
Lenders (Mean) 34.1 28.2 31.8 23.2 
  
(23.3) (14.4) (19.0) (10.1) 
Unemployment Rate (Mean) 7.0 6.9 8.9 8.4 
  
(2.7) (2.6) (4.0) (2.6) 
Change in House Prices (Mean) -0.01 0.40 -2.83 -1.63 
  
(8.31) (7.40) (16.08) (5.15) 
Delinquency Rate (Mean) 5.6 5.4 9.3 6.2 
  
(3.7) (3.5) (6.3) (2.1) 
Year (%) 
    
 
2004 8.3 8.9 8.7 9.3 
 
2005 7.1 7.7 5.7 8.4 
 
2006 6.9 7.5 4.5 8.0 
 
2007 9.8 10.6 8.0 10.7 
 
2008 14.3 13.8 15.1 12.7 
 
2009 12.7 12.3 14.2 10.9 
 
2010 10.8 10.3 12.5 9.6 
 
2011 9.2 8.8 10.6 8.8 
 
2012 10.0 9.5 10.1 10.0 
  2013 11.0 10.6 10.6 11.8 
Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
6
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Findings 
For each set of models, four results are shown. The first uses all applications and metropolitan 
area/division fixed effects. The second uses the nationwide sample of ten percent of Census tracts using 
tract-level fixed effects. The final two use the “Bubble” and “Rust” housing market samples, respectively. 
Coefficients estimated in a probit model are presented in terms of the z-score that correspond to changes 
in the probability in the standard normal distribution (see Figure 3.5). To aid in interpretation, the average 
marginal effects19, expressed in percentage points, are derived for each equation based on the model 
using a national sample of Census tracts and presented in Table 3.7. 
Figure 3.5 Standard Distribution, Probabilities and Z-Scores 
 
Z-score: 
Probability: 
-2.0 
0.0228 
-1.0 
0.1587 
0.0 
0.500 
1.0 
0.8413 
2.0 
0.9772 
 
Type of Insurance 
The results of the selection equation, capturing the likelihood of applying for FHA insurance 
relative to private mortgage insurance, are shown in Table 3.3. Each model is statistically significant and 
has pseudo-R2 values between 0.225 and 0.394. 
  
                                               
19 The average marginal effect for variable j in a probit model is determined by the formula 
∑ 𝛼𝑗𝜙(𝑥𝑖𝛼)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 
where 𝜙 is the standard normal density function. 
  
 
Table 3.3 Selection Equation: FHA Insurance Application 
  
A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
   Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Demographics 
        
 
Non-Hispanic White Male . . . . . . 
  
 
Non-Hispanic Black Male 0.4607*** 0.0024 0.395*** 0.011 0.363*** 0.014 0.356*** 0.013 
 
Hispanic Male 0.2493*** 0.0018 0.1658*** 0.0090 0.1209*** 0.0073 0.162*** 0.016 
 
Other Male -0.1158*** 0.0028 -0.073*** 0.014 -0.122*** 0.015 -0.157*** 0.021 
 
Non-Hispanic White Female 0.0257*** 0.0012 0.0273*** 0.0051 -0.0041 0.0069 0.0482*** 0.0052 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Female 0.4845*** 0.0023 0.421*** 0.011 0.358*** 0.014 0.320*** 0.012 
 
Hispanic Female 0.2324*** 0.0026 0.178*** 0.012 0.0882*** 0.0093 0.255*** 0.024 
 
Other Female -0.0382*** 0.0039 -0.060*** 0.019 -0.063*** 0.019 0.022 0.030 
 
Not Available -0.4698*** 0.0013 -0.5476*** 0.0061 -0.5557*** 0.0070 -0.6684*** 0.0070 
Loan-to-Median Value Ratio 
        
 
Under 55% . . . . . . . . 
 
55% to 69% 0.0023 0.0017 0.0259*** 0.0075 -0.1255*** 0.0077 0.071*** 0.010 
 
70% to 84% -0.0263*** 0.0017 0.0225*** 0.0077 -0.1993*** 0.0081 0.0878*** 0.0099 
 
85% to 99% -0.0937*** 0.0017 -0.0220*** 0.0081 -0.3053*** 0.0092 0.042*** 0.010 
 
100% to 114% -0.1719*** 0.0019 -0.0837*** 0.0089 -0.438*** 0.011 -0.004 0.011 
 
115% to 129% -0.2593*** 0.0020 -0.1697*** 0.0098 -0.505*** 0.012 -0.071*** 0.011 
 
130% to 144% -0.3529*** 0.0023 -0.250*** 0.011 -0.581*** 0.013 -0.101*** 0.012 
 
145% or Higher -0.5516*** 0.0020 -0.4280*** 0.0098 -0.780*** 0.011 -0.303*** 0.011 
Debt-to-Income Ratio 
        
 
Under 8% . . . . . . . . 
 
8% to 11% 0.0701*** 0.0024 0.064*** 0.010 0.140*** 0.013 0.153*** 0.009 
 
12% to 15% 0.2257*** 0.0023 0.2286*** 0.0097 0.340*** 0.013 0.344*** 0.009 
 
16% to 19% 0.3595*** 0.0023 0.3537*** 0.0099 0.518*** 0.013 0.464*** 0.009 
 
20% to 23% 0.4434*** 0.0024 0.436*** 0.010 0.592*** 0.013 0.527*** 0.010 
 
24% to 27% 0.4721*** 0.0025 0.457*** 0.011 0.606*** 0.013 0.463*** 0.012 
 
28% to 31% 0.4437*** 0.0028 0.389*** 0.013 0.538*** 0.014 0.275*** 0.015 
 
32% or Higher 0.2682*** 0.0030 0.189*** 0.013 0.345*** 0.015 0.089*** 0.018 
  Not Available 0.0563*** 0.0040 0.066*** 0.018 -0.028 0.019 0.177*** 0.020 
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Continued A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
    Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Projected FHA Lender Share -0.3850*** 0.0028 -0.153*** 0.014 0.113*** 0.027 -0.032* 0.017 
Lenders 0.000892*** 0.000023 -0.00226*** 0.00036 -0.00257*** 0.00034 -0.00512*** 0.00051 
Unemployment Rate 0.06325*** 0.00052 0.0414*** 0.0032 -0.0337*** 0.0039 0.0327*** 0.0040 
Change in House Prices -0.004056*** 0.000094 -0.00445*** 0.00048 -0.00489*** 0.00052 0.0103*** 0.0011 
Delinquency Rate 0.03423*** 0.00032 0.0308*** 0.0017 0.0696*** 0.0014 0.0453*** 0.0054 
Year 
        
 
2004 . . . . . . . . 
 
2005 -0.1656*** 0.0021 -0.1446*** 0.0091 -0.391*** 0.013 -0.1512*** 0.0096 
 
2006 -0.2134*** 0.0022 -0.2502*** 0.0096 -0.551*** 0.013 -0.272*** 0.011 
 
2007 -0.4951*** 0.0021 -0.564*** 0.010 -0.906*** 0.018 -0.570*** 0.013 
 
2008 0.1896*** 0.0022 0.192*** 0.010 -0.096*** 0.027 0.433*** 0.015 
 
2009 0.0225*** 0.0032 0.319*** 0.016 0.221*** 0.043 0.480*** 0.030 
 
2010 -0.1260*** 0.0039 0.257*** 0.020 0.424*** 0.047 0.367*** 0.033 
 
2011 -0.2233*** 0.0038 0.137*** 0.019 0.391*** 0.043 0.330*** 0.027 
 
2012 -0.2290*** 0.0033 0.063*** 0.016 0.323*** 0.035 0.256*** 0.021 
  2013 -0.3850*** 0.0028 -0.153*** 0.014 0.113*** 0.027 -0.032* 0.017 
Geographic Fixed Effects Metro Area/Division Census Tract 
 
Census Tract 
 
Census Tract 
 
Applications 10,689,655 
 
555,030 
 
530,553 
 
450,147 
 
Pseudo R2 0.225 
 
0.247 
 
0.394 
 
0.233 
 Wald Χ2 3231081*** 
 
185096.8*** 
 
264101.8*** 
 
141997.5*** 
 Log Likelihood -5555933   -282879.8   -203512.9   -233331.8   
Geographic fixed effects not shown. 
Statistically significant at the ***1% level **5% level *10% level 
  
6
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The likelihood of applying for FHA insurance generally increases with the estimated DTI ratio, but 
peaks in the 24 to 27 percent range. In the model with all applications, these DTI ratios are associated 
with a 0.472 increase in the predicted z-score relative to extremely low DTI ratios (under 8 percent).  The 
relationship is somewhat weaker when there is a more refined accounting of neighborhood conditions. In 
the national sample of Census tracts, applications with DTI ratios between 24 and 27 percent are 
associated with a 0.457 increase in the predicted z-score, equivalent to a 13.1 percentage point increase 
in FHA’s share of mortgage insurance applications. However, the estimated change in the z-score is even 
higher in the housing markets that experienced extreme variation in house prices (i.e., “Bubble” housing 
markets). Applications that do not report borrower income are typically less likely to be for FHA insurance 
than applications with DTI ratios of at least 12 percent. 
Although all loan amounts are limited to those under FHA’s single-family loan amounts, 
applicants asking for lower loan amounts are still disproportionately more likely to apply for FHA 
insurance. The likelihood of applying for FHA insurance generally falls as the loan-to-median value ratio 
increases. Using all applications, the predicted z-score for loan amounts between 30 and 44 percent 
higher than the county median single-family house sales price is 0.353 lower than loan amounts less than 
55 percent of the median, and loan amounts 45 percent and higher are associated with a 0.552 decline in 
the predicted z-score. Again, the estimated correlation between loan-level underwriting factors and the 
likelihood of FHA application is weaker with more precise neighborhood controls. The respective declines 
in predicted z-scores in the national sample of Census tracts are 0.250 and 0.428, equivalent to a 7.2 and 
12.3 percentage point decline in FHA’s share of mortgage applications. The relationship is even weaker 
in “Rust” housing markets, but again substantially stronger in “Bubble” markets. It is important to note the 
difference between the specific loan-to-value ratio of the application and the loan amount in context of 
neighborhood house prices.  
As expected given FHA’s counter-cyclical purpose, poor economic conditions generally favor 
FHA insurance. The likelihood of FHA application is directly related to the serious delinquency rate in 
every sample. The likelihood of application is inversely related to the year-over-year change in house 
prices in three models (“Rust” markets are the exception) and directly related to the county unemployment 
rate (“Bubble” markets are the exception). Based on the national sample of Census tracts, FHA’s share of 
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mortgage insurance applications increases 0.9 percentage points for every percentage point increase in 
the mortgage serious delinquency rate, 1.2 percentage points for every percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate, and 1.3 percentage points for every ten percent decline in house prices. Having 
more active lenders in a neighborhood is associated with an increase in the likelihood of FHA application 
in the model using all applications, but the relationship reverses in every model using Census tract fixed 
effects; regardless of the model, the strength of the relationship is weak: it takes an additional hundred 
lenders to lower FHA’s share of mortgage insurance applications by seven percentage points. Previous 
FHA activity among active lenders has a statistically significant legacy effect, raising the predicted z-score 
by 0.032 for every percentage point in the predicted FHA share of overall mortgage activity, equivalent to 
a 0.7 percentage point change in FHA’s share of mortgage insurance applications. 
The year of application clearly captures market developments not represented elsewhere. The 
likelihood of FHA application relative to private mortgage insurance fell between 2004 and 2007 in all 
models. In the model of all applications, the predicted z-score was 0.495 lower in 2007 relative to 2004. In 
the national sample of Census tracts, the predicted decline in z-score was 0.564, equivalent to a 16.2 
percentage point decline in FHA’s share of mortgage insurance applications. The decline was 
substantially greater in “Bubble” housing markets.  
But the likelihood of FHA application spiked with the onset of the financial crisis. In the model of 
all applications, the spike occurs in 2008 and is associated with a 0.685 increase in predicted z-scores 
relative to the previous year. Interestingly, the spike occurs a year later with more precise neighborhood 
controls. In the model based on the national sample of Census tracts, 2009 is associated with a 0.882 
increase in predicted z-scores relative to 2007, equivalent to a 25.4 percentage point swing in FHA’s 
share of mortgage insurance applications. The change was even more dramatic in both “Rust” as well as 
“Bubble” housing markets, where the likelihood of FHA application peaked.  
Since the peak of the financial crisis, the likelihood of applying for FHA insurance has generally 
been falling. In the model of all applications, 2013 is associated with a predicted z-score nearly 0.385 
lower than in 2004. In the national sample of Census tracts, the equivalent figure is 0.153 lower, 
equivalent to a 4.4 percentage point decline in FHA’s share of mortgage applications relative to 2004 and 
13.6 percentage points compared to 2009. 
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After controlling for income, loan amount, and economic conditions, minorities still rely 
disproportionately on FHA insurance. For example, Black and African-American males and females are 
associated with a 0.461 and 0.484 increase, respectively, in the predicted z-score relative to non-Hispanic 
White males in the model of all applications. This relationship is somewhat smaller after including fixed 
effects for neighborhood conditions. Using the national sample of Census tracts, the estimated change in 
z-scores are 0.395 and 0.421, respectively, equivalent to 11.4 to 12.1 percentage point increases in 
FHA’s share of mortgage insurance applications. Hispanic borrowers are associated with a z-score than 
is 0.232 to 0.249 higher in the model of all applications, and 0.166 to 0.178 higher in the sample of 
Census tracts, equivalent to a roughly five percentage point increase in FHA’s share. The difference 
between Hispanic applicants, particularly Hispanic female applicants, and non-Hispanic White males is 
noticeably smaller in “Bubble” housing markets. Applications where the sex, race or ethnicity was not 
reported are substantially less likely to be for FHA insurance. 
Likelihood of Denial 
Federal Housing Administration 
The results of the FHA outcome equation are shown in Table 3.4. Each model of FHA denial 
rates is statistically significant. Notably, the correlation between errors in the selection and outcome 
equation is also statistically significant, indicating selection bias. The correlation is 0.263 in the model of 
all applications. The correlation is weaker in the national sample of Census tracts and in the model of 
“Bubble” housing markets, but similarly strong in “Rust” housing markets.  
The likelihood of denial generally increases with DTI ratio, particularly once debt payments 
exceed 32 percent of income. In the model of all applications, FHA applications with DTI ratios between 
28 and 31 percent are associated with a 0.245 increase in the z-score, but applications with DTI ratios 32 
percent or higher are associated with a 0.806 increase in the z-score relative to applications with DTI 
ratios under eight percent.  Estimated change in z-scores are similar in the sample of Census tracts and 
are associated with 5.4 and 16.6 percentage point increase in the share of applications denied by FHA, 
respectively. The relationship between DTI ratio and the likelihood of denial in FHA applications is weaker 
in “Bubble” housing markets but substantially stronger in “Rust” markets. Applications without reported 
borrower income are also more likely to be denied. 
  
 
Table 3.4 Outcome Equation: FHA Denial 
  
A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
   Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Demographics 
        
 
Non-Hispanic White Male . . . . . . . . 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Male 0.4117*** 0.0029 0.334*** 0.014 0.291*** 0.014 0.338*** 0.015 
 
Hispanic Male 0.2304*** 0.0023 0.197*** 0.012 0.1928*** 0.0080 0.169*** 0.021 
 
Other Male 0.1997*** 0.0039 0.203*** 0.020 0.227*** 0.017 0.144*** 0.030 
 
Non-Hispanic White Female -0.0202*** 0.0018 -0.0190** 0.0078 0.0108 0.0082 -0.0188** 0.0074 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Female 0.3784*** 0.0027 0.299*** 0.013 0.279*** 0.013 0.320*** 0.014 
 
Hispanic Female 0.2092*** 0.0029 0.168*** 0.015 0.1801*** 0.0096 0.151*** 0.028 
 
Other Female 0.1960*** 0.0051 0.216*** 0.026 0.208*** 0.021 0.179*** 0.039 
 
Not Available 0.2887*** 0.0027 0.300*** 0.014 0.310*** 0.011 0.279*** 0.018 
Loan-to-Median Value Ratio 
        
 
Under 55% . . . . . . . . 
 
55% to 69% -0.1794*** 0.0022 -0.174*** 0.010 -0.1434*** 0.0086 -0.162*** 0.014 
 
70% to 84% -0.2545*** 0.0022 -0.267*** 0.011 -0.1925*** 0.0092 -0.244*** 0.014 
 
85% to 99% -0.3048*** 0.0023 -0.313*** 0.011 -0.206*** 0.010 -0.301*** 0.014 
 
100% to 114% -0.3229*** 0.0025 -0.346*** 0.013 -0.198*** 0.012 -0.357*** 0.015 
 
115% to 129% -0.3443*** 0.0029 -0.371*** 0.014 -0.211*** 0.013 -0.417*** 0.016 
 
130% to 144% -0.3490*** 0.0033 -0.373*** 0.016 -0.209*** 0.015 -0.404*** 0.017 
 
145% or Higher -0.3660*** 0.0029 -0.379*** 0.015 -0.161*** 0.014 -0.458*** 0.015 
Debt-to-Income Ratio 
        
 
Under 8% . . . . . . . . 
 
8% to 11% -0.1243*** 0.0034 -0.144*** 0.015 -0.163*** 0.015 -0.057*** 0.012 
 
12% to 15% -0.1323*** 0.0033 -0.139*** 0.014 -0.208*** 0.014 -0.031** 0.013 
 
16% to 19% -0.0783*** 0.0034 -0.081*** 0.015 -0.184*** 0.015 0.048*** 0.014 
 
20% to 23% -0.0006 0.0035 -0.001 0.016 -0.124*** 0.015 0.188*** 0.015 
 
24% to 27% 0.1027*** 0.0037 0.099*** 0.017 -0.036** 0.016 0.352*** 0.017 
 
28% to 31% 0.2452*** 0.0040 0.273*** 0.018 0.110*** 0.017 0.662*** 0.021 
 
32% or Higher 0.8063*** 0.0040 0.831*** 0.018 0.726*** 0.017 1.458*** 0.027 
  Not Available 0.5080*** 0.0057 0.536*** 0.026 0.448*** 0.025 0.518*** 0.028 
  
6
7
 
  
 
Continued 
A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
    Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Lenders -0.001718*** 0.000034 -0.00545*** 0.00055 -0.00515*** 0.00047 -0.00845*** 0.00076 
Unemployment Rate 0.03614*** 0.00071 0.0036 0.0044 -0.0051 0.0049 0.0393*** 0.0051 
Change in House Prices -0.00139*** 0.00014 -0.00186*** 0.00071 -0.00187*** 0.00067 0.0073*** 0.0015 
Delinquency Rate 0.01131*** 0.00046 0.0137*** 0.0024 0.0101*** 0.0019 0.0191** 0.0075 
Year 
        
 
2004 . . . . . . . . 
 
2005 -0.0469*** 0.0041 -0.035* 0.018 0.031 0.026 -0.185*** 0.019 
 
2006 -0.1078*** 0.0044 -0.139*** 0.020 -0.090*** 0.029 -0.174*** 0.022 
 
2007 0.0515*** 0.0047 0.016 0.023 -0.036 0.032 0.040 0.026 
 
2008 0.1391*** 0.0036 0.050*** 0.018 -0.040 0.037 0.090*** 0.025 
 
2009 0.0025 0.0045 0.002 0.024 -0.050 0.052 -0.111*** 0.042 
 
2010 0.0408*** 0.0048 0.052** 0.026 0.010 0.054 0.016 0.042 
 
2011 0.0974*** 0.0045 0.082*** 0.024 -0.007 0.049 0.137*** 0.034 
 
2012 0.1622*** 0.0041 0.150*** 0.022 0.046 0.040 0.179*** 0.028 
  2013 0.1919*** 0.0036 0.190*** 0.018 0.099*** 0.030 0.157*** 0.023 
tanh-1 ρ 0.2605*** 0.0067 0.144*** 0.034 0.101*** 0.028 0.247*** 0.228 
ρ   0.255   0.143   0.100   0.242   
Geographic Fixed Effects Metro Area/Division Census Tract 
 
Census Tract 
 
Census Tract 
 
Uncensored Applications 6,478,900 
 
328,146 
 
356,734 
 
266,551 
 Wald Χ2 306833.5*** 
 
19325.58*** 
 
20183.09*** 
 
16647.07*** 
 Log Likelihood -8171770   -411817.1   -364344.7   -343976.1   
Geographic fixed effects not shown. 
Statistically significant at the ***1% level **5% level *10% level 
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Higher loan amounts relative to median house prices are associated with lower likelihood of 
denial. Specifically, loan amounts 15 percent or higher than the median sales price on single-family 
homes in the same county are associated with a 0.323 to 0.366 decrease in the z-score compared to loan 
amounts 45 percent less than the area median in the model using all applications and 0.371 to 0.379 
decreases in the sample of Census tracts, equivalent to more than a seven percentage point decline in 
the FHA denial rate. Again, the relationship is weaker in “Bubble” housing markets and stronger in “Rust” 
markets. 
Poor economic conditions are associated with greater risk of denial. The likelihood of denial of 
FHA applications is directly related to the state serious mortgage delinquency rate in each sample. In 
three models, the likelihood of denial is inversely related to the year-over-year change in metropolitan 
area house prices (“Rust” markets are the exception) and the likelihood of denial is directly related to the 
county unemployment rate (“Bubble” markets are the exception and the estimated coefficient is not 
statistically significant). Supporting Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), having more active lenders in a 
neighborhood is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of denial in every model. Every additional 
active financial institution in a Census tract is associated with a 0.002 decline in the predicted z-score in 
the model of all applications and a 0.005 decline in the national sample of Census tracts, equivalent to a 
0.1 percentage point decline in the FHA denial rate.  
The likelihood of FHA denial fell between 2004 and 2006 but has been rising since 2009. 
Specifically, the predicted z-score associated with applications in 2006 is 0.108 lower than in 2004 in the 
model of all applications and 0.139 lower in the sample of Census tracts, corresponding to a 2.8 
percentage point decline in the share of mortgage insurance applications denied by FHA. The decline is 
larger in “Rust” housing markets, but surprisingly not in “Bubble” markets. Then in the four years after 
2009, the predicted z-score rises by nearly 0.19. By 2013 the FHA denial rate is 3.8 percentage points 
higher than it was in 2004 and 6.6 percentage points higher than in 2006, even after controlling for 
neighborhood and loan characteristics. The increase in the likelihood of denial associated with the year of 
application is also more muted in “Bubble” housing markets. 
Again, applicant demographics are still a factor after controlling for income, loan amount, and 
economic conditions. Again, replacing the state-level fixed effects with Census tract effects reduces but 
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does not eliminate racial disparities. The change in the predicted z-score associated with Black and 
African-American males is 0.412 in the full model with metropolitan area-level fixed effects. In the model 
with Census tract effects, the change in the z-score falls to 0.334, corresponding to a 6.6 percentage 
point disparity in FHA denial rates. With respect to Hispanic males, the change in the z-score falls from 
0.230 to 0.197, equivalent to a 3.9 percentage point disparity.  
Females are typically somewhat less likely to be denied than males of the same race and 
ethnicity. Applications without information on the applicant’s race, ethnicity and/or sex are associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of denial, but typically an increase less than that associated with Black and 
African-American applicants. 
Private Mortgage Insurance 
The results of the outcome equation for private mortgage insurance is shown in Table 3.5. Each 
model is statistically significant. The correlation in error terms between the selection and outcome 
equations is statistically significant in the model with all mortgage insurance applications but small and 
negative, indicating applicants associated with an unexplained increase in the likelihood of using private 
mortgage insurance are also associated with a lower likelihood of being denied by private insurers. 
However, the correlation is stronger and positive in the model of “Rust” housing markets. The correlation 
is not significant in the national sample of Census tract or in the model of “Bubble” housing markets.  
 As in the model of FHA denials, the likelihood of denial by private mortgage insurers rises with 
DTI ratio. In the model using all applications, the predicted z-score associated with DTI ratios between 28 
and 31 percent is 0.063 points higher than applications with DTI ratios under 8 percent and jumps to 
0.191 points higher for DTI ratios of 32 percent or higher. The estimated change in z-scores is stronger in 
the sample of Census tracts and corresponds to an increase in the share of applications denied by private 
mortgage insurance of up to 1.7 percentage points. Also similar to the model of FHA denial rates, the 
correlation with DTI ratios is much weaker in “Bubble” markets. 
  
  
 
Table 3.5 Outcome Equation: PMI Denial 
  
A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
   Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Demographics 
        
 
Non-Hispanic White Male . . . . . . . . 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Male 0.2195*** 0.0080 0.148*** 0.037 0.133*** 0.039 0.173*** 0.041 
 
Hispanic Male 0.1775*** 0.0057 0.199*** 0.026 0.124*** 0.021 0.029 0.050 
 
Other Male 0.0725*** 0.0076 0.138*** 0.037 0.069 0.042 0.116** 0.055 
 
Non-Hispanic White Female -0.0047 0.0037 -0.032** 0.016 -0.016 0.021 -0.037** 0.016 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Female 0.2113*** 0.0079 0.160*** 0.037 0.181*** 0.040 0.147*** 0.039 
 
Hispanic Female 0.1558*** 0.0076 0.150*** 0.036 0.106*** 0.025 0.078 0.074 
 
Other Female 0.076*** 0.010 0.167*** 0.050 0.026 0.055 0.094 0.084 
 
Not Available -0.0835*** 0.0046 -0.088*** 0.023 -0.115*** 0.027 -0.066** 0.028 
Loan-to-Median Value Ratio 
        
 
Under 55% . . . . . . . . 
 
55% to 69% -0.1091*** 0.0047 -0.094*** 0.021 -0.049** 0.021 -0.129*** 0.028 
 
70% to 84% -0.1694*** 0.0047 -0.158*** 0.022 -0.086*** 0.023 -0.172*** 0.028 
 
85% to 99% -0.2169*** 0.0050 -0.186*** 0.023 -0.144*** 0.028 -0.258*** 0.029 
 
100% to 114% -0.2491*** 0.0056 -0.250*** 0.026 -0.241*** 0.035 -0.241*** 0.030 
 
115% to 129% -0.2617*** 0.0064 -0.264*** 0.030 -0.275*** 0.041 -0.304*** 0.032 
 
130% to 144% -0.2679*** 0.0072 -0.267*** 0.033 -0.242*** 0.046 -0.248*** 0.033 
 
145% or Higher -0.2704*** 0.0070 -0.203*** 0.032 -0.297*** 0.050 -0.304*** 0.032 
Debt-to-Income Ratio 
        
 
Under 8% . . . . . . . . 
 
8% to 11% -0.1094*** 0.0067 -0.119*** 0.028 -0.075** 0.037 -0.119*** 0.024 
 
12% to 15% -0.1056*** 0.0066 -0.105*** 0.028 -0.034 0.037 -0.133*** 0.027 
 
16% to 19% -0.0629*** 0.0070 -0.061** 0.030 -0.046 0.041 -0.075** 0.030 
 
20% to 23% -0.0247*** 0.0074 -0.016 0.032 -0.040 0.043 -0.055 0.034 
 
24% to 27% 0.0213*** 0.0079 0.052 0.035 -0.018 0.044 0.021 0.036 
 
28% to 31% 0.0630*** 0.0084 0.081** 0.037 -0.043 0.044 0.116*** 0.041 
 
32% or Higher 0.1907*** 0.0080 0.229*** 0.035 0.060 0.040 0.294*** 0.041 
  Not Available 0.097*** 0.011 0.144*** 0.046 -0.003 0.045 0.154*** 0.051 
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Continued A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
    Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Lenders -0.002067*** 0.000075 -0.0009 0.0011 0.00011 0.00092 -0.0033** 0.0016 
Unemployment Rate 0.0379*** 0.0017 0.0154 0.0098 0.010 0.012 0.031*** 0.011 
Change in House Prices -0.00310*** 0.00028 -0.0052*** 0.0014 -0.0037** 0.0015 0.0151*** 0.0032 
Delinquency Rate 0.0028*** 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0051 0.0386*** 0.0043 0.026* 0.016 
Private Mortgage Insurance Company 
        
 
Radian Guaranty Inc. . . . . . . . . 
 
Genworth Mortgage Insurance Co. 0.3727*** 0.0049 0.392*** 0.022 0.381*** 0.020 0.380*** 0.023 
 
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Co. 0.5048*** 0.0045 0.536*** 0.020 0.510*** 0.019 0.460*** 0.021 
 
PMI Mortgage Co. -0.0830*** 0.0069 -0.110*** 0.032 -0.103*** 0.028 -0.195*** 0.036 
 
Republic Mortgage Insurance Co. 0.2156*** 0.0062 0.228*** 0.028 0.056** 0.029 0.199*** 0.031 
 
United Guaranty Corp. 0.4262*** 0.0049 0.487*** 0.022 0.368*** 0.022 0.383*** 0.024 
 
Triad Guaranty Insurance Corp. 0.321*** 0.010 0.344*** 0.045 0.330*** 0.039 0.368*** 0.051 
 
CMG Mortgage Insurance Co. 0.071*** 0.011 0.158*** 0.044 -0.117* 0.060 0.126** 0.049 
 
Essent Guaranty Inc. 0.153*** 0.016 0.030 0.078 0.166** 0.068 -0.034 0.075 
Year 
        
 
2004 . . . . . . . . 
 
2005 -0.1697*** 0.0073 -0.202*** 0.031 -0.209*** 0.036 -0.110*** 0.033 
 
2006 -0.2020*** 0.0076 -0.269*** 0.033 -0.159*** 0.039 -0.104*** 0.037 
 
2007 -0.0534*** 0.0072 -0.080** 0.034 -0.060 0.054 0.121*** 0.040 
 
2008 0.4736*** 0.0069 0.468*** 0.032 0.172** 0.074 0.680*** 0.050 
 
2009 0.8432*** 0.0095 0.966*** 0.049 0.436*** 0.120 1.038*** 0.091 
 
2010 0.749*** 0.011 0.888*** 0.057 0.469*** 0.137 0.898*** 0.095 
 
2011 0.435*** 0.010 0.564*** 0.052 0.318*** 0.124 0.594*** 0.076 
 
2012 0.1952*** 0.0092 0.303*** 0.045 0.097 0.099 0.364*** 0.059 
  2013 0.0937*** 0.0077 0.209*** 0.036 -0.055 0.070 0.239*** 0.045 
tanh-1 ρ -0.041*** 0.010 0.004 0.056 -0.019 0.067 0.136** 0.063 
ρ   -0.041   0.004   -0.019   0.135   
Geographic Fixed Effects Metro Area/Division Census Tract 
 
Census Tract 
 
Census Tract 
 
Uncensored Applications 4,231,445 
 
226,884 
 
173,819 
 
183,596 
 Wald Χ2 90931.07*** 
 
6678.596*** 
 
4978.146*** 
 
4677.915*** 
 
Log Likelihood -6092978   -311885.4   -229230.3   -257364.4   
Geographic fixed effects not shown. 
Statistically significant at the ***1% level **5% level *10% level 
7
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 The likelihood of denial declines as the desired loan amount rises in relation to area house prices. 
In the model using all applications, loan amounts 15 percent or more above county median single-family 
house sales price are associated with roughly a 0.27 point increase in the predicted z-score compared to 
loan amounts 45 percent lower than the county median. The relationship is similar in other models and 
corresponds to an increase in the PMI denial rate of up to two percentage points. 
 The variables included to measure economic conditions are not consistently significant across all 
models. In the model using all applications, each variable is statistically significant and in the expected 
direction.  However, only the year-over-year change in metropolitan house prices is statistically significant 
in the national sample of Census tracts. The change in house prices and the state mortgage serious 
delinquency rate is statistically significant in the model of “Bubble” housing markets. All variables are 
statistically significant at least at the ten percent level in the model of “Rust” housing markets, although 
the sign on the change in house prices is contrary to expectations.  
 However, the year of application has a large and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of 
denial. Relative to applications received in 2004, applications for private mortgage insurance in 2006 are 
associated with a 0.202 decline in the predicted z-score in the model of all applications and a slightly 
larger 0.269 decline in the sample of Census tracts, equivalent to a 1.9 percentage point decline in the 
PMI denial rate. The decline is smaller in the models of both “Bubble” and “Rust” housing markets. Then 
between 2006 and 2009 the estimated z-score increases by 1.045 in the model of all applications and by 
1.235 in the sample of Census tracts, corresponding to an 8.9 percentage point swing in the share of 
applications denied by private mortgage insurance companies. Surprisingly, the increase is lower in 
“Bubble” housing markets. After 2009, the likelihood of denial falls but remains above the 2004 baseline 
in every model except the “Bubble” housing markets in which it is not significantly different than 2004. 
Nationally, the PMI denial rate remains 1.5 percentage points higher than it was in 2004, all else being 
equal. 
 There is a 4.7 percentage point range in denial rates across individual private mortgage 
insurance companies. Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Co. is the most likely to deny an application, 
followed by United Guaranty Corp., Genworth Mortgage Insurance Co., and Triad Guaranty Insurance 
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Corp. By contrast, PMI Mortgage Co. is associated with the lowest likelihood of denial, followed by 
Radian Guaranty Inc.  
 Again, even controlling for these factors, the race, ethnicity and sex of the applicant influences 
the likelihood of denial. Non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic male applicants are associated with a 0.219 
and 0.177 increase in the estimated z-score, respectively, in the model of all applications. With a more 
refined accounting of neighborhood conditions, the estimated change in z-score associated with non-
Hispanic Black male applicants falls to 0.148, equivalent to a 1.1 percentage point disparity in the PMI 
denial rate. The estimated change in the z-score associated with Hispanic male applicants increases 
somewhat to 0.199, equivalent to a disparity of 1.4 percentage points. In the national sample of Census 
tracts, Hispanic and non-Hispanic White female applicants are somewhat less likely to be denied than 
their male counterparts, but Black and African-American female applicants are more likely to be denied 
than similar male applicants. In contrast to the model of FHA denials, private mortgage insurance 
applications without reported race, ethnicity and/or sex are less likely to be denied than non-Hispanic 
White male applicants. 
Table 3.6 shows the results of the private mortgage insurance outcome equation including 
regulatory capital ratios. Applications for private mortgage insurance companies for which the regulatory 
capital ratio is not available have been excluded from both selection and outcome equations. Again, each 
model is statistically significant. The correlation in error terms between the selection and outcome 
equations is only statistically significant in the model of “Rust” housing markets.  
The capital ratio is a statistically significant factor in the likelihood that a private mortgage 
insurance company would reject an application. In the model of all applications, the predicted z-score 
decreases 0.056 points for every additional percentage point increase in the capital ratio. Using the 
national sample of Census tracts, the strength of this relationship increases to 0.067, equivalent to a 0.6 
percentage point decline in the PMI denial rate for every percentage point increase in the insurer’s capital 
ratio. And the relationship is even stronger in both “Bubble” and “Rust” housing markets. 
  
  
 
Table 3.6 Outcome Equation: PMI Denial with Capital Ratios 
  
A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
   Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Demographics 
        
 
Non-Hispanic White Male . . . . . . . . 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Male 0.2102*** 0.0091 0.140*** 0.043 0.091** 0.044 0.190*** 0.045 
 
Hispanic Male 0.1701*** 0.0064 0.204*** 0.030 0.110*** 0.023 0.008 0.056 
 
Other Male 0.0658*** 0.0086 0.140*** 0.043 0.029 0.047 0.118* 0.060 
 
Non-Hispanic White Female -0.0033 0.0042 -0.025 0.019 -0.019 0.023 -0.039** 0.018 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Female 0.1908*** 0.0091 0.170*** 0.043 0.169*** 0.044 0.153*** 0.042 
 
Hispanic Female 0.1403*** 0.0086 0.139*** 0.042 0.118*** 0.028 -0.008 0.084 
 
Other Female 0.067*** 0.012 0.153*** 0.058 0.036 0.061 0.131 0.092 
 
Not Available -0.083*** 0.006 -0.105*** 0.029 -0.093*** 0.029 -0.081** 0.032 
Loan-to-Median Value Ratio 
        
 
Under 55% . . . . . . . . 
 
55% to 69% -0.1040*** 0.0053 -0.090*** 0.024 -0.035 0.023 -0.125*** 0.031 
 
70% to 84% -0.1600*** 0.0053 -0.153*** 0.025 -0.073*** 0.025 -0.192*** 0.031 
 
85% to 99% -0.2044*** 0.0056 -0.201*** 0.027 -0.118*** 0.030 -0.281*** 0.032 
 
100% to 114% -0.2299*** 0.0063 -0.252*** 0.031 -0.219*** 0.039 -0.245*** 0.033 
 
115% to 129% -0.2370*** 0.0072 -0.270*** 0.035 -0.217*** 0.045 -0.324*** 0.036 
 
130% to 144% -0.2350*** 0.0082 -0.256*** 0.038 -0.167*** 0.050 -0.255*** 0.037 
 
145% or Higher -0.2236*** 0.0080 -0.169*** 0.037 -0.205*** 0.054 -0.295*** 0.035 
Debt-to-Income Ratio 
        
 
Under 8% . . . . . . . . 
 
8% to 11% -0.1068*** 0.0077 -0.131*** 0.033 -0.097** 0.040 -0.118*** 0.027 
 
12% to 15% -0.1100*** 0.0076 -0.123*** 0.033 -0.076* 0.040 -0.141*** 0.030 
 
16% to 19% -0.0774*** 0.0080 -0.084** 0.035 -0.092** 0.044 -0.087*** 0.033 
 
20% to 23% -0.0432*** 0.0085 -0.048 0.038 -0.097** 0.046 -0.071* 0.037 
 
24% to 27% 0.0022 0.0090 0.032 0.040 -0.079* 0.047 0.008 0.040 
 
28% to 31% 0.0402*** 0.0096 0.055 0.042 -0.086* 0.048 0.100** 0.045 
 
32% or Higher 0.1700*** 0.0091 0.209*** 0.040 0.009 0.044 0.300*** 0.044 
  Not Available 0.039*** 0.012 0.065 0.051 -0.086* 0.048 0.130** 0.054 
  
7
5
 
  
 
Continued 
 A. All Applications B. Tract 10% Sample C. Bubble CBSAs D. Rust CBSAs 
    Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Lenders -0.002160*** 0.000084 0.0002 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0035* 0.0018 
Unemployment Rate 0.0323*** 0.0019 0.019* 0.011 -0.014 0.013 0.035*** 0.012 
Change in House Prices -0.00399*** 0.00032 -0.0070*** 0.0017 -0.004** 0.002 0.0196*** 0.0037 
Delinquency Rate 0.0002 0.0011 -0.0022 0.0058 0.0378*** 0.0048 0.040** 0.018 
Private Mortgage Insurance Company 
        
 
Radian Guaranty Inc. . . . . . . . . 
 
Genworth Mortgage Insurance Co. 0.3934*** 0.0049 0.429*** 0.023 0.439*** 0.021 0.421*** 0.024 
 
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Co. 0.5209*** 0.0045 0.576*** 0.021 0.585*** 0.020 0.511*** 0.022 
 
PMI Mortgage Co. -0.0998*** 0.0070 -0.114*** 0.032 -0.069** 0.029 -0.198*** 0.036 
 
Republic Mortgage Insurance Co. 0.1478*** 0.0065 0.159*** 0.029 -0.037 0.029 0.132*** 0.032 
 
Triad Guaranty Insurance Corp. 0.085*** 0.013 0.085 0.056 -0.067 0.049 0.052 0.060 
 
Essent Guaranty Inc. 0.281*** 0.016 0.167** 0.080 0.400*** 0.072 0.088 0.077 
Capital Ratio -0.0561*** 0.0018 -0.067*** 0.008 -0.1044*** 0.0080 -0.0806*** 0.0081 
Year 
        
 
2004 . . . . . . . . 
 
2005 -0.1647*** 0.0082 -0.229*** 0.035 -0.192*** 0.039 -0.084** 0.037 
 
2006 -0.2318*** 0.0086 -0.304*** 0.038 -0.179*** 0.042 -0.090** 0.041 
 
2007 -0.2953*** 0.0100 -0.391*** 0.047 -0.442*** 0.064 -0.165*** 0.053 
 
2008 0.087*** 0.012 0.027 0.055 -0.421*** 0.090 0.221*** 0.068 
 
2009 0.437*** 0.016 0.494*** 0.079 -0.181 0.137 0.415*** 0.112 
 
2010 0.319*** 0.018 0.411*** 0.091 -0.208 0.155 0.232** 0.118 
 
2011 -0.018 0.019 0.037 0.092 -0.507*** 0.144 -0.072 0.104 
 
2012 -0.364*** 0.020 -0.360*** 0.093 -0.846*** 0.122 -0.428*** 0.099 
  2013 -0.406*** 0.015 -0.348*** 0.070 -0.878*** 0.089 -0.399*** 0.074 
tanh-1 ρ 0.004 0.012 -0.005 0.065 0.065 0.073 0.165** 0.068 
ρ   0.004   -0.005   0.065   0.163   
Geographic Fixed Effects State 
 
Metro Area/Division Census Tract 
 
Census Tract 
 Uncensored Applications 3,357,463 
 
180,431 
 
147,752 
 
153,588 
 Wald Χ2 76422.32*** 
 
5504.22*** 
 
4371.881*** 
 
4123.675*** 
 
Log Likelihood -5264502   -268369.6   -208408.3   -229719.9   
Geographic fixed effects not shown. 
Statistically significant at the ***1% level **5% level *10% level 
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The inclusion of the capital ratio does not meaningfully alter the estimated coefficients on most of 
the other independent variables. The primary exception is the year of application. Applications in 2007, 
rather than 2006, are now found to have the lowest likelihood of denial, all else being equal, and the 
decline from 2004 is larger than that found in the model without including capital ratios. Applications 
received in 2007 are associated with a 0.295 decline in the predicted z-score in the model of all 
applications and a 0.391 decline in the sample of Census tracts, corresponding to a 3.8 percentage point 
decline in the share of applications denied by mortgage insurance companies. The decline is smaller in 
“Rust” markets.  
Nationally, applications received in 2009 still have the highest likelihood of denial, but the 
increase between 2007 and 2009 is smaller than previously estimated. The estimated z-score increases 
0.732 in the model of all applications and 0.885 in the sample of Census tracts, corresponding to an 8.6 
percentage point swing in the PMI denial rate. The likelihood of denial then declines such that 
applications in 2012 and 2013 are less likely to be denied than in 2004. Specifically, 2013 is associated 
with a decline of 0.406 in the predicted z-score relative to 2004 in the model of all applications and a 
0.348 decline in the sample of Census tracts, equivalent to a PMI denial rate that is 3.3 percentage points 
lower. Interestingly, the coefficients associated with year of application in “Bubble” housing markets show 
that controlling for other factors the likelihood of denial was highest in 2004. The predicted z-score 
associated with 2013 is 0.874 lower than that of 2004 in these metropolitan areas, which is actually 
substantially lower than during the housing bubble. 
  
  
 
Table 3.7 Marginal Effects 
  
Selection Equation Outcome Equations 
    
A. FHA Insurance 
Application 
B. FHA Denial C. PMI Denial D. PMI Denial with 
Capital Ratios 
Demographics 
    
 
Non-Hispanic White Male . . . . 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Male 0.114 0.066 0.011 0.013 
 
Hispanic Male 0.048 0.039 0.014 0.020 
 
Other Male -0.021 0.041 0.010 0.013 
 
Non-Hispanic White Female 0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 
Non-Hispanic Black Female 0.121 0.060 0.012 0.016 
 
Hispanic Female 0.051 0.033 0.011 0.013 
 
Other Female -0.017 0.043 0.012 0.015 
 
Not Available -0.158 0.060 -0.006 -0.010 
Loan-to-Median Value Ratio 
    
 
Under 55% . . . . 
 
55% to 69% 0.007 -0.035 -0.007 -0.009 
 
70% to 84% 0.006 -0.053 -0.011 -0.015 
 
85% to 99% -0.006 -0.062 -0.013 -0.019 
 
100% to 114% -0.024 -0.069 -0.018 -0.024 
 
115% to 129% -0.049 -0.074 -0.019 -0.026 
 
130% to 144% -0.072 -0.074 -0.019 -0.025 
 
145% or Higher -0.123 -0.076 -0.015 -0.016 
Debt-to-Income Ratio 
    
 
Under 8% . . . . 
 
8% to 11% 0.018 -0.029 -0.009 -0.013 
 
12% to 15% 0.066 -0.028 -0.008 -0.012 
 
16% to 19% 0.102 -0.016 -0.004 -0.008 
 
20% to 23% 0.126 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
 
24% to 27% 0.131 0.020 0.004 0.003 
 
28% to 31% 0.112 0.054 0.006 0.005 
 
32% or Higher 0.054 0.166 0.017 0.020 
  Not Available 0.019 0.107 0.010 0.006 
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Continued 
    
    
A. FHA Insurance 
Application 
B. FHA Denial C. PMI Denial D. PMI Denial 
with Capital Ratios 
Projected FHA Lender Share 0.0068 . . . 
Lenders -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0000 
Unemployment Rate 0.0119 0.0007 0.0011 0.0018 
Change in House Prices -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007 
Delinquency Rate 0.0089 0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0002 
Private Mortgage Insurance Company 
    
 
Radian Guaranty Inc. 
 
. . . 
 
Genworth Mortgage Insurance Co. . . 0.028 0.041 
 
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Co. . . 0.039 0.055 
 
PMI Mortgage Co. . . -0.008 -0.011 
 
Republic Mortgage Insurance Co. . . 0.016 0.015 
 
United Guaranty Corp. . . 0.035 . 
 
Triad Guaranty Insurance Corp. . . 0.025 0.008 
 
CMG Mortgage Insurance Co. . . 0.011 . 
 
Essent Guaranty Inc. . . 0.002 0.016 
Capital Ratio . . . -0.006 
Year 
    
 
2004 . . . . 
 
2005 -0.042 -0.007 -0.015 -0.022 
 
2006 -0.072 -0.028 -0.019 -0.029 
 
2007 -0.162 0.003 -0.006 -0.038 
 
2008 0.055 0.010 0.034 0.003 
 
2009 0.092 0.000 0.070 0.048 
 
2010 0.074 0.010 0.064 0.040 
 
2011 0.040 0.016 0.041 0.004 
 
2012 0.018 0.030 0.022 -0.035 
  2013 -0.044 0.038 0.015 -0.033 
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Neighborhood Analysis 
 The regression analyses based on the ten percent national sample results in 2,443 estimated 
coefficients associated with specific Census tracts for each model. These coefficients are converted to 
marginal effects and re-centered on the average value instead of an arbitrary reference tract and then 
merged with neighborhood characteristics from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey, including 
the minority share of the population in the Census tract and the median family income relative to the area 
median income. The results of simple scatterplots of Census tract fixed effect estimates and 
neighborhood characteristics with a linear line of best fit are shown in Figure 3.6.  
Figure 3.6A shows the estimated coefficients from the selection models. The likelihood of 
applying for FHA insurance over private mortgage insurance shows little relationship to the minority share 
of the population. However, there is an inverse correlation with the median income of the Census tract: 
every ten percentage point increase in the tract-to-area median income ratio is associated with a 0.7 
percentage point decline in FHA’s share of mortgage insurance applications. The R2 statistic indicates 
that neighborhood income explains roughly six percent of the variation in estimated Census tract fixed 
effects. 
Figure 3.6B shows the estimated coefficients from the FHA outcome model. Neither the racial 
and ethnic composition of the neighborhood nor the relative median family income of the neighborhood 
appear to substantially affect the likelihood of being denied by FHA. The R2 statistic for both is under 
0.003.  
  
  
 
Figure 3.6A Neighborhood Fixed Effects Analysis: FHA Selection 
Neighborhood Race/Ethnicity 
 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
MinorityPct 0.0084 0.0073 
Constant -0.262 0.281 
N 2,443 
 
R2 0.0006 
 
F 1.30   
 
Neighborhood Income 
 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
IncomePct -0.0746*** 0.0066 
Constant 7.372*** 0.680 
N 2,443 
 
R2 0.064 
 
F 129.26***   
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Figure 3.6B Neighborhood Fixed Effects Analysis: FHA Denial 
Neighborhood Race/Ethnicity 
 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
MinorityPct 0.0089** 0.0043 
Constant -0.280 0.171 
N 2,443 
 
R2 0.0021 
 
F 4.39**   
 
Neighborhood Income 
 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
IncomePct -0.0067* 0.0037 
Constant 0.664* 0.382 
N 2,443 
 
R2 0.0017 
 
F 3.31*   
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Figure 3.6C Neighborhood Fixed Effects Analysis: PMI Denial  
Neighborhood Race/Ethnicity 
 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
MinorityPct 0.0136*** 0.0017 
Constant -0.425*** 0.071 
N 2,443 
 
R2 0.0268 
 
F 64.53***   
 
Neighborhood Income 
 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
IncomePct -0.0124*** 0.0015 
Constant 1.225*** 0.152 
N 2,443 
 
R2 0.0318 
 
F 72.12***   
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However, neighborhood conditions do appear to somewhat influence the credit decisions of 
private mortgage insurance companies (Figure 3.6C). A ten percentage point increase in the minority 
share of the population in a neighborhood is associated with a statistically significant 1.4 percentage point 
increase in the PMI denial rate. Similarly, a ten percentage point increase in the median family income 
relative to the area median is associated with a statistically significant 1.2 percentage point decrease in 
the PMI denial rate. The R2 statistics indicate that these neighborhood characteristics explain roughly 
three percent each of the variation in Census tract fixed effects.  
Reason for Denial 
For every loan application denied, HMDA reporting allows institutions to identify the reason for 
denial. Unfortunately, no reason is given for nine percent of denied private mortgage insurance 
applications and nearly a fifth of denied FHA applications. If the reason for denial is not missing at 
random, then statistical inferences may not be valid. In addition, private mortgage insurance companies 
did not begin reporting the reason for denial until 2008. Nevertheless, tabulations of the reasons for denial 
may shed light on differences in the credit decisions of mortgage insurers.  
Table 3.8 presents the percent of denied applications that were rejected due to the three most 
commonly cited reasons: “Debt-to-Income Ratio,” “Credit History”, or “Collateral.” Because HMDA allows 
up the three reasons to be listed, these percentages are not mutually exclusive. The “Other” category 
captures all remaining applications and is exclusive of the previous three reasons. Finally, the “Missing” 
category includes applications with no reason for denial listed. 
Of the three most commonly cited reasons, private mortgage insurers were most likely to cite 
collateral as the cause for denial, followed by DTI ratio and credit history. Concerns about collateral 
peaked in 2010 when it was responsible for nearly one-third of denied applications for private mortgage 
insurance (41% excluding “Missing”). In addition, collateral accounts for a larger share of denials in “Rust” 
housing markets, reaching nearly 38 percent of denied applications (48% excluding “Missing”) in 2010 
and averaging 31 percent (33% excluding “Missing”) between 2008 and 2013. Surprisingly, concerns 
about collateral were never higher in “Bubble” markets than the national average. Instead, reasons other 
than the three selected causes were disproportionately cited. However, the ability to repay is a growing 
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concern in “Bubble” markets, with high DTI ratios accounting for 35 percent of denied application for 
private mortgage insurance in 2012, roughly double its share from 2008. 
The pattern is different among FHA applications. Between 2008 and 2013, the DTI ratio of the 
applicant was the most commonly cited reason for denial, followed by credit history. The share of 
applications denied over concerns about the collateral was the lowest of the three reasons, although it 
increased from roughly six percent of denied applications (7% excluding “Missing”) before 2008 to as high 
as 16 percent in 2010 (19% excluding “Missing”). Meanwhile, the applicant’s credit history declined from 
over 40 percent of denial applications (50% excluding “Missing”) before 2007 to only 20 percent (25% 
excluding “Missing”) in 2009 and 2010.  
Table 3.8 Reason for Denial 
Percent of Denied Applications 
  
A. Federal Housing Administration 
 
B. Private Mortgage Insurance 
    D
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2004 28.0 42.4 5.2 20.3 16.7 
 
. . . . . 
 
2005 26.7 42.0 6.2 21.3 15.4 
 
. . . . . 
 
2006 26.8 40.4 6.1 18.7 19.3 
 
. . . . . 
 
2007 26.1 39.3 6.3 19.5 20.7 
 
. . . . . 
 
2008 27.7 26.2 9.5 21.7 22.4 
 
17.3 12.5 18.8 50.8 4.3 
 
2009 25.9 20.2 14.9 25.1 19.2 
 
22.3 12.3 28.6 25.9 17.4 
 
2010 24.8 20.2 16.0 26.8 17.3 
 
22.0 10.1 32.7 21.3 19.6 
 
2011 24.5 21.8 14.3 26.4 18.2 
 
26.1 16.4 30.8 25.7 7.1 
 
2012 23.8 23.1 12.5 26.2 19.2 
 
24.9 19.4 33.2 26.0 0.1 
 
2013 24.0 23.5 12.2 23.9 21.3   24.1 27.3 25.0 26.9 0.1 
  Total (2008-13) 25.2 22.4 13.4 25.0 19.6   21.1 14.3 25.7 34.5 9.1 
*Not mutually exclusive  
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Discussion 
The tendency for financial markets to experience periods of “irrational exuberance” is well 
documented (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Kindleberger and Aliber 2011). These occurrences are 
especially prevalent in real estate or other markets where the object of purchase is used to secure 
repayment of a loan.  A century ago, Veblen (1904) noted that an excess amount of credit raises property 
values 
[B]ut since an advance of credit rests on the collateral as expressed in terms of value, an 
enhanced value of the property affords a basis for a further extension of credit, and so 
on…This cumulative extension of credit through the enhancement of prices goes on, if 
otherwise undisturbed, so long as no adverse price phenomenon obtrudes itself with 
sufficient force to convict this cumulative enhancement of capitalized values of imbecility. 
 
Unfortunately, the feedback loop between credit availability and collateral values also operates in reverse, 
with falling prices leading to a reduction in credit which serves to further depress prices. 
Through the most recent housing cycle, the trend in the likelihood that applications for mortgage 
insurance would be denied has reinforced the theory of financial instability. The likelihood of denial is 
clearly related to adverse economic conditions, but the selected measures are not consistently 
statistically significant across all models. Instead, the year of application, which captures economic 
conditions not directly measured as well as institutional changes, displays a clear cyclical pattern. The 
likelihood of denial by either FHA or private mortgage insurers declined between 2004 and 2006, as the 
housing market was overheating. Private mortgage insurers then sharply restricted the availability of 
mortgage insurance and therefore conventional mortgage credit between 2007 and 2009 as the housing 
market collapsed.  
Controlling for other factors, private mortgage insurers appear less likely to deny applications 
after 2011 than they were in 2004. However, there is evidence that private mortgage insurers are 
constrained by their maximum capital ratio regulations, which have declined substantially since 2006. In 
part, private mortgage insurance companies may have been under-capitalized due to “extraordinary” 
dividend payments and an excessive amounts of premiums ceded to captive reinsurance arrangements. 
But private financial companies will always face liquidity and solvency constraints that inhibit new 
business in a financial crisis.  
 87 
 
The denial rate among FHA applications is typically much higher than that for private mortgage 
insurance applications. In part, this is because applicants with a higher likelihood of denial are more likely 
to apply for FHA insurance in ways that are not entirely visible, as shown by the statistically significant 
correlation in error terms between the selection and outcome equations. In contrast to the trend in the 
availability of private mortgage insurance, the likelihood of denial by FHA has gradually increased, 
peaking in 2013, the latest year for which data is available. The increase in FHA denial rates reflects 
tighter underwriting standards. For example, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 increased 
the minimum downpayment from 3.0 to 3.5 percent and banned seller-funded downpayment assistance 
programs that had been associated with appraisal fraud. A minimum credit score of 500 was introduced in 
2010 and credit scores between 500 and 579 were restricted to 90 percent maximum LTV ratios 
(Mortgagee Letter 10-29). In addition, lenders implemented credit overlays, further tightening standards 
beyond FHA’s minimum underwriting guidelines, in response to the threat of litigation claiming that 
lenders improperly approved loans, as well as the introduction of “compare ratios,” in which a lender may 
lose direct endorsement authority if the default rate on its originated loans exceeds its peers. 
The divergent trends in the likelihood of denial may explain why there has been a gradual return 
to applying for private mortgage insurance after a dramatic shift towards FHA insurance around 2008 and 
2009, when conventional credit was most scarce. Some of this trend may be explained by the substantial 
increase in FHA insurance premiums (see Mortgagee Letters 2008-22; 2010-02; 2010-28; 2011-10; 2012-
04; 2013-04). Upfront and annual premiums for mortgages with high LTV ratios and terms exceeding 15 
years were 1.5 and 0.5 percent, respectively, prior to 2008 but reached 1.75 and 1.35 percent by 2013. 
On the other hand, lenders’ familiarity with FHA processes also creates a legacy effect that helps 
maintain FHA’s share of mortgage insurance applications. 
The fallout from the housing crash also has a geographic dimension. For example, Genworth 
Mortgage Insurance Company’s underwriting guidelines from September 2009 identified Arizona, 
California, Florida, Michigan and Nevada as “Declining or Distressed Markets” and identified 
neighborhoods experiencing declining values and an oversupply of homes as representing a greater risk 
and requiring additional scrutiny of the appraisal. “Properties in these markets are not eligible for the 
highest LTVs or certain loan products due to the increased risk posed by property value depreciation in 
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these localized markets.” Indeed, the shift in applications from private mortgage insurance to FHA was 
greater in housing markets that most acutely experienced the housing bubble. Yet at the same time, 
remaining applications for private mortgage insurance experienced a decline in the likelihood of denial. 
Similarly, applications for FHA insurance in “Bubble” housing markets also experienced a smaller 
increase in the likelihood of denial than the rest of the country. 
Neighborhood conditions appear to play a larger role in the credit decisions of private mortgage 
insurance companies than FHA. The likelihood of being denied by private mortgage insurers was more 
sensitive to the income and racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood than FHA.  Private mortgage 
insurers were also more likely to cite concerns about collateral as a reason for denial. By contrast, 
neighborhood conditions appear to have minimal effect on the likelihood of being denied for FHA 
insurance and collateral is less likely to be cited when an application is denied. 
 FHA is an important channel of mortgage credit for minorities, and other borrowers often 
underserved by the conventional market, regardless of economic and neighborhood conditions. However, 
Munnell et al. (1996) find that the estimated effect of underwriting standards are generally not changed 
with the inclusion of mortgage insurance approval, with the notable exception of loan-to-value ratio. 
Omitting applications for which private mortgage insurance was denied does not affect the size or 
significance of the coefficient on race, which the authors conclude shows “at a minimum, the mortgage 
insurers are not the source of the effect of race on the mortgage lending decision.” 
 This paper finds that racial disparities in the likelihood of denial are smaller among applications 
for private mortgage insurance compared to applications for FHA mortgage insurance. The relationship 
between higher DTI ratios or lower loan amounts (relative to area house prices) and the likelihood of 
denial is also weaker among applications for private mortgage insurance. However, all these borrower 
characteristics are also associated with a decrease in the likelihood of applying for private mortgage 
insurance in the first place. The narrower racial disparities in the PMI denial rate could be the result of 
higher-risk minority borrowers being steered into FHA while similarly higher-risk non-Hispanic White 
borrowers apply for private mortgage insurance. It is unclear at what point in the home-buying process 
such steering occurs. Dedman (1988) reports, “Real estate brokers who work in Black neighborhoods 
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confirmed that they often don’t send Black homebuyers to banks or savings and loans but said that is 
because those institutions have not been responsive and do not solicit their business.”  
  Further, differences in denial rates are not proof of disparate treatment. Ferguson and Peters 
(1995) demonstrate how different applicant credit profiles confound findings of disparate treatment. “[A] 
uniform, nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce (i) higher denial rates for minority 
applicants, and (ii) equal default rates for minority and majority applicants,” because the average credit 
risk of the approved minority applicants will be higher than the average of the majority, even if both have 
the same marginal risk. But  
[I]f the denial rate and the default rate are both strictly lower for the majority than for the 
minority, then nothing can be inferred about the relative credit standards being applied 
across the two components of the population… More detailed analysis of the relative 
characteristics magnitude of the difference in default or denial rates would imply 
discrimination. 
 
Unfortunately, existing HMDA reporting is insufficient to provide definitive evidence of disparate 
treatment rather than disparate impact arising out of legitimate business practices20. As noted, HMDA 
does not currently require financial institutions to disclose the applicant’s credit score, the value of the 
property (necessary to calculate the loan-to-value ratio), the loan term, interest rate21, or whether the loan 
is fixed- or adjustable-rate (necessary to calculate the precise debt-to-income ratio). In short, HMDA does 
not require lenders to report the three “C’s” fundamental to sound underwriting: collateral, 
creditworthiness and capacity to repay. This paper is, therefore, forced to make assumptions about 
interest rates and loan terms.  
In The Color of Money reports, Dedman (1988) noted banking officials “said the racial disparities 
in the study might be caused by limitations in the lending data.” Nearly twenty years later, Federal 
Reserve Governor Susan Schmidt Bies (2005) commented  
One of the most important limitations of the HMDA data set is that it does not include 
data about many of the legitimate factors lenders use to determine prices in the mortgage 
market, including key credit-risk factors… If the HMDA data set's inherent limitations are 
                                               
20 Disparate impact is where a seemingly neutral policy has a disproportionate adverse impact on 
protected class. The Supreme Court recently ruled in Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc (2015) that disparate impact may violate the Fair 
Housing Act unless the policy can be justified as a business necessity.  
 
21 Since 2004, HMDA has required financial institutions to report a rate spread if the mortgage interest 
rate exceeded a benchmark rate by some threshold. 
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not acknowledged and understood, conclusions purportedly drawn from these data alone 
run a risk of being unsound. 
 
Moreover, the existing reported information may not be wholly accurate. There is evidence that 
underwriting during the housing bubble suffered from exaggeration in appraisal values (Ben-David 2011), 
applicant incomes (Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil 2014; Mian and Sufi 2015), and misreporting of occupancy 
(Haughwout et al. 2011). It is noticeable that while this paper finds applications without reported income 
are at greater risk of being denied, they are still less likely to be denied by either FHA or private mortgage 
insurers than applications with severely high estimated DTI ratios, indicating it might have been better to 
apply for a so-called “NINJA” loan (No Income, No Job or Assets) than admit to facing a heavy debt 
burden. Mortgage fraud obviously has serious consequences for analysis of cyclicality and racial 
disparities in access to credit because it undermines the ability to appropriately account for differences in 
credit risk. HMDA does not currently require financial institutions to report whether applicant income and 
other underwriting factors were fully documented.  
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 authorized the newly-
formed CFPB to require these and many more variables to be collected, including “such other information 
as the Bureau may require.” Similarly, financial institutions may be required to list the reason(s) for denial, 
rather than having the option to leave the field blank. The CFPB (2014) states 
To ensure that HMDA continues to empower communities by providing transparency into 
mortgage lending practices, the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau believes that the 
HMDA data must be updated to address the informational shortcomings exposed by the 
financial crisis, to meet the needs of homeowners, potential homeowners, and 
neighborhoods throughout the nation, and to reflect changes in business practices and 
the technological evolution of the mortgage market. 
 
In addition to these new variables, CFPB is also considering requiring a unique, universal loan 
identifier. HMDA regulations already require, “An identifying number for the loan or loan application, and 
the date the application was received” (12 CFR 1003.4(1)). However, the current system of loan 
identification his inadequate for tracking loans across databases. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act allows for, “as the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau may determine 
to be appropriate, a universal loan identifier” (12 USC § 2803(b)(6)(G)). Such a universal identifier could 
potentially allow mortgage loans to be traced from application to default or payment, meaning both the 
denial rate and default rate could be found for populations of interest. A universal identifier could also 
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allow the private mortgage insurance loan-application register compiled by FFIEC to be merged with 
HMDA’s loan-application register so that the effect of mortgage insurance on access to credit could be 
better understood. For example, the effect of captive reinsurance and other arrangements in steering 
borrowers to one private mortgage insurance company or another could be empirically investigated. 
The choice and availability of mortgage insurance, and access to credit generally, will need to be 
reassessed once this new information becomes available. 
Conclusion 
 Higher DTI ratios, lower loan amounts, and poor economic conditions are associated with an 
increase chance of applying for FHA mortgage insurance rather than private mortgage insurance. The 
level of FHA activity in the previous year among active lenders has a statistically significant effect on the 
current probability of applying for FHA insurance. After controlling for these factors, there was a dramatic 
swing towards applying for FHA insurance at the start of the financial crisis which has been gradually 
reversed. 
Many of the same characteristics that predict FHA application are also associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of denial, reflecting the fact that FHA typically serves a higher risk segment of 
the mortgage insurance market. Moreover, there is a statistically significant correlation in the error terms 
among the selection and outcome equations (i.e., selection bias) such that applications more likely to 
apply for FHA insurance were also more likely to be denied. Controlling for other factors, the likelihood of 
being denied by FHA was greatest in 2013, the latest year data were available.  
Conditional on application and controlling for other factors, the likelihood of denial among 
applications for private mortgage insurance increased drastically between 2006 and 2009, but has since 
fallen. However, the decline in regulatory capital ratios among private mortgage companies contributes to 
a lack of credit availability. There was also wide variation in the likelihood of denial across individual 
private mortgage insurance companies. 
There are clear racial patterns in application and credit decisions. Even after accounting for other 
factors, minority applicants are substantially more likely to apply for FHA insurance instead of private 
mortgage insurance and are more likely to be denied by either type of insurer. However, given insufficient 
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information on the likelihood of default, these patterns cannot necessarily be attributed to disparate 
treatment of minorities. 
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CHAPTER 4: LOAN PERFORMANCE AND ADVERSE SELECTION  
Mortgage insurance is a contract in which lenders or investors are compensated for losses in the 
event of a default by the borrower. Coverage is typically paid for by the borrower through monthly 
premiums determined at the time of origination. The Federal Housing Administration’s single-family 
mortgage insurance program was created by the National Housing Act of 1934 to encourage lenders to 
extend credit to borrowers in the depths of the Great Depression.22 Since then, FHA has insured over 40 
million mortgages and serves as an important source of credit, particularly for first-time homebuyers and 
other low wealth borrowers with insufficient savings for large downpayments. FHA also stepped up to 
ensure continued access to credit during the recent housing crisis, replaying the counter-cyclical role it 
served seven decades earlier. 
 Since the 1950s, insurance for conventional (i.e., not government-insured) mortgages with low 
downpayments has also been available through private mortgage insurance companies. Given mortgage 
insurers’ focus on credit risk, early studies on the determinants of mortgage default often utilized 
mortgage insurance data, including both FHA (e.g., von Furstenberg 1969, Foster and Van Order 1984) 
and private mortgage insurance (e.g., Campbell and Dietrich 1983).23 But few have compared the relative 
performance of FHA and private mortgage insurance or insured mortgages relative to uninsured loans. 
There are notable differences between FHA and private mortgage insurance. Most importantly, 
underwriting standards for private mortgage insurance are typically more stringent, serving a lower risk 
population with correspondingly lower insurance premiums. For example, home purchase loans insured 
by FHA in 2013 had an average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of nearly 96 percent, compared to 
approximately 92 percent for privately-insured loans purchased by Fannie Mae, according to public loan-
level acquisition data. Credit score also differentiates insurance market segments (Pennington-Cross and 
                                               
22 See Vandell (1995) for a detailed history of FHA. 
 
23 See Quercia and Stegman (1992) for an overview of these studies and others. 
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Nichols 2000; Lacour-Little 2004). The average credit score on privately-insured home purchase 
mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae in 2013 was 757 compared to roughly 691 for FHA-insured loans.   
Surprisingly, however, Herzog and Earley (1970) find that FHA- and VA-insured loans were less 
likely to default than conventional loans after controlling for risk characteristics, but presume the 
difference is due to “differences in appraisal practices and other underwriting policies for which we lack 
data.” Yet the serious delinquency rates of FHA- and privately-insured loans through the most recent 
housing crisis seems to confirm Herzog and Earley’s finding (see Figure 4.1A). The share of FHA loans 
60 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure doubled between 2002 and 2009, rising from roughly six 
percent to 12 percent according to the Mortgage Bankers Association’s National Delinquency Survey. 
Meanwhile, although the default rates reported by private mortgage insurance companies were generally 
below the serious delinquency rate of FHA-insured loans until 2008, they peaked between 13 and 24 
percent depending on the insurer as the housing crisis persisted. 
Figure 4.1A Serious Delinquency Rate by Mortgage Insurer 
 
Note: Default is defined for FHA-insured, prime and subprime loans as 60 or more days late or in foreclosure. PMI 
Mortgage Insurance Co., Genworth Mortgage Insurance Co. and Radian Guaranty Inc. define default as failure to pay 
any scheduled amount and have master policies that require the insurer be notified shortly after the borrower 
becomes three months (90 days) delinquent, but note that most defaults are reported earlier. For tracking purposes, 
PMI and Radian do not consider a loan to be in default until the borrower has missed two consecutive payments (60 
days). Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. defines delinquency as insured loans 45 days or more past due. 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey; SEC filings and other company reports. 
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This descriptive comparison of default rates may not accurately capture the differences in 
performance between the two insurance systems for several reasons.  First, the definition of default used 
by the private insurers does not necessarily align with that reported by the Mortgage Bankers Association, 
making comparisons questionable.  Second, the poorer credit quality of FHA borrowers may overstate 
differences in loan performance. An accurate assessment of the default risk of FHA-insured loans 
compared to privately-insured and uninsured loans must account for differences in common underwriting 
factors such as credit score and LTV ratio as well as economic conditions such as changes in house 
prices and mortgage interest rates.  
Finally, differences in the maturity of loan portfolios also affect accurate assessment of default 
risk. For example, the claims rate for FHA’s 2009 book of business at the time of the last independent 
actuarial review (3.3 percent) was less than that of the 2004 book of business (9.0 percent).  But this may 
be because loans in the 2009 book of business have had less time to become distressed. Comparing 
both books of business at the same maturity, such as five years after origination, shows that the 2009 
book of business is on a trajectory for worse performance than the 2004 book (see Figure 4.1B). Further, 
the 2009 book of business was 137 percent bigger than the 2004 book of business, swelling the 
denominator in the flow rate used in the National Delinquency Survey that does not account for vintage or 
maturity. Consequently, the lower serious delinquency rates among FHA loans may simply reflect the 
dramatic increase in new FHA originations in the aftermath of the housing crash and misrepresent true 
loan performance.  
In this paper we evaluate the relative risks of default and prepayment of similar FHA-insured, 
privately-insured and uninsured home purchase mortgages with respect to credit risk characteristics, 
economic conditions and loan maturity. We find that FHA-insured loans have a lower likelihood of default 
than uninsured loans, but privately-insured loans are more likely to default. However, the estimated 
default risk of both types of insured loans falls when differences in total mortgage costs are accounted for, 
suggesting the presence of adverse selection.  
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Figure 4.1B FHA Cumulative Claims Rate by Book of Business 
 
Source: Integrated Financial Engineering, Inc. (2014). 
Background 
 The performance of mortgages insured by FHA is particularly important because as a federal 
agency FHA is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government and large credit losses 
may ultimately be borne by American taxpayers. Indeed, the 2012 actuarial review of the Mutual 
Mortgage Insurance Fund, which finances FHA’s mortgage insurance program, found that that the value 
of projected claims on existing insured forward loans exceeded the value of projected premium revenue 
and current capital reserves by $13.5 billion (Integrated Financial Engineering 2012). This deficit 
prompted a $1.7 billion draw on the U.S. Treasury the following year to cover credit losses for the first 
time in FHA’s history. 
FHA has repeatedly raised insurance premiums to cover the increase in credit losses (Mortgagee 
Letters 2008-22; 2010-02; 2010-28; 2011-10; 2012-04; 2013-04). FHA has also adopted several reforms 
to lower default rates. Appraisal standards were strengthened to ensure independence and accuracy 
(Mortgagee Letters 2008-39; 2009-28). The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 increased the 
minimum downpayment to 3.5 percent (Mortgagee Letter 2008-23). In 2010, a 10 percent downpayment 
was required for borrowers with credit scores between 500 and 579, and borrowers with credit scores less 
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than 500 are no longer eligible for FHA insurance at all (Mortgagee Letter 10-29). A newly created Office 
of Risk Management will oversee further efforts to measure and manage risk.  
But perhaps the most important policy change was the prohibition of seller-funded downpayment 
assistance by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act. The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s Mortgage Credit Analysis for Mortgage Insurance on One- to Four-Unit Mortgage Loans 
(4155.1 REV-5) allowed sellers to contribute up to six percent of the sales price toward closing costs. 
Contributions exceeding six percent, or actual closing costs, resulted in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the 
sales price for calculating the LTV ratio. Importantly, the handbook stated that seller contributions cannot 
be used to meet the down payment requirement. Down payment assistance providers, “[M]ay not be a 
person or entity with an interest in the sale of the property, such as the seller, real estate agent or broker, 
builder, or any entity associated with them. Gifts from these sources are considered inducements to 
purchase and must be subtracted from the sales price.”  
Seller-funded downpayment assistance programs circumvented this regulation. Often a third-
party agency would provide financial assistance to the buyer in exchange for a donation from the seller. 
Because the “donation” was typically incorporated into the final sales price, the borrower effectively 
financed the downpayment and purchased the house with a higher LTV ratio than regulations allowed. 
Over half of appraisers, lenders, real estate agents and other industry participants surveyed believed that 
seller-funded down payment assistance inflated the appraised value and sales price of the property 
(Concentrance 2005).  Similarly, a GAO (2005) study found that homes bought with seller-funded down 
payment assistance between 2000 and 2005 were appraised at and sold for 2 to 3 percent more than 
comparable homes.   
Larger mortgage payments and lower equity combined to make seller-funded downpayment 
programs perform considerably worse than other downpayment assistance programs. Evaluating fixed-
rate FHA-insured mortgages with LTV ratios over 95 percent, HUD estimated that nonprofit assisted 
borrowers resulted in claims 2.33 to 2.51 times greater than borrowers who used other downpayment 
funds between FY2005 and FY2007 (HUD 2008). HUD attempted to ban seller-funded downpayment 
programs several times. HUD was sued for ruling that gifts from one seller-funded program would not 
count toward borrowers’ downpayments, resulting in a 1998 settlement that allowed the programs to 
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continue (Foote 2009). In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service stated that the “self-serving, circular-
financing arrangements” of seller-funded downpayment programs were inconsistent with the operation of 
a nonprofit organization (IRS 2006). In 2008, a federal district court overturned another attempt by HUD 
to prohibit seller-funded downpayments.  The issue was finally settled by the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, which states that in no case may required downpayments be provided by “any 
third part or entity that is reimbursed, directly or indirectly” by “the seller or any other person or entity that 
financially benefits from the transaction.”  
By the time HUD was able to prohibit seller-funded downpayment assistance programs, the 
eventual damage to FHA’s reserves was inevitable. According to the last actuarial review, endorsed loans 
originated under a seller-funded downpayment assistance program are estimated to ultimately cost FHA 
$15.25 billion (Integrated Financial Engineering 2012). For context, the economic value of FHA’s forward 
loans was negative $13.5 billion in 2012. That is, without seller-funded downpayment programs the 
economic value of FHA’s forward loan insurance program would have remained positive.  
 The widespread appraisal fraud in seller-funded downpayment assistance programs may create 
misleading LTV ratios among FHA-insured loans prior to 2008. Consequently, FHA-insured loans are 
expected to perform worse than conventional loans with similar nominal levels of home equity.  
Adverse Selection 
Mortgage insurance is not intended to prevent loan defaults, only to compensate investors if they 
occur. In economic theory, negative home equity is the sine qua non of mortgage default (Quercia and 
Stegman 1992; Foote, Gerardi and Willen 2008). While not all “underwater” borrowers default, distressed 
borrowers with home equity can in theory always refinance or sell the property to avoid default. Mortgage 
insurance is typically associated with high LTV ratios, but according to this theory the presence of 
mortgage insurance should have little impact on the default rates for loans with similar levels of home 
equity. 
However, there are reasons to believe mortgage insurance could be associated with a difference 
in default risk. Mortgage insurers may encourage adherence to stricter underwriting standards, even 
when these are loosened in the overall mortgage market. Insurers may provide a “second set of eyes” in 
the underwriting process, imposing a degree of additional discipline on lenders (Promontory 2011). 
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Indeed, maintaining underwriting standards may have made both FHA and private mortgage insurance 
less competitive at the height of the housing bubble, reducing their market share and sparing them from 
the worst performing cohorts of loans as house prices started to collapse.  
On the other hand, lenders may seek mortgage insurance only on higher risk loans. The first 
independent actuarial review of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund describes the dilemma: 
[I]f FHA were to raise premiums across the board, it may find that less risky borrowers 
who make higher downpayments will opt for conventional loans. This could mean that 
FHA will increasingly insure only more risky borrowers, for whom claim rates would be 
greater. This principle of adverse selection poses serious risks for the Fund. As FHA 
becomes less attractive for less risky borrowers, the remaining borrowers will face still 
higher premiums if the Fund is to attain a sound position. (Price Waterhouse 1990) 
 
The review further states, “The greater risk encountered at higher premium levels is exacerbated by 
FHA’s policy of charging one premium to all borrowers, regardless of risk” (Price Waterhouse 1990). Of 
course, even risk-based premiums can only be set according to risk characteristics observable to 
mortgage insurers, while lenders may possess additional information on borrower risk. 
 The minimal variation in FHA insurance premiums allows private mortgage insurance companies 
to compete for the lowest risk end of the mortgage insurance market by varying premiums based on 
observable risk characteristics. But the lack of risk-based pricing in FHA premiums is a policy decision. In 
fact, FHA did briefly adopt risk-based pricing in 2008 before the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
placed a one-year moratorium on the practice, which FHA has since continued (Mortgagee Letters 2008-
16; 2008-22). Given that FHA premiums are based on the risk-neutral budgetary cost under the Federal 
Credit Reform Act of 1990 instead of a more expensive risk-averse approach utilized by private financial 
companies24, FHA would be able to underprice private mortgage insurers across the credit spectrum if it 
were again to vary premiums by observable risk characteristics.  
The private mortgage industry also benefits from the dominant market share of the government-
sponsored enterprises and their statutory requirement for credit enhancement on high LTV ratio 
mortgages.  Fannie Mae’s charter specifically prohibits purchasing mortgages with LTV ratios over 80 
percent, “unless… that portion of the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage which is in excess of such 
80 per centum is guaranteed or insured by a qualified insurer as determined by the corporation.” Blood 
                                               
24 Congress had debated evaluating FHA premiums under “fair-value accounting” that would incorporate 
a market risk premium. 
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(2001) points to the lack of such a mandate in the commercial market as a reason for private mortgage 
insurance losses in the 1970s. Over 13 percent of the Enterprises’ single-family books of business carry 
private mortgage insurance, with a maximum potential loss recovery (risk-in-force) of $152 billion at the 
end of 2013. 
Then again, the Enterprises charge their own guarantee fees, which may exacerbate adverse 
selection when layered on private mortgage insurance premiums because the additional cost will 
discourage low risk borrowers from using the Enterprise/PMI channel. Guarantee fees may be 
unnecessarily high if they fail to account for the loss mitigation benefits of mortgage insurance. In 
response to a recent request for input, the private mortgage industry trade association argued: 
It is critical that FHFA, in computing g-fees, correctly incorporate the impact of MI in 
reducing the Enterprises’ estimated costs of providing a credit guarantee. To do 
otherwise results in consumers being charged twice for the same risk reduction, which 
disproportionately disadvantages low- and moderate-income and first time homebuyers. 
However, it is apparent from information in the RFI and elsewhere that the Enterprises 
are not appropriately taking MI into account, thereby significantly discounting MI’s risk 
mitigation benefits. (USMI 2014) 
 
In some cases, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are charging more for their second loss position than 
private mortgage insurers charge for their first loss position.  
Other research finds that mortgages with LTV ratios just under 80 percent create greater 
expected losses for the Enterprises than mortgages with smaller downpayments but covered by mortgage 
insurance (Goodman et al. 2014; Park and Ratcliffe 2014). This is because standard mortgage insurance 
coverage is greater than the difference between the actual LTV ratio and 80 percent—the level at which 
mortgage insurance is not required. For example, the standard coverage for a 95 percent LTV ratio is 30 
percent, meaning with respect to the Enterprises the mortgage is similar to one with a 65 percent LTV 
ratio in terms of loss severity.  Yet the guarantee fees do not fully reflect the loss mitigation.  
The guarantee fees may not fully account for mortgage insurance because of the risk that a 
distressed mortgage insurance company might not be able to fully cover claims. The Great Recession 
proved that counter-party risk is not hypothetical. All of the counterparties used by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and rated by one of the major credit rating agencies had ratings below the “AA-” level 
required under existing regulations.  Three mortgage insurance companies (PMI Mortgage Insurance Co., 
Republic Mortgage Insurance Company, and Triad Guaranty Insurance Corporation) entered run-off 
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under supervision of their state regulators, meaning claims continued to be processed but no new 
business is endorsed. Even existing claims are being partly deferred.  
Consequently, the Federal Housing Finance Agency is tightening regulatory standards on private 
mortgage insurers. New private mortgage insurer eligibility requirements lower the risk-to-capital ratio 
from 25:1 to 18:1, forcing insurers to hold more capital. Zandi, Parrott and deRitis (2014) estimate that 
these regulations will increase mortgage insurance premiums by an average of 15 basis points, with the 
introduction of greater risk-based capital requirements raising premiums more for higher risk borrowers.  
Our hypothesis is that after controlling for observable risk characteristics, loans with FHA or 
private mortgage insurance will have a higher likelihood of default due to adverse selection. This is 
expected to be particularly true for loans insured by FHA because of their higher insurance premiums and 
limited ability to offer risk-based pricing. FHA-insured loans are also expected to have higher rates of 
prepayment, as borrowers seek to take advantage of equity accumulation and refinance to a loan with a 
lower rate or without mortgage insurance. 
Conceptual Framework 
Under the stylized model used by Ferguson and Peters (1995) and extended by Ambrose, 
Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2002), the credit risk of mortgage applicants can be distilled into a single 
factor, Ω ϵ [0,1], with a probability density function 𝑓(Ω) and cumulative distribution 𝐹(Ω) . Underwriting 
standards can be represented as a maximum acceptable credit risk, Ω*, where all applicants above Ω* are 
rejected. The maximum credit risk acceptable to FHA, ΩFHA, is assumed to be greater than the credit risk 
acceptable to the private mortgage insurers, ΩPMI. 
The market segmentation between FHA and private mortgage insurers creates distinct credit risk 
profiles, as already demonstrated. More stringent underwriting standards means the average credit risk, 
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and therefore the expected default rate in the conventional mortgage insurance market, is less than 
for FHA endorsed loans. Mathematically, 
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∫
Ω𝑓(Ω)𝜕Ω
𝐹(Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼)
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼
0
 
and 
Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∫
Ω𝑓(Ω)𝜕Ω
𝐹(Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴) − 𝐹(Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼)
Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼
 
such that 
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Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ < Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
This difference in credit risk distributions confounds simple comparisons of loan performance.  
Furthermore, both private mortgage insurance and FHA insurance face a problem that pesters 
any insurance scheme: adverse selection. Lenders often have greater knowledge of a borrower’s credit 
risk than captured in traditional underwriting standards available to mortgage insurers. Bank lenders may 
have detailed knowledge of the financial situation of a customer from years of providing banking and 
financial services.  This asymmetric information allows lenders the option to profitably self-insure when 
lending to lower risk borrowers.   
Even if a country’s market and regulatory environment is conducive to high-volume low-
risk mortgage financing, the mortgage insurer must avert ‘adverse selection of risk,’ i.e., it 
must overcome the mortgage lender’s natural inclination to choose—loan by loan—which 
cases to submit for insurance and which cases to ‘self-insure.’ After all, who more than 
the lender is likely to know which credits and which properties present significant 
incremental risks most in need of insurance against default-induced losses? (Blood 2001) 
 
Conceptually, the observable risk distribution is actually the aggregation of two latent distributions 
(see Figure 4.2). Lenders have full information on both distributions, but self-insure the distribution, Ω𝐿, 
that is lower risk according to characteristics unobservable to others. Lenders pass on the credit risk of 
the remaining loans, constituting the residual (higher risk) distribution Ω𝐼, to mortgage insurers. The 
degree of separation in the distributions is determined by the extent to which the inside knowledge of the 
lenders is different than the observable risk characteristics (i.e., without any unique information, the 
distributions would be one and the same). 
In the presence of adverse selection, the average credit risk for private mortgage insurance and 
FHA insurance are   
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∫
Ω𝐼𝑓(Ω𝐼)𝜕Ω𝐼
𝐹(Ω𝐼
𝑃𝑀𝐼)
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼
0
 
and 
Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∫
Ω𝐼𝑓(Ω𝐼)𝜕Ω𝐼
𝐹(Ω𝐼
𝐹𝐻𝐴) − 𝐹(Ω𝐼
𝑃𝑀𝐼)
Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼
 
respectively.  As a consequence, the credit risk of the mortgage insurers exceeds the expected risk in the 
absence of adverse selection.  
Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ < Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   
and 
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Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ < Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
Meanwhile, the average credit risk of uninsured or self-insured mortgages is determined by the 
low risk distribution. 
Ω𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∫
Ω𝐿𝑓(Ω𝐿)𝜕Ω𝐿
𝐹(Ω𝐿
𝐹𝐻𝐴)
Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴
0
 
Note that the credit risk integral of self-insured lenders extends beyond Ω𝑃𝑀𝐼 to Ω𝐹𝐻𝐴, which indicates that 
adverse selection plagues both private and public mortgage insurance programs.  
Lenders self-insure by charging interest rates with a sufficient spread over the risk-free rate to 
cover credit losses. But because lenders only self-insure the Ω𝐿 distribution, the observed risk-based 
variation in rate spreads is effectively right-censored; borrowers in the Ω𝐼 distribution will find explicit 
mortgage insurance premiums less expensive because they are based only on observable risk 
characteristics. Therefore, all else equal, differences in total insurance costs that include both interest rate 
spreads and mortgage insurance premiums should correlate with the degree of asymmetric information. 
That is, a loan that a mortgage lender is willing to self-insure for much less than a private mortgage 
insurance company would explicitly insure is likely to be less risky than observable loan and borrower 
characteristics would suggest. 
Figure 4.2 Credit Risk and Market Segmentation 
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Methodology 
Loan Performance Data 
Loan performance data was obtained from CoreLogic under the auspices of its Academic 
Research Council. A random sample of single-family, owner-occupied, first lien, fixed-rate, home 
purchase loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios over 80 percent originated between 2002 and 2010 was 
drawn from 19 metropolitan areas.  
In addition to cleaning the data25, this paper further restricts the observations to improve the 
comparability of insurance types. Loan amounts are restricted to those under the FHA loan limits for a 
given county and year.  Observations were excluded if the LTV ratio exceeded 97 percent, the borrower’s 
credit score was less than 620, or private mortgage insurance would not otherwise have been available at 
the time of origination due to the combination of credit score and LTV ratio (see Table 4.2A)26. Loans with 
low or no documentation of income and assets, and with certain high risk features (interest only, negative 
amortization, etc.) are also excluded. 
Table 4.1A shows the loan characteristics of the CoreLogic sample after data cleaning and the 
above mentioned restrictions. Compared to uninsured loans, loans with private or FHA mortgage 
insurance are much less likely to be originated through the wholesale channel and more likely to be 
originated by a correspondent lender. Loan amounts are also higher among insured loans. Borrower 
credit scores are lowest among FHA-insured and highest among privately-insured loans, while LTV ratios 
are highest among FHA-insured and lowest among privately-insured loans.  
The market share of each loan type also shifted during the study period. Over 46 percent of 
uninsured loans in the sample were originated before 2005. In contrast, nearly 58 percent of privately 
insured loans were originated between 2007 and 2009, and 82 percent of FHA-insured loans were 
originated between 2008 and 2010. The more recent vintage of FHA-insured loans may explain why a 
higher share (48 percent) of such loans is still current, compared to privately-insured and uninsured loans 
                                               
25 Additional data cleaning included dropping observations with more than three missing periods in the 
performance history, loans where the first date in the payment history preceded the date of origination, 
loan amounts under $10,000, loans with negative mortgage interest rates, and loans with interest rates 
greater than 500 basis points above or below the prime rate. 
 
26 Loans removed by the required credit score and LTV combinations were disproportionately (62 
percent) insured by FHA. 
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(34 percent and 37 percent, respectively). Current loans are censored outcomes, which present 
challenges for analysis.  
Market shares also vary by region (Table 4.1C). FHA insurance has a disproportionately higher 
market share in San Diego and a low market share in Miami. Private mortgage insurance is more 
prevalent in New York and Chicago and less prevalent in Las Vegas. Loans without mortgage insurance 
have a higher market share in Miami and lower shares in Denver and San Diego. These markets had 
sharply different experiences during the Great Recession, which make simple comparisons of the 
likelihood of default difficult. 
Table 4.1 Sample Characteristics 
  
A. Unmatched B. Matched & Weighted 
  Uninsured PMI FHA Uninsured PMI FHA 
Property Type (Percent) 
      
 
Single-Family or Townhouse 62.7 51.4 60.6 58.7 61.4 57.1 
 
Condo, Co-Op, Etc. 37.3 48.6 39.4 41.3 38.6 42.9 
Loan Source (Percent) 
      
 
Retail 26.4 31.0 24.4 30.7 33.2 31.1 
 
Wholesale 26.0 2.0 3.4 18.3 6.6 19.8 
 
Mortgage Broker 30.5 26.2 9.3 30.5 35.3 30.3 
 
Correspondent Lender 17.1 40.8 62.9 20.6 24.9 18.7 
Origination Year (Percent) 
      
 
2002 14.8 4.5 2.7 14.8 14.8 14.8 
 
2003 19.8 9.6 4.6 19.8 19.8 19.8 
 
2004 11.7 8.1 3.0 11.7 11.7 11.7 
 
2005 6.8 6.5 2.5 6.8 6.8 6.8 
 
2006 4.8 5.9 1.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 
 
2007 14.1 13.0 3.9 14.1 14.1 14.1 
 
2008 18.1 32.5 19.5 18.1 18.1 18.1 
 
2009 5.5 12.2 33.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 
 
2010 4.4 7.6 28.7 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Loan Amount (2010$) 194.6 215.0 217.8 190.8 196.0 186.3 
  
(85.2) (97.8) (124.6) (85.5) (84.5) (83.4) 
Credit Score 717.1 726.0 708.7 711.3 720.8 710.4 
  
(52.4) (50.7) (52.0) (51.4) (50.4) (52.1) 
Loan-to-Value Ratio (Percent) 92.4 91.0 92.9 92.7 92.2 93.3 
    (4.1) (3.9) (4.0) (4.0) (3.9) (3.9) 
Outcome (Percent) 
      
 
Current (Censored) 36.8 34.2 47.5 38.8 35.9 25.6 
 
Defaulted 11.8 18.8 10.9 12.9 21.4 12.1 
 
Prepaid 51.4 47.0 41.6 48.2 42.7 62.2 
Observations (Unweighted) 28,599 16,027 37,438 21,501 11,142 12,422 
Weight . . . 1.0 1.9 1.7 
    . . . . (3.5) (2.6) 
Standard deviations presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1C Geographic Distribution Prior to Matching 
Percent 
 
Uninsured PMI FHA 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area 38.0 16.6 45.4 
Boston-Quincy, MA Metropolitan Division 37.6 21.0 41.5 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC Metropolitan Statistical Area 39.0 13.4 47.6 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL Metropolitan Division  29.5 32.7 37.8 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area 33.4 22.5 44.0 
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX Metropolitan Division  36.2 19.5 44.3 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO Metropolitan Statistical Area 26.1 16.9 56.9 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI Metropolitan Division  43.6 15.7 40.6 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Metropolitan Statistical Area 35.9 7.8 56.3 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA Metropolitan Division  30.0 17.3 52.7 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL Metropolitan Division  44.9 26.0 29.1 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI Metropolitan Statistical Area  26.8 18.4 54.9 
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ Metropolitan Division  29.5 34.9 35.6 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ Metropolitan Statistical Area 38.1 10.9 51.0 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA Metropolitan Statistical Area  43.1 12.5 44.4 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area  25.5 12.9 61.5 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA Metropolitan Division 42.8 13.7 43.5 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area 41.0 13.6 45.4 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metropolitan Division  39.1 10.2 50.7 
Table 4.2A Private Mortgage Insurance Premiums (Basis Points) 
Coverage* Type 
Loan-to- 
Value Ratio Credit Score 
Prior to Nov. 
2008 
Nov. 2008 to 
Sept. 2009 
Oct. 2009 
Onward 
35 Annual 95.01% to 
97.00% 
700 or Higher 96 98 98 
680 to 699 96 110 153 
660 to 679 96 NA NA 
620 to 659 96 NA NA 
30 Annual 90.01% to 
95.00% 
700 or Higher 78 94 94 
680 to 699 78 94 120 
660 to 679 78 94 NA 
620 to 659 78 120 NA 
25 Annual 85.01% to 
90.00% 
700 or Higher 52 62 62 
680 to 699 52 62 62 
660 to 679 52 62 NA 
620 to 659 52 76 NA 
12 Annual 85% or Less 700 or Higher 32 38 38 
680 to 699 32 38 38 
660 to 679 32 38 NA 
620 to 659 32 44 NA 
*Standard coverage required by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Source: Genworth Financial 
Table 4.2B FHA Mortgage Insurance Premiums (Basis Points) 
Type Loan-to-Value Ratio 
Prior to July 
2008 
July 2008 to 
Sept. 2008 
Oct. 2008 to 
Mar. 2010 
Apr. 2010 to 
Sept. 2010 
Oct. 2010 
Onward 
Upfront   150 125-175* 175 225 100 
Annual 
Greater than 95.00% 50 55 55 55 90 
95.00% or Less 50 50 50 50 85 
*Depending on credit score (for credit scores of 600 or higher) 
Source: FHA Mortgage Letters 2000-38; 2008-16; 2008-22; 2010-02; 2010-28 
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Propensity Score Matching 
As noted, the different risk profiles of conventional and FHA-insured mortgages confound simple 
comparisons of default and prepayment rates. Covariates in an econometric model can account for these 
differences, but pre-analysis matching has been found to reduce selection bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983; Dehejia and Wahba 1999). A propensity score is the probability of assignment conditional on 
observed loan characteristics at origination, effectively summarizing the covariates into a single measure 
and providing a straightforward means of record matching. The propensity score matching procedure 
involves three steps. 
First, the propensity score itself is estimated. Given three types of mortgage insurance (FHA, 
private insurance, and no insurance), a multinomial logistic regression is used.  
Pr(𝑦 = 𝑗) =
𝑒x𝛽𝑗
1 + ∑ 𝑒x𝛽𝑘𝐽𝑘=1
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,2 
Pr(𝑦 = 𝑗) =
1
1 + ∑ 𝑒x𝛽𝑘𝐽𝑘=1
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 0 
In this case, the propensity score 𝑒(x) is the probability of no mortgage insurance, represented as the 
base outcome 
𝑒(x) = Pr (𝑦 = 0) 
Loan characteristics at origination used to estimate the propensity score include the loan-to-value 
ratio, loan amount, and borrower credit score as well as interactions and higher-order terms, plus 
categorical variables representing loan source, property type, metropolitan area and year of origination. 
FHA-insured loans are identified either by the loan type or if FHA is listed as the mortgage insurer. 
Privately insured loans are identified as conventional loans insured by one of the major private mortgage 
insurance companies.27 Non-insured loans are conventional loans explicitly identified as without mortgage 
insurance. 
Second, each uninsured loan is matched with replacement to at least two comparable FHA loans 
using a nearest neighbor method stratified by metropolitan area and year of origination, which is intended 
                                               
27 These include CMG Mortgage Insurance Company, Genworth Financial (formerly GE Capital Mortgage 
Insurance), Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Company (MGIC), PMI Mortgage Insurance Company, Radian 
Guaranty (formerly Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Company), Republic Mortgage Insurance 
Company, Triad Guaranty Insurance Corporation, and United Guaranty Corporation.  
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to match on general economic environment as well as individual borrower characteristics.28. Following 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), distance is measured by the logit, 𝑞(x), of the propensity score which 
creates a more normal distribution and avoids compression to a 0 to 1 scale, rather than the raw 
propensity score. 
𝑞(x) = ln (
𝑒(x)
1 − 𝑒(x)
) 
Matching with replacement ensures the closest possible match by allowing an FHA loan to be 
matched multiple times if it has the smallest difference in propensity scores to multiple uninsured loans. 
Each uninsured loan is matched to at least two FHA loans to compensate for the decrease in sample size 
that matching with replacement can create. Similarly, in cases where multiple loans have identical 
propensity scores, all are included. If an FHA loan is matched to multiple uninsured loans, the record is 
weighted by the number of matches. The region of common support29 is strengthened by dropping ten 
percent of uninsured loans where the propensity score density of FHA loans is lowest.  
Finally, every uninsured loan not dropped in the previous step is matched to two comparable 
privately-insured loans, again using a nearest neighbor method stratified by metropolitan area and year of 
origination. No further trimming is used to prevent uninsured loans matched to FHA loans from being 
dropped. 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates how matching creates common support. The initial distribution of FHA-
insured loans was highly dissimilar to the distribution of uninsured loans. These distributions become 
progressively more similar first by matching loan records and then by weighting records based on the 
number of matches.  Table 4.1B shows how matching and weighting reduces the differences in loan 
characteristics across the types of mortgage insurance. Figure 4.4 shows that matching increases the 
cumulative survival rates of uninsured and privately insured loans but decreases the survival rate of FHA-
insured loans. However, the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate does not differentiate between failure due to 
prepayment from failure due to default.  
                                               
28 Propensity score matching is accomplished using the Stata program psmatch2 created by Leuven and 
Siansi (2003). 
 
29 Common support means every observation has a probability of being any type of loan (i.e., uninsured, 
privately-insured or FHA-insured) between zero and one:  0 < Pr(𝑦 = 𝑗) < 1. 
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Because the propensity score matching was stratified by market and origination year, these 
factors are strictly balanced across insurance types. However, other differences persist. Notably, FHA 
loans continue to have lower credit scores and higher loan-to-value ratios on average than privately-
insured or uninsured loans. Both FHA- and privately-insured loans remain more likely to be originated 
through a wholesale channel and somewhat less likely to be originated through a mortgage broker or 
correspondent lender than uninsured loans. Consequently, covariates are still necessary in the survival 
model.  The final sample consists of 45,065 loans before weighting.  
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Figure 4.3 Propensity Score Matching Common Support 
A. Unmatched 
 
B. Matched 
 
C. Matched and Weighted 
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Figure 4.4 Propensity Score Matching and Survival Estimate 
 
Note: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate: ?̂?(𝑡) = ∏ (
𝑛𝑗−𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
)𝑗|𝑡𝑗≤𝑡  where 𝑑𝑗 is the number of failures (default or prepayment) 
at time 𝑡𝑗 and 𝑛𝑗 is the number of loans at risk. 
Competing Risks Survival Model 
Borrowers are often understood to have an implicit “put” option to sell the house back to the 
lender for the value of the mortgage (i.e., default) and a “call” option to buy the mortgage at par (i.e., 
prepay, either through selling the home or refinancing the mortgage). Of course, borrowers do not behave 
as “ruthlessly” as suggested, in part because of the transaction costs involved, the social stigma of 
default, and the possibility of a deficiency judgment in some states. Nevertheless, option theory, first 
applied to mortgages by Asay (1978), provides a clear conceptual foundation for analyzing borrower 
behavior. 
Early empirical studies typically evaluated only default or refinance, but not both.  Kau et al. 
(1992) argue for the importance of evaluating the borrower’s decision jointly.  
Since prepayment and default substitute for one another, contracts with only one of the 
default or prepayment provisions lead the borrower to behave differently than when both 
are present. This substitution effect means that one cannot accurately value either the 
individual provisions or their interaction without both options being present. 
 
The long amortization periods of most mortgages also means right-censoring is an issue. In fact, 
nearly one-third of loans in the matched sample was neither prepaid nor in default at the last observation. 
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Some share of these loans will default or prepay in the future but cannot currently be observed. In order 
to address this censoring problem, a survival analysis model is most appropriate.30 Survival analysis 
models estimate the likelihood of an event or hazard in any period, conditional on survival to that 
particular period. 
Following Deng, Quigley and Van Order (1996), this paper uses a semiparametric approach to 
estimate a proportional hazard model with competing risks. In the survival analysis model developed by 
Fine and Gray (1999)31, the subhazard function for cause 𝑖 can be represented as 
ℎ̅𝑖(𝑡|x) = ℎ̅𝑖,0(𝑡)𝑒
xβ 
for a vector of covariates and a baseline subhazard function ℎ̅𝑖,0(𝑡). The cumulative subhazard function is  
𝐻𝑖(𝑡) = ∫ ℎ̅𝑖(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
𝑜
 
Model Variables 
Default is defined as the first instance of a 90-day delinquency, foreclosure or real estate owned 
(i.e., repossessed by the lender) recorded in the loan history. Loan histories that do not include an 
instance of default or prepayment prior to November 2013, the servicing rights being sold, or status no 
longer recorded are considered censored.  
The following variables are fixed at origination: 
Mortgage Insurance Type – The type of mortgage insurance is the primary explanatory variable 
of interest. Two dummy variables indicate whether the loan was endorsed by either FHA or a 
private mortgage insurance company, with uninsured loans (self-insured by the lender/investor) 
as the reference category.  
Rate Spread at Origination – Analyses are presented with and without the rate spread at 
origination included. The rate spread is typically defined as the contract interest rate less the 
prevailing prime interest rate reported by Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey. The 
rate spread on uninsured loans includes an implicit self-insurance premium, but explicit premiums 
on insured loans are not included in the rate spread. In order to standardize this measure of credit 
                                               
30 Note bene: Survival analysis is particularly fitting given the word “mortgage” is an Old French term for 
“death pledge,” referring to a closed-end loan’s fixed term to maturity, and “amortize” is from the Middle 
English term “to bring to death” (McDonald and Thornton 2008). 
 
31 The model developed by Fine and Gray (1999) is implemented using the stcrreg command in Stata. 
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risk, we adjust the rate spread to reflect the total annual costs of principal, interest and mortgage 
insurance payments32, if applicable, as a share of the original loan balance (see Table 4.3). FHA 
and private mortgage insurance premiums are typically priced only using observable 
characteristics already included in the survival model, specifically credit score and LTV ratio. If 
the rate spread at origination provides any additional explanatory power it must reveal risk 
unobservable to mortgage insurers.  
Property Type – Condominiums, cooperatives and other dwelling types are identified separately 
from single-family units and townhouses.  
Origination Channel – The relationship between borrower and lender has been found to have a 
significant impact on loan performance (Laderman and Reid 2008; Ding et al. 2011). The 
origination channel is identified as retail, wholesale, correspondent, or mortgage broker using a 
series of binary variables. Retail lending is used as the reference category.  
Credit Score at Origination – The credit score is a statistical measure of creditworthiness 
created by one of the major credit rating bureaus based on factors like payment history, length of 
credit history, credit utilization, etc. The score developed by the Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) 
ranges from 350 and 800, but the sample has been restricted to borrowers with credit scores of at 
least 620.  Credit score and its squared term are used as variables, as well as an interaction 
between credit score and the mark-to-market loan-to-value ratio. 
Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects – Geographically-based fixed effects absorb many unobserved 
factors that may contribute to the likelihood of default, including differences in state and other 
laws on predatory lending, homestead exemptions, mortgage recourse and anti-deficiency 
judgments, etc. 
Origination Year Cohort Effects – Fixed Effects for year of origination capture differences in the 
general economic environment not accounted for elsewhere. 
The following variables are time-varying: 
                                               
32 Up-front FHA premiums are assumed to be financed in the loan amount. 
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Change in Prime Rate –The change in interest rates since origination affects the likelihood of 
exercising the implicit call option of prepaying the loan by refinancing. Interest rates are defined 
as the prevailing prime rate reported in Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey. 
Mark-to-Market Loan-to-Value Ratio – The put option may be “in the money” for loans with 
negative equity, which depends on the initial downpayment, amortization since origination and 
change in the value of the house. In a mark-to-market LTV ratio, the numerator is the outstanding 
loan balance at a given point in time. Because all of the loans in the data are fixed-rate loans with 
30 year terms, the debt in the months after origination can be imputed using a standard 
amortization schedule and the interest rate at origination.  The denominator is the sales price at 
origination proportionately adjusted by CoreLogic’s repeat sales house price index at county- or 
metropolitan area-level.  The MTMLTV ratio and its square term are used as covariates, as well 
as the interaction between the MTMLTV ratio and the borrower’s credit score at origination. 
Employment Conditions – “Trigger events” such as job loss have been found to tip underwater 
borrowers into default. Gerardi et al. (2013) find that individual unemployment is the strongest 
predictor of default. Unfortunately, household-level information on employment and loan 
performance is limited. This paper uses both the unemployment rate and year-over-year change 
in the level of employment at the county level to capture employment conditions as proxies for job 
loss.  
Table 4.3 Mortgage Interest Rate Spreads Adjusted for Insurance Premiums 
    Uninsured PMI FHA 
Mortgage Interest Rate (Percent) 6.2 6.1 6.1 
  
(0.8) (0.6) (0.7) 
Rate Spread (Basis Points) 15.4 11.5 11.7 
  
(51.7) (32.2) (36.5) 
 
Adjusted Rate Spread  15.4 82.5 73.3 
    (51.7) (38.9) (37.0) 
Standard deviations presented in parentheses. 
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Findings 
Table 4.4A presents the estimated subhazard ratios for the likelihood of default. The estimated 
directions of model covariates are largely consistent with expectations. Loans originated by 
correspondent lenders or through a mortgage broker are associated with a slightly elevated risk of default 
compared to retail branch lending. On the other hand, wholesale lending is associated with a lower risk of 
default. An increase in the prime mortgage interest rate since origination is associated with a decrease in 
the risk of default. 
Labor market conditions have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of default; a higher 
unemployment rate is associated with a higher default rate, while a year-over-year increase in 
employment is associated with decrease in risk. The metropolitan statistical area or division (not shown) 
also has a statistically significant effect. The Boston and Portland metropolitan areas, in particular, are 
associated with a lower risk of default. Meanwhile, Miami and Phoenix are associated with a higher risk of 
default. 
Borrower credit score at origination and the mark-to-market loan-to-value ratio are statistically 
significant when taken together, but the higher-order terms and interaction make interpretation of the 
coefficients difficult. In order to aid in understanding, Figure 4.5 plots the simulated cumulative default 
probability by credit score and MTMLTV ratio for a mortgage on a single-family house originated through 
a retail channel in 2002 with no change in employment or prime interest rates, and a six percent 
unemployment rate.33 As expected, the lower credit score and higher MTMLTV ratio are associated with 
higher default rates. 
  
                                               
33 Cumulative incidence functions plotted using Stata’s stcurve command. Mean values are used for any 
value not specified. 
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Table 4.4 Default Subhazard 
  
A. Without Rate Spread B. With Rate Spread 
    SHR Std. Err. SHR Std. Err. 
Mortgage Insurance 
    
 
Uninsured . . . . 
 
PMI 1.607*** 0.080 1.140** 0.075 
 
FHA 0.927 0.045 0.725*** 0.039 
Adjusted Rate Spread . . 1.00481*** 0.00049 
Property Type 
    
 
Single-Family or Townhouse . . . . 
 
Condo, Co-Op, Etc. 1.040 0.053 1.049 0.053 
Origination Channel 
    
 
Retail . . . . 
 
Wholesale 0.761* 0.111 0.651*** 0.099 
 
Mortgage Broker 1.153*** 0.062 1.130** 0.061 
 
Correspondent Lender 1.248*** 0.065 1.244*** 0.065 
Credit Score at Origination 0.998 0.013 1.002 0.013 
 
Squared 0.9999899 0.0000094 0.9999869 0.0000093 
Mark-to-Market Loan-to-Value Ratio 0.995 0.017 0.992 0.017 
 
Squared 0.999940 0.000037 0.999949 0.000037 
 
Credit Score 1.000048** 0.000023 1.000048** 0.000023 
Change in Prime Rate Since Origination 0.814*** 0.034 0.776*** 0.032 
Unemployment Rate 1.130*** 0.015 1.132*** 0.015 
Change in Employment 0.9584*** 0.0065 0.9582*** 0.0066 
Origination Year 
    
 
2002 . . . . 
 
2003 1.115 0.136 1.206 0.148 
 
2004 1.221* 0.139 1.315** 0.150 
 
2005 1.151 0.139 1.258* 0.152 
 
2006 0.841 0.105 0.890 0.111 
 
2007 0.752** 0.094 0.760** 0.096 
 
2008 0.547*** 0.067 0.556*** 0.068 
 
2009 0.234*** 0.035 0.240*** 0.036 
 2010 0.241*** 0.040 0.230*** 0.038 
Observations 2,325,945 2,325,945 
Subjects 45,065 45,065 
 
Current (Censored) 16,925 16,925 
 
Default 6,625 6,625 
 
Prepaid 21,515 21,515 
Wald χ2 3171*** 3317*** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -65331 -65192 
Akaike information criterion (AIC)  130742 130466 
C. Difference in Default Sub-Hazard Ratios  
    PMI FHA 
 
Without Rate Spread 1.607 0.080 0.927 0.045 
 
With Rate Spread 1.140 0.075 0.725 0.039 
 Difference -0.466*** 0.110 -0.202*** 0.059 
Statistically significant at the *10% level **5% level ***1% level. 
Metropolitan area fixed effects not shown. 
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Figure 4.5 Default Subhazard by Credit Score and MTMLTV Ratio 
 
Examining the coefficient on mortgage insurance shows that privately insured loans are more 
likely to default than uninsured loans after accounting for observable risk characteristics. Specifically, the 
default subhazard is 61 percent higher for privately insured loans, and statistically significant. On the 
other hand, the subhazard associated with FHA insurance is not statistically significant. Table 4.4B shows 
the results after including the adjusted rate spread at origination. Consistent with expectations, the 
estimated subhazard ratios decline for both types of insurance. Private mortgage insurance is associated 
with only a 14 percent increase in the default hazard and FHA insurance is associated with about a 
statistically significant 27 percent reduction.  
Simply stated, after using the higher monthly mortgage costs as a proxy for unobserved risk, 
FHA-insured loans are less likely to default than uninsured loans. Both coefficients are statistically 
significant. Table 4.4C shows that this decline in coefficients associated with mortgage insurance after the 
inclusion of the adjusted rate spread is larger for privately-insured loans but statistically significant for 
both. Figure 4.6 simulates the cumulative default probability by type of mortgage insurance and shows 
how the inclusion of the adjusted rate spread lowers the default rate among insured loans. Applying the 
average adjusted rate spread at origination to all insurance types increases the predicted default rate 
among uninsured loans by nearly a percentage point after five years, while reducing the predicted default 
rate among FHA and privately insured loans by roughly 0.6 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively.  
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Table 4.5 presents the estimated subhazard ratios for the likelihood of prepayment, the 
competing hazard to the default model. Loans originated through the wholesale channel are substantially 
more likely to prepay than loans originated through the retail channel, while loans originated through a 
correspondent lender are somewhat less likely to prepay.  
Not surprisingly, prevailing interest rates are a strong driver of prepayment behavior—a one 
percentage point increase in the prime mortgage interest rate since origination cuts the prepayment 
hazard by nearly 58 percent. Stronger employment conditions are associated with a slight increase in the 
likelihood of prepayment. The likelihood of being prepaid rose for loans originated after 2002, peaking in 
the 2007 and 2008 books of business. Borrowers in Detroit and Boston were more likely to prepay, while 
borrowers in Miami were less likely. 
FHA insured loans are more likely to prepay than uninsured loans, while privately-insured loans 
were less likely to prepay. The coefficients associated with both types of insurance are statistically 
significant. Again, after controlling for the (adjusted) rate spread at origination, the subhazard ratios fell for 
both types of mortgage insurance. Table 4.5C confirms that this decline in the subhazard ratios after 
controlling for the rate spread at origination is statistically significant. Figure 4.7 depicts the cumulative 
incidence functions with and without including the rate spread.  
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Figure 4.6 Default Subhazard by Mortgage Insurance Type 
 
Figure 4.7 Prepayment Subhazard by Mortgage Insurance Type 
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Table 4.5 Prepayment Subhazard 
  
A. Without Rate Spread B. With Rate Spread 
    SHR Std. Err. SHR Std. Err. 
Mortgage Insurance 
    
 
Uninsured . . . . 
 
PMI 0.839*** 0.028 0.646*** 0.025 
 
FHA 1.701*** 0.048 1.400*** 0.043 
Adjusted Rate Spread . . 1.00381*** 0.00030 
Property Type 
    
 
Single-Family or Townhouse . . . . 
 
Condo, Co-Op, Etc. 0.970 0.029 0.982 0.029 
Origination Channel 
    
 
Retail . . . . 
 
Wholesale 4.599*** 0.272 4.258*** 0.252 
 
Mortgage Broker 0.971 0.034 0.962 0.034 
 
Correspondent Lender 0.821*** 0.023 0.812*** 0.023 
Credit Score at Origination 1.013* 0.008 1.018** 0.008 
 
Squared 0.9999864** 0.0000053 0.9999833*** 0.0000053 
Mark-to-Market Loan-to-Value Ratio 0.912*** 0.011 0.907*** 0.011 
 
Squared 0.999977 0.000028 0.999985 0.000028 
 
Credit Score 1.000109*** 0.000016 1.000113*** 0.000017 
Change in Prime Rate Since Origination 0.422*** 0.009 0.406*** 0.009 
Unemployment Rate 0.937*** 0.009 0.935*** 0.009 
Change in Employment 1.0180*** 0.0059 1.0169*** 0.0059 
Origination Year 
    
 
2002 . . . . 
 
2003 1.538*** 0.094 1.659*** 0.101 
 
2004 1.618*** 0.102 1.720*** 0.109 
 
2005 2.047*** 0.160 2.218*** 0.169 
 
2006 2.085*** 0.163 2.232*** 0.174 
 
2007 2.742*** 0.199 2.800*** 0.199 
 
2008 2.718*** 0.168 2.781*** 0.169 
 
2009 2.318*** 0.149 2.396*** 0.152 
 2010 2.195*** 0.148 2.165*** 0.145 
Observations 2,325,945 2,325,945 
Subjects 45,065 45,065 
 
Current (Censored) 16,925 16,925 
 
Default 21,515 21,515 
 
Prepaid 6,625 6,625 
Wald χ2 5862*** 6178*** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -211937 -211692 
Akaike information criterion (AIC)  423954 423466 
C. Difference in Default Sub-Hazard Ratios 
    PMI FHA 
 
Without Rate Spread 0.839 0.028 1.701 0.048 
 
With Rate Spread 0.646 0.025 1.400 0.043 
 Difference -0.193*** 0.037 -0.301*** 0.064 
Statistically significant at the *10% level **5% level ***1% level. 
Metropolitan area fixed effects not shown. 
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Table 4.6 Subhazards by Mortgage Insurance Company 
  
A. Default B. Prepayment 
    SHR Std. Err. SHR Std. Err. 
Mortgage Insurance Company 
    
 
FHA . . . . 
 
PMI Company 1 1.731*** 0.178 0.483*** 0.030 
 
PMI Company 2 1.903*** 0.214 0.487*** 0.034 
 
PMI Company 3 1.702*** 0.174 0.375*** 0.028 
 
PMI Company 4 1.704*** 0.184 0.400*** 0.030 
 
PMI Company 5 1.805*** 0.271 0.432*** 0.047 
 
PMI Company 6 1.697*** 0.189 0.547*** 0.037 
Property Type 
    
 
Single-Family or Townhouse . . . . 
 
Condo, Co-Op, Etc. 1.065 0.070 1.048 0.040 
Origination Channel 
    
 
Retail . . . . 
 
Wholesale 0.864 0.153 4.175*** 0.320 
 
Mortgage Broker 1.151* 0.084 1.275*** 0.061 
 
Correspondent Lender 1.241*** 0.085 0.798*** 0.032 
Credit Score at Origination 1.010 0.018 1.019* 0.011 
 
Squared 0.999982 0.000013 0.9999829** 0.0000072 
Mark-to-Market Loan-to-Value Ratio 1.011 0.024 0.909*** 0.014 
 
Squared 0.999926 0.000048 0.999973 0.000036 
 
Credit Score 1.000028 0.000032 1.000118*** 0.000021 
Change in Prime Rate Since Origination 0.835*** 0.047 0.426*** 0.013 
Unemployment Rate 1.139*** 0.021 0.961*** 0.012 
Change in Employment 0.9656*** 0.0089 0.9905 0.0075 
Origination Year 
    
 
2002 . . . . 
 
2003 0.999 0.147 1.595*** 0.125 
 
2004 1.073 0.149 1.653*** 0.137 
 
2005 0.931 0.141 2.062*** 0.217 
 
2006 0.643*** 0.104 2.544*** 0.261 
 
2007 0.632*** 0.100 3.893*** 0.372 
 
2008 0.451*** 0.069 2.832*** 0.230 
 
2009 0.176*** 0.033 2.273*** 0.195 
 2010 0.177*** 0.037 2.320*** 0.210 
Observations 1,188,088 1,188,088 
Subjects 23,367 23,367 
 
Current (Censored) 8,516 8,516 
 
Default 3,776 3,776 
 
Prepaid 11,075 11,075 
Wald χ2 1900*** -101861*** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -32733 -101861 
Akaike information criterion (AIC)  65554 203810 
Statistically significant at the *10% level **5% level ***1% level. 
Metropolitan area fixed effects not shown. 
  
 122 
 
Finally, Table 4.6 examines whether the effects of insurance are consistent across private 
mortgage insurance companies. Table 6A shows that the increase in the likelihood of default is 
remarkably similar, regardless of specific financial institution. The default hazard associated with loans 
insured by private mortgage insurers are 70 to 90 percent higher than loans insured by FHA. Similarly, 
Table 6B shows that privately-insured loans are consistently less likely to prepay than FHA-insured loans, 
regardless of the specific insurer.   
Discussion 
In his seminal work on adverse selection, Akerlof (1970) notes: 
While the large banks in the central cities have prime interest rates of 6, 8, and 10 per 
cent, the local moneylender charges 15, 25, and even 50 per cent. The answer to this 
seeming paradox is that credit is granted only where the granter has… personal 
knowledge of the character of the borrower. The middleman who tries to arbitrage 
between the rates of the moneylender and the central bank is apt to attract all the 
‘lemons’ and thereby make a loss.  
 
The private mortgage insurance industry may be in the unfortunate position of operating between the 
inside knowledge of the mortgage lender and the federally-supported Federal Housing Administration. 
Our results show that privately-insured loans are more likely to default than similar loans without 
insurance, controlling for observable risk characteristics such as credit score and MTMLTV ratio. 
Accounting for differences in the total cost of implicit and explicit mortgage insurance using an adjusted 
rate spread at origination reduces the higher default hazard among privately-insured loans, suggesting 
that adverse selection based on risk characteristics unobservable to the insurers may explain at least 
some of difference. Adverse selection would mean the direction of causality does not run from private 
mortgage insurance to a higher likelihood of default, but rather from loans with a higher likelihood of 
default being disproportionately assigned to private mortgage insurance. 
At first glance, the claims resulting from higher default rates on privately-insured loans may be 
offset from the standpoint of the mortgage insurance companies by the prolonged revenue stream of the 
remaining loans that are less likely to prepay. However, the Homeowner Protection Act of 1998 requires 
that private mortgage insurance policies be automatically terminated once the balance of the loan 
reaches 78 percent of the original value (not mark-to-market value) of the security property. Roughly ten 
percent of uninsured and privately-insured loans in this sample reached the 78 percent threshold. The 
Federal Housing Administration adopted a similar cancellation policy in 2001 (Mortgagee Letters 2000-
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38), but only six percent of FHA loans in our sample reached the 78 percent threshold. Moreover, FHA 
changed the policy in 2013 as part of reforms to restore the financial health of the Mutual Mortgage 
Insurance Fund. Now, premiums will be assessed for the entire life of the loan, or up to eleven years if the 
LTV ratio at origination is 90 percent or less (Mortgagee Letter 2013-04). 
In addition to rescinding its cancellation policy and tightening underwriting standards, FHA has 
also begun evaluating the performance of lenders using so-called “compare ratios.” FHA may revoke 
direct endorsement authority if a mortgagee has a two year default rate 50 percent higher than the 
equivalent rate for the states in which the mortgagee is active (Mortgagee Letters 2010-03; 2013-12). The 
use of performance metrics in addition to ex ante observable borrower characteristics may help FHA 
overcome the asymmetric information problem at the heart of adverse selection. Lenders must be 
cautious of disproportionately steering ‘lemons’ into FHA relative to other lenders. However, compare 
ratios have been criticized for contributing to use of credit overlays by lenders, tightening underwriting 
standards beyond that required by FHA. The Mortgage Bankers Association argues, “The Compare Ratio 
has created a ‘race to the top’ in which lenders are forced in many cases to only lend to borrowers with 
stronger credit profiles for fear that the resulting performance of loans made to borrowers with weaker 
credit profiles will lower their compare ratio and lead to FHA terminating their origination authority” (Mills 
2014). In response, FHA has also created a supplemental compare ratio, comparing lender performance 
to a risk-weighted target default rate (HUD 2014a).   
The cumulative effect of these reforms is that the economic value of recent endorsements has 
rebounded greatly from the Great Recession. The lifetime economic value of the 2010 to 2014 books of 
business is estimated at $45.1 billion, helping return the overall value of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance 
Fund to a positive figure by the fall of 2014 (HUD 2014). Continued reforms suggest that FHA is not 
satisfied. In its most recent report to Congress, FHA estimates that it would need a net present value in 
claims-paying capacity equal to roughly 8.5 percent of insurance in-force to weather another housing 
crisis, well above the current 2 percent capital ratio required under the National Affordable Housing Act of 
1990. 
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Policies and premiums sufficient to withstand another housing crisis may be at odds with the 
public purpose of FHA (Quercia and Park 2013). The original review of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance 
Fund notes: 
If the equity target is set too high, the resulting high premiums may make ownership 
unaffordable and potentially exclude those individuals most in need of the services FHA 
was meant to provide… We do not believe it is possible to build MMI’s equity to a level 
needed to cover catastrophic risk. To do so would require premiums at levels that would 
impair MMI’s social purposes. Catastrophic risk is implicitly covered through the backing 
of the U.S. Treasury. (Price Waterhouse 1990) 
 
The Government Accountability Office (2001) has suggested that Congress define the “types of economic 
conditions under which the Fund would be expected to meet its commitments without borrowing from the 
Treasury,” which implies that there are some conditions under which drawing from the Treasury would be 
acceptable.  
However, high premiums do support the policy goal of “crowding in” private capital. The Obama 
Administration’s 2011 white paper on housing finance reform states, “FHA should return to its pre-crisis 
role as a targeted provider of mortgage credit access for low- and moderate-income Americans and first-
time homebuyers… As we begin to pursue increased pricing for guarantees at Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, we will also increase the price of FHA mortgage insurance… This will continue the ongoing effort to 
strengthen the capital reserve account of FHA, and put it in a better position to gradually shrink its market 
share.” The policy is effectively inviting adverse selection, hoping the private sector will outbid FHA for 
lower-risk borrowers in order to shrink and focus FHA’s market towards traditionally under-served, higher 
risk borrowers. 
Yet given the strong performance of FHA, the desire to return FHA’s market share to its historical 
levels may be misplaced. This study finds that FHA-insured loans were less likely to default than 
privately-insured or uninsured loans with similar, moderately high-risk characteristics. Indeed, FHA 
outperformed every major private mortgage insurer. While FHA’s market share is likely to shrink from its 
high during the financial crisis, a share larger than its historical average may be a stabilizing influence in 
the housing market. And insuring more moderately high-risk borrowers will allow FHA to better serve the 
very high-risk borrowers through the cross-subsidization embedded in its flat premium pricing.  
Conclusion 
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 This paper uses propensity score matching to create comparable samples of home purchase 
mortgages with FHA mortgage insurance, private mortgage insurance and without insurance based on 
observable risk characteristics. A semiparametric proportional hazard model with competing risks is then 
used to estimate the likelihood of default or prepayment. Privately-insured loans have a default hazard 
nearly 60 percent higher than similar uninsured loans, although this figure falls to 14 percent when the full 
costs of mortgage insurance are included in the model. This adjusted rate spread variable captures some 
unobserved information about credit risk and the results suggest adverse selection may explain some of 
the difference in the likelihood of default. In contrast, FHA-insured loans are found to be no more likely to 
default than similar uninsured loans before accounting for differences in mortgage costs and over 27 
percent less likely to default after including the adjusted rate spread. Further, FHA outperforms every 
individual private mortgage insurer. The problem of adverse selection and the strong performance of FHA 
have important implications for public policies that shape the American housing finance system. 
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CHAPTER 5: MORTGAGE INSURANCE AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION 
In 2011, the U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development released a joint white paper outlining options for reforming America’s housing 
finance reform. The primary focus of the proposal was “paving the way for a robust private 
mortgage market” including “returning FHA to its traditional role as targeted lender of affordable 
mortgages.”  What private capital means in the mortgage market and the appropriate role for 
FHA insurance should be reconsidered given the findings of the previous chapters. 
Recognizing Private Mortgage Insurance as Private Capital 
 The Administration’s white paper proposes reducing the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in the mortgage market and ultimately winding down both institutions, “creating the 
conditions for private capital to play the predominant role in housing finance.” However, given 
the ongoing weakness in the conventional market, prematurely winding down the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) will only encourage more borrowers to take advantage of other 
government-insured channels, such as FHA. It is important to remember that the credit 
enhancement requirement for GSE purchases involves a degree of private capital in the market.  
Consequently, all else equal, mortgage financing through the GSEs with private mortgage 
insurance in front of the government guarantee is preferable to FHA insurance entirely backed 
by the federal government. Guarantee fees levied by the government-sponsored enterprises to 
ensure timely payment of principal and interest to investors need to appropriately reflect the risk 
private capital assumes. Then more risk could be transferred to the private sector by 
encouraging deeper coverage. 
The private mortgage industry trade association recently argued: 
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It is critical that FHFA, in computing g-fees, correctly incorporate the impact of MI 
in reducing the Enterprises’ estimated costs of providing a credit guarantee. To 
do otherwise results in consumers being charged twice for the same risk 
reduction, which disproportionately disadvantages low- and moderate-income 
and first time homebuyers. However, it is apparent … that the Enterprises are not 
appropriately taking MI into account, thereby significantly discounting MI’s risk 
mitigation benefits. (USMI 2014) 
Park and Ratcliffe (2014) estimate that private mortgage insurance reduced the loss rates on 
Fannie Mae’s insured books of business between 2000 and 2012 by 73 percent and overall loss 
rates by 27 percent. Nevertheless, Park also concludes that Fannie Mae’s loan-level price 
adjustments do not fully reflect the loss mitigation of private mortgage insurance. The total 
guarantee fees on mortgages with higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios systematically exceed 
actual loss rates. This may be because standard insurance coverage is typically greater than 
the difference between the LTV ratio and 80 percent, the point at which credit enhancement is 
no longer required. The standard insurance coverage for a mortgage with a 95 percent LTV 
ratio, for example, is 30 percent meaning from the perspective of the government-sponsored 
enterprise the risk exposure is more similar to a loan with a 65 percent LTV ratio. The 
Enterprises’ guarantee fees on high LTV ratio mortgages should be reduced to correspond with 
actual risk.  
The GSEs have also been experimenting with “back-end” risk sharing with the private 
sector through sales on the secondary market. In these credit-linked securities, payments are 
based on the performance of a reference pool of recently issued mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS). Unlike the MBS, the timely payment of principal and interest of the credit-linked 
securities is not guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Instead, investors may bear losses 
if loans in the reference pool default. As of May 2015, Freddie Mac has sold roughly 18 percent 
of its portfolio risk through its Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) shelf and Fannie Mae 
sold 11 percent through its Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS) shelf (Goodman 2015).  
But Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could also increase risk sharing at the “front-end,” 
before the risk ever arrives on their balance sheets, through deeper private mortgage insurance 
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coverage. In fact, Congress is considering requiring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pursue 
greater front-end risk sharing. Section 706 of the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act (S. 
1484) introduced by Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) in 2015 notes 
It is the sense of Congress that (1) at the direction of the [Federal Housing 
Finance] Agency, the enterprises have executed a series of transactions in which 
the enterprises share credit risk with the private sector; (2) in the risk-sharing 
transactions to date, the enterprises have shared credit risk on pools of 
residential mortgage loans that back securities on which an enterprise either 
already guarantees or does not yet guarantee the timely payment of principal and 
interest; (3) the risk that the enterprises have shared has been either any loss 
suffered on the loans in the pool or any loss in excess of some minimal level on 
loans in the pool; (4) to date, the vast majority of risk-sharing transactions have 
involved either back-end risk sharing or the transfer of the second loss position; 
and (5) the Agency should direct the enterprises to—(A) engage in more front-
end risk sharing in which the first loss position is transferred; and (B) retain data 
that can help inform policymakers and the public about the impact to consumers, 
the market, and the enterprises from such transactions. 
 
Specifically, the proposed legislation instructs, “The Director shall require that each enterprise 
engage in significant and increasing risk-sharing transactions, including front-end risk sharing 
and risk-sharing transactions in which the first loss position is transferred, considering market 
conditions and the safety and soundness of the enterprise.” Risk-sharing through mortgage 
insurance may be preferable to secondary market sales because published insurance premium 
schedules are more transparent and predictable than the price of risk sold through structured 
securities.  
The GSEs already allow mortgage insurance coverage to vary, although mortgages with 
less than standard coverage require additional loan-level price adjustments to compensate for 
the additional risk assumed by the GSEs. For example, adjustable-rate mortgages or long-term 
fixed-rate mortgages with a 95 percent LTV ratio must have either 30 percent standard 
coverage or 16 percent minimum coverage plus pay an additional up-front fee of between 0.5 
and 2.5 percent, depending on borrower credit score. Similarly, deeper private mortgage 
insurance coverage would presumably entail a proportionate decrease in loan-level price 
adjustments.  
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 Deep private mortgage insurance coverage would effectively reduce the GSEs’ role to a 
catastrophic guarantee.  Losses experienced in a moderate housing downturn should be 
completely covered by private mortgage insurance. Only in a severe crisis should losses reach 
the GSEs. Because the federal government is expected based on past experiences to take 
actions to stabilize the economy in general and the housing market in particular during a severe 
crisis, there is always some degree of catastrophic guarantee. However, the guarantee provided 
by the GSEs would be explicit and at least partially funded.  
 On the other hand, incorporating the loss mitigation of private mortgage insurance 
coverage and especially deep coverage into guarantee fee pricing assumes the ability of private 
mortgage insurers’ to survive in a housing downturn. The possibility that one or more insurers 
may be unable to pay claims in a crisis is known as counterparty risk. In fact, three private 
mortgage insurance companies failed during the Great Recession. In response, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency increased counterparty capital ratio requirements from 4.0 percent to 
5.6 percent.  Zandi, Parrott and deRitis (2014) estimate that these regulations will increase 
mortgage insurance premiums by an average of 15 basis points. However, the empirical results 
presented in Chapter 4 already suggest private mortgage insurance is vulnerable to adverse 
selection. Raising private mortgage insurance premiums may only steer more borrowers to FHA 
insurance or exacerbate adverse selection issues, particularly if the loss mitigation enable by 
private mortgage insurance is not reflected in guarantee fees.  
 An alternative approach might be to use a portion of the guarantee fees to develop a 
federal reinsurance program for private mortgage insurance companies. This fund would 
reimburse a portion of mortgage insurance companies for losses based on some objective 
measure. For example, reimbursement could be related to a nominal decline in national house 
prices, so that years with no such decline have no reimbursement. But as prices fell, such as 
beginning around 2006, the insurance fund would being paying an increasing share of losses 
suffered by mortgage insurance companies. Such a system would automatically scale up the 
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federal government’s guarantee during periods of systemic crisis, as proposed by the 
Administration’s white paper on housing finance reform. The results presented in Chapter 3 
demonstrated that the decline in private mortgage insurers’ capital ratios contributed to an 
increase in the likelihood of denying applications for mortgage insurance, reducing the 
availability of conventional mortgage credit. Similarly, the results in Chapter 2 show that 
reductions in FHA-insured loan originations has not led to a “crowding in” of private mortgage 
insurance, possibly because their weak financial condition. Reimbursement might enable private 
mortgage insurance companies to continue endorsing new loans through a housing cycle, 
ensuring continued access to conventional mortgage credit.   
Reconsidering the Role of the Federal Housing Administration  
 The Administration’s white paper is even more direct about reducing FHA lending to its 
historic market share, primarily by increasing FHA insurance premiums. 
In addition to winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FHA should return to 
its pre-crisis role as a targeted provider of mortgage credit access for low- and 
moderate-income Americans and first-time homebuyers… As Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s presence in the market shrinks, the Administration will coordinate 
program changes at FHA to ensure that the private market – not FHA – picks up 
that new market share. 
 
However, the results presented in the previous chapters merit reconsideration of FHA’s role in 
the mortgage market. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 find that FHA lending is concentrated in years 
and regions experiencing housing downturns and among higher risk borrowers. If these are the 
only segments that FHA is allowed to serve, then the premiums necessary to cover losses will 
create a death spiral of adverse selection. The financial viability of the Mutual Mortgage 
Insurance Fund requires business from periods of housing recovery and less risky borrowers. 
More importantly, the results presented in Chapter 4 suggests that FHA insurance may actually 
lower the risk of default compared to privately-insured and uninsured loans among borrowers 
with moderate risk characteristics. These findings argue for a larger presence of FHA in the 
market.  
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 Increasing insurance premiums is understandable given the unprecedented draw on 
Treasury to cover credit-related losses. To avoid another “bailout” in the future, FHA appears to 
be pursuing higher capital reserves, noting that the net present value of losses at its trough is 
expected to be roughly 8.5 percent—substantially higher than the two percent capital ratio 
required under the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.  
 However, the FHA was never intended to withstand a severe economic crisis. Twenty-
five years ago, the first actuarial review of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund noted 
Finding the right size of the cushion given the MMI Fund’s implicit public purpose 
presents a particular challenge. Too little equity risks making MMI reliant on the 
Treasury (and ultimately the taxpayer) in even moderately adverse conditions… 
If the equity target is set too high, the resulting high premiums may make 
ownership unaffordable and potentially exclude those individuals most in need of 
the services FHA was meant to provide. (Price Waterhouse 1990) 
 
The analysis argued that it would be inefficient for the FHA to reserve for a “Great Depression” 
scenario, which they defined as “four consecutive years of 10 percent nominal declines in house 
prices, a rise in the unemployment rate to 20 percent, and 5 percentage point declines in 
interest rates” (Price Waterhouse 1990). “[W]e assume that the social purpose of the Fund is 
such that it should not be expected to withstand such a calamity... Catastrophic risk is implicitly 
covered through the backing of the U.S. Treasury” (PriceWaterhouse 1990). In fact, because 
the original authorization in the National Housing Act of 1934 allowed FHA to draw on Treasury, 
the backing was always explicit and ultimately called upon for the first time in September 2013. 
  The experience of the housing market in the Great Recession very nearly met the 
criteria of a Great Depression. The cumulative decline in nominal house prices was roughly 
equivalent to four years of 10 percent declines. The federal funds rate fell more than five 
percentage points and the contract rate on a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage fell almost 3.5 
percentage points. Only the unemployment rate remained well below the “Great Depression” 
standard, peaking at 10.6 percent, but the headline rate does not capture discouraged workers 
that stopped looking for work and other marginally attached workers. Based on the this 
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understanding, the cost associated with FHA’s books of business during the housing crash are 
analogous to other automatic stabilization programs such as unemployment insurance, 
countercyclical monetary policy, or fiscal stimulus  legislation like the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  
Moreover, it is important to consider the one-time $1.7 billion transfer in context. For 
example, Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation (2014) estimates the cost of the home 
mortgage interest deduction at between $68 and $93 billion per year between 2014 and 2018—
more than the entire budget of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
in which FHA is located. The home mortgage interest deduction disproportionately favors higher 
income households: households earning over $200,000 accounted for just five percent of tax 
returns but claimed over 42 percent of the value of the mortgage interest deduction. The tax 
expenditure also skews incentives towards more debt without rewarding paying down principal.  
In contrast, FHA insurance is less costly, primarily serves lower income households that would 
otherwise not be able to afford homeownership, and is confined to lower loan amounts.  
Critics argue that FHA should “price to risk” meaning vary insurance premiums based on 
borrower risk characteristics (Pinto 2012). FHA briefly adopted risk-based pricing in 2008 before 
a moratorium was enacted by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (Mortgagee Letters 
2008-16; 2008-22). However, the lack of risk-based pricing is essential to how FHA pools risk 
across borrowers. Lower risk borrowers cross-subsidize higher risk borrowers, expanding 
access to affordable mortgage credit. On the other hand, risk pooling and average-risk pricing 
also expose FHA to the possibility of adverse selection. The results presented in Chapter 4 
suggest adverse selection may be an issue for FHA insurance. FHA-insured loans have a lower 
likelihood of default after controlling for borrower risk characteristics, but that does not 
compensate for an insurance fund that become heavily concentrated among high risk 
borrowers.  
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Critics also argue that FHA’s should raise premiums because credit subsidies are 
understated under current federal accounting rules that do not incorporate market risk, or the 
correlation between the return on an investment and growth in the overall economy. The 
Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners (PATH) Act (H.R. 2767) introduced by Rep. 
Scott Garret (R-NJ) in 2013 proposes that “the executive branch and Congress would be 
required to use fair-value accounting in calculating the costs of FHA insurance programs that 
consider not only the borrowing costs of the federal government, but also the costs of the 
market risk the federal government is incurring by issuing FHA mortgage insurance or mortgage 
insurance commitments.”  
Incorporating a market risk premium would mean FHA pricing would routinely exceed its 
expected losses. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that FHA insurance over the next 
decade will generate budgetary savings of $63 billion under current federal accounting rules but 
cost $30 billion under fair-value accounting (Remy 2014). Conventional market participants 
must be risk-averse because unexpected losses that result in insolvency mark the end of a 
private company. But FHA can and has operated with a negative economic value. Periods when 
the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund has been in the red will often be when FHA insurance is 
actually most valuable to investors, because they are associated with systemic financial crises.  
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Figure 5.1 Cost Accounting and Risk Pricing 
 
 
FHA uses the space between the risk-neutral budgetary cost and the risk-averse 
“market” cost to engage in risk pooling rather than narrowly tailored risk-based pricing (Figure 
5.1). The delineation between conventional and FHA markets is where risk-based pricing with a 
risk-adverse market premium is equal to average-risk pricing based only on expected budgetary 
cost.  
Calls for FHA to adopt both greater risk-based pricing and fair-value accounting would 
undermine access to affordable mortgage credit and the stability of the housing market. If FHA 
continues to pool risk, then fair-value accounting would show large paper losses (i.e., losses 
never likely to impact the federal budget) at current premiums that would not be politically 
sustainable. FHA could raise premiums, but then lower risk borrowers would be able to find 
better pricing in the conventional market and FHA insurance suffer adverse selection. The CBO 
notes, “Although FHA could raise the fees it charges to reduce those fair-value subsidies, 
raising fees to achieve a substantial negative fair-value subsidy would be difficult due to 
competition from the private sector. Thus, fair-value accounting could hinder setting fees to 
accumulate a positive capital reserve ratio, as FHA is required to do under current law” (Castelli 
P
ri
c
e
Credit Risk
Fair-Value (Risk-Averse) Cost
Budgetary (Risk-Neutral) Cost
Average Budgetary Cost
Cross-Subsidy
Conventional FHA
Risk Premium 
Above Expected Cost
 135 
 
et al. 2014). If FHA adopts risk-based pricing but continues to use risk-neutral budgetary 
accounting, then the cost advantage would allow FHA to underprice the conventional market 
across the entire spectrum of borrower credit risk. Finally if FHA adopts both fair-value 
accounting and risk-based pricing, then it would operate no differently than a private mortgage 
insurance company and loses its raison d'être.  
Looking forward, the projections of the independent actuarial reviews of the Mutual 
Mortgage Insurance Fund are promising. Loans endorsed between 2010 and 2013 are 
expected to contribute $34.0 billion to the Fund and the 2014 book another $11.1 billion. In the 
next year, the economic value is projected to rise to over $15 billion with the capital ratio 
improving to 1.3 percent and exceeding the 2 percent threshold by FY 2017. 
But former as FHA Commissioner John Weicher (1995) noted 
[T]he fact that FHA does not lose money on its home mortgage insurance is not a 
justification for its existence; the justification is that it serves a public purpose. 
Serving that purpose without losing money is an indication that the FHA home 
mortgage insurance program works reasonably well—not perfectly, but 
reasonably well. 
 
Perhaps the Administration agrees and has reconsidered trying to “crowd in” private 
capital through high FHA prices. In January 2015, it announced a substantial reduction in 
annual FHA premiums. For example, the annual insurance premium for a 30-year fixed-rate 
loan under $625,500 and 95 percent LTV ratio will fall from 1.30 percent to 0.80 percent. HUD 
(2015) projects the reduction will save more than two million FHA homeowners an average of 
$900 annually. Importantly, the reduction will also make FHA insurance more competitive with 
the conventional market (Figure 5.2). Before the reduction, FHA was estimated to be the lowest 
cost option for 30-year, fixed-rate loans with a 95 percent LTV ratio and borrower credit scores 
under 680. After the reduction, FHA could be competitive for similar loans with borrower credit 
scores of 720 or higher. The borrowers FHA competes for at the margin are the lower risk 
borrowers FHA needs to keep the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund financially sound while 
expanding access to mortgage credit to higher risk borrowers. 
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Figure 5.2 FHA and GSE/PMI Monthly Premiums 
 
Concerns that the conventional market and FHA insurance constitute a dual market 
could be ameliorated by merging these segments in the secondary market. Specifically, if 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are to be completely wound down, as the Administration 
proposes, then the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) could be allowed 
to guarantee conventional loans in addition to FHA- and VA-insured mortgages. Not only would 
retaining Fannie and Freddie or some other government-sponsored enterprise(s) with the 
explicit backing of the federal government be largely redundant with Ginnie Mae, Ginnie Mae’s 
business model is arguably superior in placing private capital before the government guarantee. 
Ginnie Mae does not guarantee mortgage-backed securities. It guarantees that the issuer of 
those securities will be able to meet its financial obligations. Consequently, the government 
guarantee is only necessary when the capital reserves of the issuer are exhausted, placing the 
taxpayer in a fourth loss position behind the borrower’s downpayment, mortgage insurance, and 
the capital of the issuer.  
Mixing conventional and government-insured loans in mortgage-backed securities would 
allow both to benefit from an increase in liquidity and the exemption from Securities and 
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Exchange Commission rules necessary for the existence of the “To Be Announced” market, in 
which borrowers are able to lock-in interest rates before closing. Conventional loans with high 
LTV ratios would be required to purchase private mortgage insurance as under the current 
system. Required private mortgage insurance coverage could even be increased as discussed 
earlier. 
Mortgage insurance has been a fixture in the American housing finance system for 
decades. Counter-cyclical capital reserve requirements and maintenance of conservative 
underwriting standards caused both FHA and private mortgage insurance to lose market share 
during the housing bubble. But these factors also prove the worth of mortgage insurance in 
ensuring a stable mortgage market. As the American housing finance system undergoes 
reforms, private mortgage insurance should be recognized as private capital when used in front 
of the guarantee of timely principal and interest provided by the government-sponsored 
enterprises. In fact, government-sponsored enterprises should pursue greater front-end risk 
sharing through deeper private mortgage insurance coverage.  
FHA mortgage insurance is comparable to private mortgage insurance but also serves a 
critical public mission to ensure access to mortgage credit during housing downturns and 
expanding access to credit to underserved borrowers. The benefits of operating as a public 
agency should be recognized, such as using risk-neutral cost accounting instead of fair-value 
accounting, but also offset by requiring policies designed to fulfill its public purpose, such as 
average-risk pricing instead of risk-based pricing. The financial viability of FHA’s mortgage 
insurance program requires some degree of competition with the private sector to cross-
subsidize higher risk borrowers and ongoing presence during housing market recoveries to 
recoup losses incurred during the downturn. 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
10180 Abilene, TX 320 -0.431*** 0.073 -0.442 0.122 
10420 Akron, OH 1,320 -0.471*** 0.037 -0.562*** 0.045 
10500 Albany, GA 360 -0.333*** 0.060 -0.471*** 0.067 
10580 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 1,688 -0.347*** 0.038 -0.409*** 0.042 
10740 Albuquerque, NM 1,488 -0.781*** 0.112 -0.269 0.123 
10780 Alexandria, LA 304 -0.261*** 0.048 0.042 0.116 
10900 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 1,296 -0.345*** 0.058 -0.623*** 0.055 
11020 Altoona, PA 272 -0.134 0.042 -0.193 0.091 
11100 Amarillo, TX 496 -0.371*** 0.071 -0.538*** 0.106 
11180 Ames, IA 152 -0.175 0.065 -0.359*** 0.068 
11260 Anchorage, AK 544 -0.320*** 0.065 -0.482*** 0.085 
11300 Anderson, IN 288 -0.088 0.075 0.107 0.240 
11340 Anderson, SC 272 -0.329*** 0.074 -0.489 0.137 
11460 Ann Arbor, MI 744 -0.323** 0.081 -0.566*** 0.070 
11500 Anniston-Oxford, AL 224 -0.281*** 0.064 0.119 0.138 
11540 Appleton, WI 336 -0.181** 0.046 -0.312*** 0.046 
11700 Asheville, NC 624 -0.078 0.024 -0.167*** 0.031 
12020 Athens-Clarke County, GA 352 -0.212 0.068 -0.527*** 0.077 
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 5,480 -0.508*** 0.025 -0.830*** 0.027 
12100 Atlantic City, NJ 504 -0.204 0.098 -0.690*** 0.091 
12220 Auburn-Opelika, AL 168 -0.360*** 0.079 -0.627*** 0.086 
12260 Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 760 -0.391*** 0.049 -0.612*** 0.114 
12420 Austin-Round Rock, TX 2,016 -0.087 0.114 -0.346*** 0.076 
12540 Bakersfield, CA 1,096 -0.098 0.129 -1.249*** 0.106 
12580 Baltimore-Towson, MD 4,912 -0.518*** 0.032 -0.561*** 0.023 
12620 Bangor, ME 392 -0.266** 0.068 -0.189 0.087 
12700 Barnstable Town, MA 400 -0.245 0.090 -0.292*** 0.052 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
12940 Baton Rouge, LA 1,128 -0.135 0.054 -0.228 0.078 
12980 Battle Creek, MI 312 -0.288 0.098 -0.627*** 0.100 
13020 Bay City, MI 216 -0.187 0.089 -0.458** 0.115 
13140 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 776 -0.234*** 0.034 -0.330*** 0.063 
13380 Bellingham, WA 216 -0.116 0.079 -0.249*** 0.057 
13460 Bend, OR 168 0.112 0.245 -0.657*** 0.127 
13740 Billings, MT 256 -0.319 0.107 -0.097 0.125 
13780 Binghamton, NY 520 -0.229*** 0.053 -0.384 0.122 
13820 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 1,784 -0.225*** 0.025 -0.504*** 0.035 
13900 Bismarck, ND 168 -0.270 0.088 -0.428** 0.104 
13980 Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA 216 -0.089 0.086 -0.126 0.084 
14020 Bloomington, IN 328 -0.158 0.053 -0.228 0.083 
14060 Bloomington-Normal, IL 320 -0. 363*** 0.062 -0.349*** 0.064 
14260 Boise City-Nampa, ID 632 -0.451** 0.115 -0.701*** 0.111 
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 7,296 -0.414*** 0.016 -0.440*** 0.012 
14500 Boulder, CO 504 -0.419*** 0.078 -0.701*** 0.048 
14540 Bowling Green, KY 176 -0.196 0.077 -0.238 0.078 
14740 Bremerton-Silverdale, WA 392 -0.319** 0.082 -0.278*** 0.052 
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 1,672 -0.350*** 0.046 -0.431*** 0.029 
15180 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 688 -0.486*** 0.097 -0.921*** 0.127 
15260 Brunswick, GA 144 -0.396*** 0.088 -0.369*** 0.072 
15380 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 2,320 -0.526*** 0.032 -0.645*** 0.064 
15500 Burlington, NC 184 -0.077 0.095 -0.402* 0.104 
15540 Burlington-South Burlington, VT 344 -0.184** 0.046 -0.322*** 0.056 
15940 Canton-Massillon, OH 696 -0.385*** 0.050 -0.717*** 0.069 
15980 Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 936 -0.375 0.113 -1.001*** 0.131 
16180 Carson City, NV 80 -0.942** 0.225 -1.226*** 0.226 
16220 Casper, WY 136 -0.691*** 0.105 -0.265 0.115 
16300 Cedar Rapids, IA 440 -0.259** 0.065 -0.591*** 0.108 
16580 Champaign-Urbana, IL 400 -0.217 0.063 -0.276*** 0.049 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
16620 Charleston, WV 608 -0.270*** 0.031 -0.394*** 0.064 
16700 Charleston-North Charleston, SC 920 -0.401*** 0.057 -0.759*** 0.076 
16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 2,120 -0.506*** 0.038 -0.626*** 0.037 
16820 Charlottesville, VA 288 -0.054 0.136 -0.508*** 0.080 
16860 Chattanooga, TN-GA 776 -0.253*** 0.048 -0.468*** 0.062 
16940 Cheyenne, WY 144 -0.626*** 0.067 -0.323 0.110 
16980 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 16, 120 -0.333*** 0.021 -0.476*** 0.019 
17020 Chico, CA 336 0.053 0.165 -0.606*** 0.089 
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 3,856 -0.338*** 0.036 -0.729*** 0.050 
17300 Clarksville, TN-KY 392 -0.212 0.082 -0.062 0.064 
17420 Cleveland, TN 168 -0.206 0.110 -0.269 0.100 
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 5,376 -0.364*** 0.024 -0.641*** 0. 028 
17660 Coeur d'Alene, ID 168 -0.140 0.250 0.469 0.328 
17780 College Station-Bryan, TX 312 -0.340 0.216 -0.689*** 0.093 
17820 Colorado Springs, CO 920 -0.401*** 0.086 -0.422*** 0.041 
17860 Columbia, MO 248 -0.170 0.092 -0.552*** 0.088 
17900 Columbia, SC 1,136 -0.406*** 0.060 -0.718*** 0.091 
17980 Columbus, GA-AL 584 -0.267** 0.064 -0.516*** 0.067 
18020 Columbus, IN 120 -0.199 0.125 -0.400 0.140 
18140 Columbus, OH 3,032 -0.454*** 0.044 -0.768*** 0.065 
18580 Corpus Christi, TX 656 -0.255** 0.064 -0.627*** 0.070 
18700 Corvallis, OR 152 -0.069 0.119 -0.413* 0.109 
19060 Cumberland, MD-WV 240 -0.112 0.051 -0.039 0.119 
19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 8,280 -0.104 0.069 -0.417*** 0.027 
19140 Dalton, GA 200 -0.171 0.093 -0.268 0.099 
19180 Danville, IL 200 -0.210 0.060 -0.194 0.175 
19340 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 816 -0.411*** 0.039 -0.594*** 0.084 
19380 Dayton, OH 1,648 -0.247*** 0.037 -0.553*** 0.044 
19460 Decatur, AL 264 -0.416*** 0.080 -0.306 0.170 
19500 Decatur, IL 280 -0.294*** 0.048 -0.344 0.152 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
19660 Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 616 -0.523*** 0.067 -0.896*** 0.100 
19740 Denver-Aurora, CO 4,296 -0.615*** 0.073 -0.633*** 0.043 
19780 Des Moines, IA 856 -0.590*** 0.066 -0.868*** 0.097 
19820 Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 10,192 -0.176*** 0.039 -0.500*** 0.023 
20020 Dothan, AL 264 -0.307 0.091 -0.427 0.215 
20100 Dover, DE 272 -0.339 0.097 -0.442*** 0.089 
20220 Dubuque, IA 160 -0.482*** 0.069 -0.452 0.184 
20260 Duluth, MN-WI 720 -0.265*** 0.038 -0.515*** 0.056 
20500 Durham, NC 688 -0.384* 0.104 -0.487*** 0.075 
20740 Eau Claire, WI 256 -0.223*** 0.042 -0.348** 0.085 
20940 El Centro, CA 232 -0.385 0.466 -0.626*** 0.084 
21060 Elizabethtown, KY 176 -0.037 0.082 -0.455 0.126 
21140 Elkhart-Goshen, IN 224 -0.497*** 0.048 -0.486*** 0.089 
21300 Elmira, NY 168 -0.345** 0.080 -0.198 0.227 
21340 El Paso, TX 992 -0.819*** 0.119 -1.423*** 0.183 
21500 Erie, PA 576 -0.401*** 0.054 -0.365*** 0.072 
21660 Eugene-Springfield, OR 624 -0.318*** 0.066 -0.329*** 0.048 
21780 Evansville, IN-KY 680 -0.289*** 0.045 -0.370*** 0.074 
21820 Fairbanks, AK 152 -0.410*** 0.077 -0.664* 0.173 
22020 Fargo, ND-MN 320 -0.395*** 0.062 -0.804*** 0.077 
22140 Farmington, NM 176 -0.169 0.088 -0.390 0.115 
22180 Fayetteville, NC 440 -0.161 0.048 -0.266*** 0.062 
22220 Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO 536 -0.339*** 0.068 -0.440*** 0.079 
22380 Flagstaff, AZ 200 -0.391 0.284 -0.527 0.144 
22420 Flint, MI 1,040 -0.297*** 0.054 -0.517*** 0.054 
22500 Florence, SC 360 -0.305*** 0.058 -0.627*** 0.099 
22520 Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL 248 -0.220*** 0.036 -0.368 0.150 
22540 Fond du Lac, WI 160 -0.052 0.058 -0.204 0.087 
22660 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 448 -0.273 0.092 -0.606*** 0.062 
22900 Fort Smith, AR-OK 416 -0.218 0.071 0.305 0.178 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
23020 Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL 264 -0.074 0.090 -0.019 0.077 
23060 Fort Wayne, IN 824 -0.440*** 0.054 -0.747*** 0.076 
23420 Fresno, CA 1,256 -0.450 0.161 -0.592*** 0.100 
23460 Gadsden, AL 224 -0.166 0.053 -0.594*** 0.095 
23540 Gainesville, FL 344 -0.132 0.078 -0.638*** 0.091 
23580 Gainesville, GA 176 -0.340** 0.081 -0.477*** 0.098 
24020 Glens Falls, NY 264 -0.121 0.092 -0.195 0.123 
24140 Goldsboro, NC 168 0.026 0.084 -0.050 0.119 
24220 Grand Forks, ND-MN 208 -0.367*** 0.069 -0.248 0.105 
24300 Grand Junction, CO 224 -0.238 0.146 -0.131 0.144 
24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 1,272 -0.345*** 0.040 -0.632*** 0.062 
24500 Great Falls, MT 176 -0.567 0.155 -0.522 0.210 
24540 Greeley, CO 288 -0.365 0.139 -0.557*** 0.081 
24580 Green Bay, WI 504 -0.250*** 0.049 -0.533*** 0.072 
24660 Greensboro-High Point, NC 1,128 -0.224*** 0.047 -0.646*** 0.057 
24780 Greenville, NC 200 -0.054 0.126 -0.519*** 0.090 
24860 Greenville, SC 1,008 -0.240*** 0.036 -0.713*** 0.075 
25060 Gulfport-Biloxi, MS 400 -0.266*** 0.048 -0.093 0.121 
25180 Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV 368 -0.092 0.067 -0.374*** 0.085 
25260 Hanford-Corcoran, CA 184 -0.146 0.207 -0.304 0.120 
25420 Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 888 -0.425*** 0.050 -0.418*** 0.051 
25500 Harrisonburg, VA 200 -0.414*** 0.090 -0.359** 0.086 
25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 2,216 -0.282*** 0.039 -0.338*** 0.031 
25620 Hattiesburg, MS 200 -0.337** 0.083 0.003 0.184 
25860 Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC 544 -0.152 0.051 -0.387*** 0.064 
25980 Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA 88 0.037 0.071 -0.217 0.114 
26180 Honolulu, HI 1,552 -0.061 0.017 -0.027 0.012 
26300 Hot Springs, AR 152 -0.231** 0.059 -0.323 0.095 
26380 Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux, LA 328 -0.097 0.044 0.102 0.149 
26420 Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 7,048 -0.395*** 0.044 -0.588*** 0.032 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
26580 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 600 -0.175 0.057 -0.338 0.110 
26620 Huntsville, AL 688 -0.094 0.063 -0.512*** 0.087 
26820 Idaho Falls, ID 208 -0.258 0.071 -0.410*** 0.086 
26900 Indianapolis, IN 2,512 -0.537*** 0.031 -0.782*** 0.064 
26980 Iowa City, IA 216 -0.163 0.098 -0.156 0.057 
27060 Ithaca, NY 184 -0.152 0.064 -0.214 0.141 
27100 Jackson, MI 288 -0.309*** 0.065 -0.488*** 0.071 
27140 Jackson, MS 920 -0.191* 0.051 0.294 0.123 
27180 Jackson, TN 240 -0.211 0.105 -0.348 0.096 
27260 Jacksonville, FL 1,608 -0.416*** 0.050 -0.585*** 0.054 
27340 Jacksonville, NC 200 -0.121** 0.028 -0.287*** 0.042 
27500 Janesville, WI 288 -0.246*** 0.038 -0.378*** 0.051 
27620 Jefferson City, MO 240 -0.348*** 0.047 -0.525*** 0. 098 
27740 Johnson City, TN 304 -0.211 0.069 -0.345*** 0.078 
27780 Johnstown, PA 384 -0.201* 0.054 -0.155 0.119 
27860 Jonesboro, AR 160 -0.507** 0.124 -1.549** 0.375 
27900 Joplin, MO 256 -0.386*** 0.056 -0.466** 0.116 
28020 Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 608 -0.236 0.069 -0.461*** 0.059 
28100 Kankakee-Bradley, IL 208 -0.166 0.066 -0.422** 0.100 
28140 Kansas City, MO-KS 4,000 -0.358*** 0.044 -0.548*** 0.033 
28420 Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA 288 -0.599*** 0.136 -0.758*** 0.137 
28660 Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX 496 -0.099 0.116 -0.206 0.085 
28700 Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA 520 -0.134 0.052 -0.349*** 0.064 
28740 Kingston, NY 392 -0.200** 0.052 -0.293** 0.069 
28940 Knoxville, TN 1,008 -0.358*** 0.046 -0.357*** 0.049 
29020 Kokomo, IN 192 -0.310*** 0.071 0.000 0.204 
29100 La Crosse, WI-MN 240 -0.151** 0.036 -0.152 0.073 
29140 Lafayette, IN 352 -0.278 0.082 -0.612*** 0.142 
29180 Lafayette, LA 400 -0.122*** 0.028 -0.334 0.091 
29340 Lake Charles, LA 344 -0.342*** 0.042 -0.445*** 0.072 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
29460 Lakeland, FL 872 -0.358 0.109 -0.836*** 0.131 
29540 Lancaster, PA 752 -0.586 0.182 -0.396*** 0.065 
29620 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 888 -0.280*** 0.042 -0.334*** 0.043 
29700 Laredo, TX 256 -0.719*** 0.160 -0.721** 0.170 
29740 Las Cruces, NM 248 -0.673*** 0.121 -1.329*** 0.218 
29820 Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 2,728 -0.679*** 0.141 -1.216*** 0.092 
29940 Lawrence, KS 168 -0.378*** 0.077 -0.642** 0.159 
30020 Lawton, OK 232 -0.428*** 0.081 -0.298 0.121 
30140 Lebanon, PA 232 -0.171 0.055 -0.190 0.083 
30300 Lewiston, ID-WA 128 -0.152 0.066 -0.269 0.151 
30340 Lewiston-Auburn, ME 224 -0.260 0.087 -0.271 0.122 
30460 Lexington-Fayette, KY 752 -0.273*** 0.049 -0.640*** 0.073 
30620 Lima, OH 272 -0.109 0.040 -0.288 0.118 
30700 Lincoln, NE 488 -0.528*** 0.037 -0.476*** 0.067 
30780 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 1,168 -0.357*** 0.051 -0.610*** 0.077 
30860 Logan, UT-ID 184 -0.155 0.112 0.181 0.120 
30980 Longview, TX 336 -0.146 0.056 -0.564*** 0.090 
31020 Longview, WA 168 -0.037 0.087 -0.352*** 0.072 
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 20,712 0.068 0.065 -0.540*** 0.030 
31140 Louisville, KY-IN 2,128 -0.357*** 0.032 -0.509*** 0.042 
31180 Lubbock, TX 504 -0.499 0.222 -0.391 0.213 
31340 Lynchburg, VA 440 -0.255*** 0.056 -0.262*** 0.058 
31420 Macon, GA 416 -0.296*** 0.066 -0.554*** 0.071 
31460 Madera, CA 152 -0.542 0.251 -0.825*** 0.187 
31540 Madison, WI 864 -0.174*** 0.027 -0.259*** 0.025 
31700 Manchester-Nashua, NH 648 -0.468*** 0.039 -0.512*** 0.039 
31900 Mansfield, OH 256 -0.208*** 0.046 -0.440*** 0.102 
32580 McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX 640 -0.323*** 0.058 -0.656*** 0.095 
32780 Medford, OR 288 -0.059 0.176 -1.012*** 0.126 
32820 Memphis, TN-MS-AR 2,224 -0.355*** 0.055 -0.510*** 0.052 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
1
4
5
 
  
 
APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
32900 Merced, CA 376 -0.212 0.293 -1.143*** 0.225 
33100 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 7,080 -0.365*** 0.040 -0.611*** 0.043 
33140 Michigan City-La Porte, IN 232 -0.367*** 0.082 -0.347 0.176 
33260 Midland, TX 208 -0.442 0.143 -0.299 0.158 
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 3,272 -0.189*** 0.015 -0.368*** 0.021 
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 5,920 -0.472*** 0.022 -0.826*** 0.029 
33540 Missoula, MT 152 -0.389 0.138 -0.500* 0.131 
33660 Mobile, AL 888 -0.269*** 0.046 -0.261* 0.069 
33700 Modesto, CA 712 0.077 0.187 -1.210*** 0.135 
33740 Monroe, LA 376 -0.294*** 0.038 -0.584*** 0.133 
33780 Monroe, MI 304 -0.333*** 0.065 -0.360*** 0.059 
33860 Montgomery, AL 652 -0.172** 0.043 -0.222 0.074 
34060 Morgantown, WV 232 -0.085 0.084 -0.426 0.120 
34100 Morristown, TN 200 -0.163 0.083 -0.275 0.102 
34580 Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA 216 -0.263 0.100 -0.381** 0.089 
34620 Muncie, IN 232 -0.419*** 0.097 -0.696** 0.174 
34740 Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI 352 -0.413*** 0.082 -0.538*** 0.084 
34820 Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC 344 -0.587*** 0.078 -0.847*** 0.104 
34900 Napa, CA 208 0.250 0.282 -0.469** 0.118 
34940 Naples-Marco Island, FL 416 -0.609 0.193 -0.774*** 0.146 
34980 Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro, TN 2,096 -0.294*** 0.065 -0.528*** 0.048 
35300 New Haven-Milford, CT 1,464 -0.294*** 0.034 -0.400*** 0.033 
35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 1,900 -0.133 0.052 0.092 0.117 
35620 York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 34,712 -0.273*** 0.014 -0.515*** 0.013 
35660 Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 384 -0.319*** 0.060 -0.499*** 0.090 
35980 Norwich-New London, CT 496 -0.281*** 0.058 -0.369*** 0.057 
36100 Ocala, FL 368 -0.233 0.100 -0.545 0.169 
36140 Ocean City, NJ 192 -0.160 0.078 -0.254 0.163 
36220 Odessa, TX 232 -0.714*** 0.102 -0.788*** 0.143 
36260 Ogden-Clearfield, UT 736 -0.270*** 0.053 -0.355*** 0.050 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
36420 Oklahoma City, OK 2,624 -0.480*** 0.036 -0.574*** 0.047 
36500 Olympia, WA 272 0.027 0.129 -0.423*** 0.093 
36540 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 1,880 -0.763*** 0.063 -0.876*** 0.072 
36740 Orlando, FL 2,624 -0.806*** 0.074 -1.198*** 0.111 
36780 Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 304 -0.134 0.045 -0.518*** 0.073 
36980 Owensboro, KY 240 -0.270 0.081 -0.316 0.171 
37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 1,232 -0.046 0.273 -0.524*** 0.061 
37340 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 728 -0.607*** 0.074 -0.899*** 0.105 
37460 Panama City-Lynn Haven, FL 232 -0.390** 0.095 -0.334 0.147 
37620 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 368 -0.243** 0.057 0.046 0.124 
37700 Pascagoula, MS 256 -0.041 0.068 -0.396 0. 194 
37860 Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 608 -0.274 0.081 -0.251 0.079 
37900 Peoria, IL 752 -0.262*** 0.038 -0.381*** 0.058 
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 11,488 -0.530*** 0.017 -0.457*** 0.020 
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 5,480 -0.163 0.170 -1.165*** 0.110 
38220 Pine Bluff, AR 256 -0.495*** 0.064 0.226 0.219 
38300 Pittsburgh, PA 5,720 -0.291*** 0.021 -0.480*** 0.022 
38340 Pittsfield, MA 312 0.035 0.049 -0.151 0.049 
38540 Pocatello, ID 192 -0.353*** 0.060 -0.439* 0.116 
38860 Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 864 -0.211*** 0.032 -0.281*** 0.033 
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 3,392 -0.279*** 0.036 -0.511*** 0.025 
38940 Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL 480 -1.076*** 0.241 -2.389*** 0.466 
39100 Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 1,024 -0.311*** 0.035 -0.406*** 0.041 
39140 Prescott, AZ 200 -0.282 0.096 -0.625*** 0.109 
39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 2,768 -0.353*** 0.030 -0.417*** 0.022 
39340 Provo-Orem, UT 648 -0.176 0.098 -0.351*** 0.056 
39380 Pueblo, CO 392 -0.393*** 0.060 -0.459*** 0.060 
39460 Punta Gorda, FL 184 -0.473*** 0.097 -0.497* 0.132 
39540 Racine, WI 312 -0.219* 0.059 -0.334* 0.087 
39580 Raleigh-Cary, NC 1,016 -0.257*** 0.051 -0.507*** 0.067 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
39660 Rapid City, SD 192 -0.215*** 0.048 -0.200 0.062 
39740 Reading, PA 656 -0.478*** 0.055 -0.574*** 0.082 
39820 Redding, CA 264 0.027 0.187 -0.397 0.117 
39900 Reno-Sparks, NV 552 -0.399 0.215 -1.264*** 0.165 
40060 Richmond, VA 2,200 -0.605*** 0.046 -0.554*** 0.039 
40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 4,656 0.455 0.126 -1.049*** 0.066 
40220 Roanoke, VA 464 -0.471*** 0.075 -0.315** 0.079 
40340 Rochester, MN 352 -0.250 0.076 -0.447** 0.111 
40380 Rochester, NY 1,976 -0.481*** 0.031 -0.545*** 0.058 
40420 Rockford, IL 656 -0.208*** 0.048 -0.411*** 0.063 
40580 Rocky Mount, NC 256 0.001 0.055 -0.303 0.093 
40660 Rome, GA 160 -0.249 0.108 0.065 0.207 
40900 Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 3,200 0.004 0.079 -0.830*** 0.059 
40980 Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 448 -0.445*** 0.066 -0.413*** 0.080 
41060 St. Cloud, MN 272 -0.330*** 0.072 -1.020*** 0.115 
41100 St. George, UT 144 -0.398 0.214 -0.375 0.269 
41140 St. Joseph, MO-KS 280 -0.327*** 0.075 -0.408*** 0.084 
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL 4,400 -0.376*** 0.024 -0.586*** 0.023 
41420 Salem, OR 504 -0.312*** 0.065 -0.558*** 0.049 
41500 Salinas, CA 648 0.017 0.136 -0.691*** 0.089 
41540 Salisbury, MD 184 -0.326 0.105 -0.290 0.097 
41620 Salt Lake City, UT 1,632 -0.256*** 0.057 -0.521*** 0.059 
41660 San Angelo, TX 184 -0.330 0.093 -0.498 0.173 
41700 San Antonio, TX 2,600 -0.446*** 0.057 -0.591*** 0.049 
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 4,760 -0.017 0.070 -0.243 0.093 
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 6,920 0.149 0.109 -0.482*** 0.055 
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 2,760 0.305 0.125 -0.219*** 0.049 
42020 San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA 344 0.172 0.146 -0.417* 0.111 
42060 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 680 -0.102 0.211 -1.047*** 0.242 
42100 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 416 -0.340 0.133 -0.688*** 0.129 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   
PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
42140 Santa Fe, NM 288 -0.162 0.084 -0.496*** 0.071 
42220 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 688 -0.070 0.103 -0.308*** 0.064 
42260 Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL 1,144 -0.234 0.093 -1.037*** 0.133 
42340 Savannah, GA 584 -0.253 0.090 -0.355*** 0.058 
42540 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA 1,344 -0.284*** 0.029 -0.445*** 0.067 
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 5,296 -0.309*** 0.031 -0.387*** 0.020 
43100 Sheboygan, WI 192 -0.102 0.045 -0.408*** 0.068 
43300 Sherman-Denison, TX 208 -0.277 0.109 -0.291 0.090 
43340 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 704 -0.379*** 0.038 -0.523*** 0.065 
43580 Sioux City, IA-NE-SD 288 -0.570*** 0.049 -0.575** 0.146 
43620 Sioux Falls, SD 296 -0.588*** 0.059 -0.701** 0.166 
43780 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 672 -0.351*** 0.040 -0.651*** 0.107 
43900 Spartanburg, SC 400 -0.119 0.052 -0.422*** 0.080 
44060 Spokane, WA 840 -0.511*** 0.036 -0.515*** 0.057 
44100 Springfield, IL 432 -0.316*** 0.046 -0.238 0.066 
44140 Springfield, MA 1,088 -0.398*** 0.045 -0.469*** 0.045 
44180 Springfield, MO 656 -0.300* 0.081 -0.422*** 0.075 
44220 Springfield, OH 344 -0.106 0.079 -0.500*** 0.111 
44300 State College, PA 216 -0.152 0.047 -0.310*** 0.062 
44700 Stockton, CA 968 0.103 0.157 -0.753*** 0.074 
44940 Sumter, SC 176 -0.374*** 0.076 -0.309 0.122 
45060 Syracuse, NY 1,504 -0.283*** 0.051 -0.397*** 0.064 
45220 Tallahassee, FL 496 -0.352*** 0.074 -0.473*** 0.072 
45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 4,368 -0.407*** 0.046 -0.824*** 0.050 
45460 Terre Haute, IN 352 -0.341*** 0.062 -0.114 0.139 
45500 Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 208 -0.263 0.088 -0.357 0.140 
45780 Toledo, OH 1,376 -0.400*** 0.024 -0.666*** 0.053 
45820 Topeka, KS 432 -0.382*** 0.053 -0.813*** 0.069 
45940 Trenton-Ewing, NJ 576 -0.449*** 0.057 -0.449*** 0.067 
46060 Tucson, AZ 1,568 -0.558*** 0.132 -0.980*** 0.092 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction). 
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APPENDIX A. METROPOLITAN AREA ESTIMATED SUBSTITUTION COEFFICIENTS (CONTINUED) 
   PMI CES 
CBSA Name N Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
46140 Tulsa, OK 2,112 -0.376*** 0.049 -0.588*** 0.054 
46220 Tuscaloosa, AL 432 -0.141 0.070 -0.672*** 0.085 
46340 Tyler, TX 288 -0.169 0.088 -0.322*** 0.055 
46540 Utica-Rome, NY 712 -0.154 0.045 -0.168 0.094 
46660 Valdosta, GA 280 -0.123 0.080 -0.376 0.139 
46700 Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 632 0.494 0.165 -0.892*** 0.082 
46940 Vero Beach, FL 184 -0.423 0.156 -0.690 0.236 
47020 Victoria, TX 224 -0.177 0.114 -0.449** 0.107 
47220 Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 248 -0.549*** 0.092 -0.683** 0.170 
47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 2,848 -0.414*** 0.035 -0.413*** 0.029 
47300 Visalia-Porterville, CA 600 -0.420 0.184 -0.692*** 0.131 
47380 Waco, TX 392 -0.420 0.120 -0.651*** 0.133 
47580 Warner Robins, GA 152 -0.448** 0.103 -0.535*** 0.097 
47900 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 7,984 -0.542*** 0.036 -0.712*** 0. 022 
47940 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 392 -0.415*** 0.071 -0.761*** 0.116 
48140 Wausau, WI 216 -0.104 0.049 -0.184 0.073 
48260 Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH 312 -0.258*** 0.051 -0.087 0.131 
48300 Wenatchee, WA 160 -0.260 0.085 -0.154 0.063 
48540 Wheeling, WV-OH 384 -0.255*** 0.047 -0.482*** 0.106 
48620 Wichita, KS 1,144 -0.245*** 0.034 -0.474*** 0.057 
48660 Wichita Falls, TX 320 -0.222 0.067 -0.713*** 0.120 
48700 Williamsport, PA 216 -0.339*** 0.074 -0.611*** 0.125 
48900 Wilmington, NC 384 -0.145 0.082 -0.239 0.074 
49020 Winchester, VA-WV 168 -0.847*** 0.149 -0.689*** 0.087 
49180 Winston-Salem, NC 776 -0.346** 0.084 -0.592*** 0.095 
49340 Worcester, MA 1,288 -0.304*** 0.032 -0.364*** 0.024 
49420 Yakima, WA 272 -0.396** 0.094 -0.152 0.090 
49620 York-Hanover, PA 656 -0.332*** 0.052 -0.454*** 0.046 
49660 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 1,320 -0.310*** 0.032 -0.498*** 0.044 
49700 Yuba City, CA 232 0.469 0.290 -0.646* 0.169 
49740 Yuma, AZ 256 -0.672* 0.179 -1.137*** 0.245 
Statistically significant at *10% level **5% level ***1% level (Bonferroni correction).
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APPENDIX B. METROPOLITAN AREAS AND DIVISIONS SAMPLES 
“Rust” Housing Markets 
Akron, OH 
Anderson, IN 
Ann Arbor, MI 
Battle Creek MI 
Bay City, MI 
Canton-Massillon, OH 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 
Dayton, OH 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 
Flint, MI 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 
Greeley, CO 
Holland-Grand Haven, MI 
Jackson, MI 
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 
Kokomo, IN 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 
Mansfield, OH 
Monroe, MI 
Munci, IN 
Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI 
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 
Sandusky, OH 
Springfield, OH 
Toldeo, OH 
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy, MI 
Younsgtown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 
 
“Bubble” Housing Markets 
Bakersfield, CA 
Bend, OR 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 
Carson City, NV 
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 
El Centro, CA 
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL 
Fresno, CA 
Hanford-Corcoran, CA 
Lake Havasu City-Kingman, AZ 
Lakeland, FL 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 
Madera, CA 
Merced, CA 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 
Modesto, CA 
Naples-Marco Island, FL 
Ocala, FL 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 
Palm Coast, FL 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 
Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL 
Prescott, AZ 
Punta Gorda, FL 
Reno-Sparks, NV 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 
Salinas, CA 
Sarasota-Brandenton-Venice, FL 
Stockton, CA 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 
Vero Beach, FL 
Visalia-Porterville 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL 
Yuba City, CA 
Yuma, AZ 
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